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Recent developments in network theory have provided new avenues for studying the
spread of disease within populations. However, there is a need to develop dynamic
generative models of networks that can capture the dynamic nature of many real-
world systems that typical models cannot account for.
Models of the spread of livestock disease have frequently employed traditional net-
work approaches, but with the availability of highly detailed animal movement
datasets, there is unprecedented scope to develop generative models of livestock
trade parameterised by these data and exploring the spread of disease modulated
by trade. Livestock diseases incur significant financial burdens on farms and gov-
ernments, and the presence of disease remains a constant issue, so developing new
insights and novel control strategies is vital.
Analytically tractable generative models of livestock trade, parameterised to the
Scottish cattle trading system, are developed, incorporating dynamics such as time-
varying trading partnerships that, to date, have not been accounted for. Expressions
for the basic reproduction number R0 are obtained and manipulations to trading be-
haviour are shown to reduce R0 while maintaining farm business requirements.
Extended models, accounting for time-varying trading behaviours, are developed.
Individual-based adaptation in response to changes in trading propensities is shown
to mitigate the prevalence reducing potential of such changes, highlighting the need
to account for behavioural responses when modelling disease spread. Typical disease
control measures, such as post-movement testing and risk aversion are shown to be
effective in controlling disease, but can perturb the trading system. When parame-
terised to the Scottish cattle trade system, the impact of these control measures on
prevalence is explored.
The models presented here are a first attempt at analysing trade and its effect on dis-
ease spread at a national scale for a highly heterogeneous system using a generative
network modelling approach, and can be extended to other real-world systems.
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The recent development of network theory has provided an effective framework for
modelling the spread of disease within populations that exhibit heterogeneous con-
tact patterns that are challenging (or impossible) to account for in traditional models
of disease spread. Despite these developments, models of disease spread on highly
dynamic and temporal networks are currently lacking, and the analysis of genera-
tive temporal networks (in which networks grow and develop based on individual-
or system-level properties) is a promising avenue of study that may provide novel
insight on disease spread within populations.
The spread of disease within livestock trading networks act as an ideal case study for
the development and analysis of generative network models, due to the availability
of long-term, highly detailed datasets in which the movements of individual animals
between premises are recorded. The UK cattle tracing system (CTS) dataset is
an example of one such dataset. This thesis is concerned with the development of
novel generative trading models, and the analysis of the spread of disease modulated
through trades between individuals, using the Scottish subset of the CTS dataset
as a case study throughout. The models presented in this thesis are not confined to
livestock trade, and may be adapted and applied to a number of dynamic network
systems, such as the spread of computer viruses, or the spread of human diseases.
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1.1 Livestock diseases within cattle herds
The maintenance and control of livestock diseases within cattle herds has been a
constant issue for farmers and governments for a number of years. Since the be-
ginning of the 21st century, there have already been a number of disease outbreaks
within the UK, the most notable the 2001 Foot-and-Mouth disease (FMD) epidemic
[45, 80]. Not only are there significant production costs due to the debilitating ef-
fects of these diseases [12, 68, 75, 102], there are harder to quantify impacts such
as on farmers’ emotional well-being [86] and public perception and trust of govern-
ments’ handling of disease outbreaks [54, 105]. Thus controlling infectious diseases
is of vital importance not only from a financial perspective, but from an ethical and
welfare perspective too.
Below we give examples of some livestock diseases that are currently of national
and international importance. We consider two endemic diseases (diseases that are
persistent within farms and incur long-term financial burdens), Bovine Tuberculosis
and Paratuberculosis, and an exotic epidemic disease (within the UK), Foot and
Mouth disease.
1.1.1 Bovine Tuberculosis
Bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) is an endemic disease in cattle that is acquired via in-
fection by the bacterium Mycobacterium bovis through close animal contacts [104],
and has been estimated to cost the UK annually £100 million [4]. At a farm level,
analysis has revealed that annual costs to individual farms in the UK due to the
management of bTB are in the range of £505 to £3184, with the variation due to a
number of factors, such as herd demographics [17]. Due to its impact on trade, the
EU introduced legislation characterising nations as officially tuberculosis free if the
national herd prevalence did not increase by more than 0.1% per year for six years
[49]. A number of mainland EU states have achieved officially tuberculosis free sta-
tus, including, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, France, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Austria, Slovakia, Finland, and Sweden [49], with states such as Italy
that are not yet officially tuberculosis free observing general downward trends in
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prevalence [1, 110].
Conspicuously, the UK has not achieved officially tuberculosis free status, with be-
tween herd prevalence estimated at 5-6% in 2009 [4]. Moreover, trends of bTB
prevalence in the UK have indicated that prevalence levels have been increasing
consistently, with the exception of Scotland which has been officially tuberculosis
free for a number of years [2]. There have been a number of suggested reasons why
the UK has not been able to eradicate bTB, while other EU member states have.
Perhaps most notably, the 2001 FMD epidemic lead to widespread disruption in
bTB testing [2], and atypical animal movement dynamics following the outbreak
due to replenishment of stock have altered the risk factors for bTB introduction in
British farms [19, 116]. Moreover, there has been a general tendency for farms to
consolidate and increase their herd sizes [2], contributing to the persistence of bTB
due to herd size being a risk factor in bTB spread [16]. Another contributing factor
is the presence of susceptible wildlife that have been suggested as environmental
reservoirs of bTB, most notably badgers [103]. While the interactions between bad-
gers and livestock are not fully understood, there is evidence that close proximity
to an infected badger sett increases the herd-level risk of infection [82]. As the UK
has higher badger density than mainland Europe [18], and with the badger popula-
tion increasing over the years [61], attempts have been made to control the badger
population in an effort to minimise bTB spread, for example through culling. Ran-
domised badger culls have had mixed effects, with reduction in cattle bTB observed
within the cull areas, but increased bTB observed in areas outside the cull areas [32].
However, despite these results culling has continued for many years. While there are
trade links between Scotland and high prevalence areas of the rest of the UK, the
use of pre- and post-movement testing has been an effective deterrent in the spread
of bTB to Scotland from the rest of the UK [44]. This, combined with lower badger
[61] and cattle densities (at herd level) [2], have been suggested as reasons for why
Scotland has managed to remain officially tuberculosis free.
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1.1.2 Paratuberculosis
Paratuberculosis (paraTB), also known as Johne’s disease, is an endemic disease in
cattle caused by the bacterium Mycobacterium avium subsp. paratuberculosis, linked
to Crohn’s disease in humans, and is often acquired by the faecal-oral route [108]. It
is known to persist for long periods of time within the environment under the right
conditions, making controlling this disease a challenge [121]. There is an economic
incentive to control the disease, with losses due to reduced milk production and
weight loss reducing slaughter value [12, 75, 107]. It has been estimated that annual
losses per cow in the UK due to paraTB are £27 for dairy cattle [75] and £16 for
beef cattle due to weight loss [53]. Control of the disease can be challenging owing
to a long incubation period, allowing for unknowing disease spread and late-time
detection [122, 123]. In addition, sensitivities of animal tests have a large degree
of variation, resulting in failed detections of infected animals [60, 93, 120]. The
potential role of rabbits in the spread and maintenance of paraTB is also not fully
understood, however the presence of paraTB in rabbits has been observed in excreta,
allowing for the possibility of grazing animals to ingest and become infected [23, 24].
Investigations into whether paraTB could be controlled via the culling of rabbits
revealed that very high levels of culling (>90%) for a single cull and >40% for
repeated long-term culling would be necessary to effectively control paraTB within
the rabbit population [26].
The importance of controlling paraTB is not universally recognised, resulting in
further challenges to effectively controlling the disease. International survey studies
have found differing opinions on control programmes intended to reduce paraTB
incidence, with those in favour citing animal health and reductions in production
losses the primary reasons. Conversely, those not in favour of control programmes
cite economic concerns, other diseases are of greater importance, and paraTB is
not prevalent enough to be of concern [123]. Bulk milk tank samples of randomly
selected dairy farms have provided estimates for herd-level prevalence of paraTB in
Britain, finding approximately 68% of dairy farms to be classed as infected [112].
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1.1.3 Foot-and-Mouth Disease
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease that was once
endemic to Britain, though is now considered an epidemic disease [70], however re-
mains an endemic disease in many countries around the world [123]. Understanding
the spread of FMD has become vitally important in the wake of the 2001 UK FMD
epidemic, and has clearly highlighted the role of animal movements in the ability for
disease to spread [51]. The epidemic was largely attributed initially to sheep move-
ments to market, which seeded infection in other animals (including cattle) and lead
to long-range disease dispersal, after which localised spreading was responsible for
the majority of cases [45]. Upon detection of the disease, nationwide movement
restrictions were imposed and premises suspected of being infected were subject to
herd culling. As a result, approximately 10 million animals were slaughtered and
estimated costs to the UK agricultural industry due to these stock losses has been
calculated at around £3.1 billion [116]. There were other losses, not directly re-
lated to agriculture, such as to tourism due to the closing of the British countryside,
amounting to approximately £3.2 billion [45]. Moreover, the management of the
outbreak has been criticised due to the government’s policy of slaughtering herds
deemed at risk of being infected [105] and subsequent analysis has shown that more
targeted culling strategies may have been more effective with less financial impact
[64], although the control strategies employed during the outbreak were based on
predictions of mathematical models [67].
Another FMD outbreak occurred in August 2007, though the impact was far less
severe than the previous 2001 epidemic. This was due to a number of factors,
including rapid detection of infected animals, and an immediate national restriction
of livestock movements [7]. Another key factor was the timing of the outbreak, as the
2001 epidemic began in springtime, a period of the year in which animal movements
are at their peak [45]. In total, 2160 animals were slaughtered in the 2007 outbreak
and total costs to the UK were estimated to be £147 million [7].
The FMD outbreaks in the UK provide a clear example of the significant im-
pact livestock diseases can have on animal health, economies, and disruption to
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farm businesses. Moreover, the complex nature of trade influences the success of
widespread infection (without animal movements, the 2001 FMD epidemic would
not have achieved such widespread distribution [64]), highlighting the importance
of understanding the demographics of animal movements in an attempt to control
disease spread.
1.2 Demographics of livestock movements
The availability of large scale livestock movement databases allow for detailed anal-
ysis of the demography of livestock and livestock movements. An example of such a
dataset in UK cattle trade is the Cattle Tracing System (CTS) data, which uniquely
identifies premises and animals, as well as recording individual animal movements,
and births and deaths at a daily timescale [113]. Analysis of this data for the years
following the 2001 FMD outbreak revealed that the trend of movement character-
istic within the UK were moving in directions speculated to permit greater disease
persistence [109]. Simulation based studies have produced similar results, suggesting
that the introduction of movement standstills following the 2001 FMD epidemic have
altered the livestock trading system in ways that may lead to greater disease persis-
tence [115]. More longer-term analyses, however, have shown that these trends have
generally stabilised since 2005 and the UK cattle trading system has not significantly
altered in recent years [38, 113].
An observed distributional property of the UK cattle trading system is that of so-
called scale-free (or scale-free like) behaviour, in particular for the number of farms
from whom and to whom a farm buys and sells animals annually [22, 38, 46]. Such
distributions, also known as Power-Laws, frequently occur throughout nature and are
characterised by long-tails, with the vast majority of individuals possessing few con-
tacts, and a small fraction possessing disproportionately larger numbers of contacts
[91]. However, it should be noted that in the real world, such scale-free properties are
always subject to some cut-off due to system size. Furthermore, some authors dis-
pute whether or not observed phenomena are truly scale-free or in fact deviate from
true scale-free processes [33]. Nonetheless, scale-free like, or approximately scale-
33
free, phenomena are widely observed in many varied phenomena in the natural and
human world. In the context of livestock trading, most farms buy a small number of
animals, but a small number of farms buy a very large number of animals. Similarly,
the vast majority of farms sell only a small number of animals with a small minority
selling very large numbers. In terms of connectivity in the trade system, this means
that a small number of farms play a major role. Such characteristics have also been
observed in livestock trading systems of countries other than the UK [71, 76, 101].
Farms display some habitual trading behaviour in terms of from whom or to whom
animals are bought or sold. While some trade partnerships persist, with repeated
trades between buyers and sellers, the majority of movements (60%) are between
farms that have never traded before and will not trade again. Approximately 33% of
movements are the result of repeat trades in partnerships that have traded between
2 and 10 times [113].
Seasonal trading patterns are clearly evident in the UK cattle trading system, with
defined peaks in April and October, corresponding to peaks in births in April, and
movements to slaughter in October [84, 113]. As evidenced by the 2001 FMD epi-
demic, springtime movements were a key component in the initial spread of disease
[45]. Seasonal trading patterns are examples of episodic or “bursty” activity; move-
ments occur in concentrated bursts followed by periods of low activity [11]. Such
activity patterns have been studied in the context of disease spread and have been
found to alter the spreading capability of disease, slowing disease spread [78].
The UK cattle trading system is also characterised by the presence of livestock
markets. These premises are generally small in number (617 in the UK compared
with 138640 total premises) but are responsible for a significant number of animal
movements [113]. This is in part because they enable trade between farms that
may not otherwise be possible via direct movements, resulting in animal movements
over distances that are disproportionately larger than typical direct farm-to-farm
movements [84]. This role of markets was evident during the 2001 FMD epidemic,
with initial market movements seeding infection into geographical locations that
may not have otherwise been infected [45]. Analysis of contact chains in the UK
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cattle trading system reveals the role of markets in connecting individual farms to
many others, leading to very large contact chains, and geographically distant farms
being connected by a few intermediate animal holdings [38].
The UK cattle trading system is highly complex and heterogeneous, with farms
trading in different manners individually and over time. Accounting for disease
spread on these systems is therefore a challenge and a theoretical framework that
allows for individual heterogeneity would help in assessing the spread of disease on
these complex systems. In the next section we give an outline of networks that have
the potential of allowing for theoretical considerations of disease spread on livestock
trading systems.
1.3 Networks
Farms in cattle trade systems do not trade uniformly with every other farm. More-
over, most farms are generally limited to a few contacts with a small number of
farms in a given year [113], and farms may maintain trade relationships with spe-
cific farms over long periods. Mathematical models, therefore, should account for
this heterogeneity in contact patterns, and the recent development of network the-
ory has provided an avenue to do so [90]. A network, or graph, consists of nodes
(representing individuals in a population or farm premises, for example) and edges
connecting nodes that represent contacts or partnerships between nodes, where edges
can be undirected (indicating a two-way relationship between nodes) or directed (an
edge emanating from one node i to another j indicates the presence of a relationship
from i to j, but not necessarily from j to i) [90]. Two common representations of
systems in a network framework are described below.
1.3.1 Static networks
The static network is a network in which nodes and edges are permanent and non-
changing. In static networks, the network can be characterised by the adjacency
matrix, A, whose elements indicate the presence of edges in the network. For an
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undirected network, the element Aij indicates the presence of an edge between i and
j (and so Aij = Aji) and takes value 1 if there is an edge and 0 otherwise (weighted
edges, in which elements of the adjacency matrix can have values larger than 1, are an
extension that allow for greater characterisation of the importance of specific edges).
In directed networks Aij takes value 1 if there is a directed edge from i to j (so Aij
and Aji are not necessarily equal) and 0 otherwise [90]. The number of edges of a
node, called its degree for undirected networks, and in- and out-degree for directed
networks, representing the fact that nodes may not have equal numbers of edges
pointing at or emanating from them, can be distributed arbitrarily to form a so-
called degree distribution, the probability that a randomly chosen node has a given
number of edges [90]. Frequently in real-world networks, scale-free or Power-Law
distributions are observed, characterised by long tails in which most nodes have a
small degree, with a small number of nodes having a disproportionately larger degree
[91].
For networks with nontrivial degree distributions, questions arise over the role and
importance of specific nodes within the network. Measures from social network
analysis have been developed to answer these questions, and are collectively known as
centrality measures [50]. Node degree is a simple centrality measure, however a more
sophisticated centrality measure is the eigenvector centrality which measures nodes’
importance in connecting high degree nodes together. Distance-based centrality
measures are useful in assessing the ability for traversal across the network. The
closeness centrality measures the mean distance (shortest path) for a node i to reach
any other node j, whereas the betweenness centrality is the fraction of paths between
nodes that node i falls on and is a measure of the control of node i on network flow
(livestock, for instance) [50].
The components of a network measure the sizes of subsets of the network in which
nodes within the subset can all be reached [90]. In undirected networks, the largest
of these subsets is called the giant component. For directed networks, there is a giant
strongly connected component, the largest subset of the network in which a directed
path in both directions exists between every node pair (strongly connected), and a
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giant weakly connected component, the largest subset of the network in which the
directed nature of edges is ignored (weakly connected) [90].
1.3.2 Temporal networks
Temporal networks differ from static networks in one key component; nodes and/or
edges are not necessarily permanent, and can appear and disappear over time [57].
Individuals may cease contact with some and begin contact with others over time,
representing edge fluctuation, or new individuals may be born and old individuals
die, represent node appearance and disappearance. As with static networks, we can
define a time-dependent adjacency matrix A(t), whose elements, Aij(t), indicate
whether an edge (whether undirected or directed) is present at time t. The degree
of an individual, can then be defined as the at time t number of edges of the node.
Defining the degree distribution can be challenging due to the potential for the
temporal dynamics of the network to alter the distribution of edges according to
arbitrary rules, however attempts have been made to obtain analytical expressions
for degree distributions for temporally evolving networks [40].
Centrality measures on temporal networks can be hard to quantify owing to the time-
dependent nature of edges [57]. Attempts to generalise static centrality measures
to temporal networks has often involved aggregating the network into discrete time
steps, creating network snapshots in a given time interval, and calculating centralities
in successive time steps [57, 69]. Choosing an adequate time step, however, may be
challenging depending on the dynamic nature of the network [69].
Attempts to define temporal components in a network have been successful when
aggregating the network into a series of temporal snapshots. Components are then
defined for each temporal snapshot, with the temporal giant strongly connected
component being the largest set of nodes such that each node is strongly connected to
every other node at a given snapshot. Similarly, the temporal giant weakly connected
component is the largest set of nodes in which every node is weakly connected to the
other in a given snapshot [92]. Analysis of such temporal components has revealed
large fluctuations in component sizes over time that may not be observed in static
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networks [92].
Network models may therefore provide a useful framework for modelling livestock
trade, owing to its ability to characterise individuals according to arbitrary proper-
ties and account for temporal variation in trade dynamics. While temporal networks
provide a more realistic interpretation of real-world behaviour, there are few models
of temporal networks and there is a pressing need for the development of generative
models of temporal networks parameterised to real data so that characteristics of in-
dividuals are represented [57]. Attempting to address this issue is a critical aim/goal
of this thesis.
1.4 Modelling disease dynamics
1.4.1 Compartmental and mass action models
Characterising disease states of individuals into discrete compartments is a fre-
quently used and powerful tool in studying disease spread [8]. Epidemiological mod-
els of disease spread often reduce disease status to a number of key categories (e.g.
susceptible, infected, recovered) and explore how the mechanisms of disease spread
influence the transition of individuals between these categories. For simple disease
models, transitions between disease states occur according to rates (for example an
intrinsic rate of disease transmission β and rate of recovery from disease γ [8]), and
an assumed demographic structure of the population, the simplest being the mass
action assumption, whereby all individuals can come into contact with one another
at any given time, and contacts occur between individuals proportionately to the
density of individuals in each disease state [8].
Perhaps the simplest widely used compartmental model of disease spread is the SIR
model, in which individuals are characterised as either susceptible to infection (S),
currently infectious (I), or recovered from infection (R). Assuming the law of mass












This simple set of differential equations is nonetheless analytically intractable, i.e.
an explicit solution for each of the disease state densities cannot be obtained, due
to the nonlinear interaction terms. However, insightful information can be gleaned
from these models, notably the reproductive ratio of the disease, R0, defined as the
expected number of secondary cases caused by a single infectious individual in an






For deterministic systems, such as the simple SIR model above, the value of R0
determines absolutely the ability for disease to persist within the population. If
R0 < 1 then the disease is unable to persist and dies out, if R0 > 1 the disease will
spread exponentially (initially). The critical point R0 = 1 indicates the threshold
value at which point the disease stability switches [55]. Assessing the value of R0
is often used to inform forecasting and intervention strategies for disease control
[118]. The law of mass action is unrealistic, however, and the effects of host and
contact heterogeneity can have significant effects on disease spread [119]. The de-
velopment of network theory has allowed epidemiologists to analyse the spread of
disease within populations without requiring the mass action assumption and under
arbitrary connectivity and contact patterns.
1.4.2 Disease spread on networks
Attempts to assess the spread of disease on networks has currently been mostly
confined to static networks [10], though to great success. By assuming edges in
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a network are distributed according to some arbitrary degree distribution, it has
been shown that disease spread is significantly influenced by an individual’s degree,
with R0 explicitly linked to the degree distribution of the system [89] and that
disease can spread and persist within high degree nodes even if R0 < 1 [118]. In
terms of outbreaks, there is a clear link with outbreak sizes and the size of the
giant component, with nodes outside the giant component unable to cause large-
scale outbreaks, and the size of the outbreak is determined by the size of the giant
component for infectious individuals inside the giant component [89]. Modelling the
spread of disease on directed networks has been less frequent, however extensions
of disease spread to directed networks shows that success of the spread of disease is
influenced by the out component of the network [25], and models of semi-directed
networks (networks comprising of both undirected and directed edges) have shown
that epidemic thresholds are generally larger than for fully undirected networks
[77]. Of interest is disease spread on scale-free networks, due to their ubiquity in
real-world networks [91]. Significantly, it has been shown that for most real-world
networks that exhibit scale-free like properties, there is no epidemic threshold, and
disease can spread and persist even at low transmission rates [100]. An important
property relevant to disease control is the effect of immunisation strategies in scale-
free networks. In particular, it has been shown that random immunisation cannot
remove disease even at very high immunisation levels. On the other hand, targeted
immunisation of the most highly connected nodes is highly effective, with disease
eradication possible even at low immunisation levels [99].
Attempts to model disease spread on temporal networks have produced some suc-
cess. An example is the so-called neighbour exchange model [118, 119], in which
individuals possess a fixed degree following an arbitrary degree distribution, how-
ever edges in the network switch with some rate. This model, intended to reflect that
real-world network connections are not necessarily static, was successful in showing
that R0 was heavily influenced by the switching rate, indicating that static approx-
imations of dynamic networks may be inadequate [118]. The neighbour exchange
model was intended to complement a model of dynamic partnerships in which in-
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dividuals form and end partnerships with arbitrary rates, and importantly, without
the requirement that the degree of individuals was maintained [6]. By assuming
a tree-like network, expressions for R0 were obtained, highlighting the importance
of time-varying partnerships. Extending this model to heterogeneous populations is
covered in Chapter 2. A true, continuous time, analytically tractable network model
of disease spread that accounts for variable contact patterns as well as time-varying,
non-constrained, degree distributions appears to be lacking and is a fundamental
future challenge.
1.4.3 Stochastic simulation of disease processes
Deterministic models of disease spread are useful in analysing typical properties of
disease spread, such as long-run behaviour, however they do not necessarily account
for random variation (stochasticity) that is present in the real world. Inclusion
of stochasticity allows for random events that may hinder disease spread that a
deterministic model would not account for, and stochastic simulation of disease
outbreaks can more accurately capture the variability of a disease outbreak [65].
However, despite inclusion of stochasticity, typical system behaviour will closely
resemble deterministic models in many cases.
In general, the time-evolution of stochastic systems behave according to a random-
walk process and the state of the system at a point in time can be encapsulated by a
single equation, the so-called master equation [5]. Unfortunately, for most systems,
the master equation is analytically intractable, however the Gillespie Stochastic
Simulation Algorithm (Gillespie SSA) generates trajectories of the system that are
exact solutions of the master equation [47, 48]. Each trajectory represents a single
realisation of the stochastic process defining the system, and obtaining multiple
independent trajectories offers insight into average properties of the system, as well
as the variance (and covariation) due to stochasticity.
The SSA assumes Poissonian dynamics and relies on the memory-less property of
the exponential distribution to calculate the time jump between two events and also
what the next event is. Given a system of x possible events, and associated event
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rates Ek, k ∈ {1, . . . , x}, with E =
∑x
k=1Ek being the total event rate, the algorithm
behaves as follows:
1. Initialise the starting state of the system and set the time t = 0.
2. The time of the next event, t + ∆t, is calculated by generating a Uniform





3. The next event to occur is obtained by drawing a second Uniform random
number r2. Event k occurs if
x−1∑
k=1




4. Perform event k, and update the state of the system. Recalculate the event
rates of any events that were altered by event k. Set t→ t+ ∆t.
5. Repeat from Step 2 until either t > tmax, or some other criteria is met (such
as disease extinction).
As an example, consider the SIS disease model, in which susceptible individuals are
infected by infectious individuals with rate βSI, and remain infectious until they
recover and become susceptible again, which occurs with rate γ. Figure 1.1 com-
pares the behaviour of the deterministic and stochastic systems for a population of
N = 100 individuals, an initial state of S = 99 and I = 1 individuals, with disease
parameters β = 0.02 and γ = 0.2. Clearly the general behaviour of the two sys-
tems is similar, however due to stochasticity, for some realisations of the stochastic
model, there are varying times to reach equilibrium, and there is general variation
around the equilibrium. An important observation is that for some stochastic reali-
sations, the disease dies out, which is not permitted under the deterministic model
(as parameterised). Figure 1.2 shows that the disease behaves in two ways: either
the disease successfully spreads, in which case it reaches an equilibrium (with some
variation around the equilibrium), or it does not spread and dies out. These two
equilbria, the disease-free equilibrium and the endemic equilibrium, exist for the
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Figure 1.1: Time trajectories of the deterministic (left) and stochastic (right) SIS disease model.
1000 stochastic realisations are generated for using the Gillespie SSA.
deterministic model, however the disease-free equilibrium is unstable for the cho-
sen parameterisation (thus the disease always spreads and persists). It should be
noted that even in the persistent disease state, the stochastic system is only in very
long-lived metastable state and that ultimately stochastic extinction will occur [74].
1.5 Network-based approaches to modelling dis-
ease spread on livestock trading systems
There has been much work on understanding disease spread on livestock trading sys-
tems. A common approach is to make use of large-scale animal movement datasets
to recreate historic networks that match previously observed animal movements,
and overlay a simulated disease process. A crucial finding of such studies is the
identification of trading as a risk factor for introduction of disease into herds, for
example for bTB [39, 46, 98], paraTB [13, 71], and FMD [37, 51, 97]. The 2001
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of equilibrium disease prevalence for the stochastic SIS model.
FMD epidemic is an example of how disease can alter network structure and have
long-term consequences for disease control. Indeed, it has been shown through net-
work analysis that control measures, such as animal testing, as a consequence of the
FMD epidemic have altered trading behaviours in a way that increases the giant
strong component of the network and permits greater disease spread, highlighting
the complex nature of cattle trade and the challenges of modelling such systems
[109, 115]. As a result of FMD control strategies, the role of animal movements as
a risk factor for bTB spread has become more prominent [116].
Framing livestock trading in a network context has allowed for the exploration of the
effect of changes to the structure of the network on the spread of livestock disease. In
particular, exploitation of the highly heterogeneous and scale-free nature of livestock
trading networks has shown that rewiring trading connections between farms based
on network-level properties, such as centrality measures or by rewiring movements
away from certain holdings like markets, can significantly reduce disease prevalence
when targeted at a small number of farms [43, 85, 117]. In addition, effectively
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removing certain connections in the network has been shown to alter the structure
of the network and the size of the giant component in a way that may be effective
in reducing disease persistence [62, 63]. Targeted vaccination strategies, such as
based on farm size or other risk factors, may also potentially be an effective control
strategy in combating disease spread [64, 66].
An important consideration when modelling trade by recreating networks from his-
toric movement data is the temporal structure of the system. A general approach
to analysing livestock movements is to assume some temporal snapshotting of the
network, where connections between farms are static over some dicrete time period.
Analysing the timescale of snapshots on livestock trading networks has shown that
static network approximations hide important temporal characteristics of the real-
world system, such as centrality, hindering the efficacy of disease control strategies
[9]. For the UK network specifically, the importance of a dynamical network ap-
proach has been made clear, with static networks producing qualitatively different
disease spreading properties compared with more dynamic representations of the
network [114].
Models of disease spread that explicitly replicate observed animal movements are
able to illustrate the potential for disease spread and even possible control measures.
However, this is only in the historic context of past trading dynamics and it is
challenging to use such an approach to generalise farm trading behaviour to ask
“what if...” questions. Generative models that paramaterise a system at farm-level
from these movement datasets would be a powerful tool in exploring the role of
trade on disease spread while not being constrained to only replay past trading
events, and there is currently a pressing need for the development of generative
models of network dynamics in general [57]. Moreover, to date there have been few
attempts at designing generative models of cattle trade, however those models that
have been proposed have proved to be able to capture key system-wide properties
of the trading networks they represent, as well as providing new insights into the
role of trade on disease spread [58, 87]. In particular, manipulating the frequency of
trade and size of animal batches, while conserving animal flows, has been show to
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potentially reduce disease prevalence [87]. However, these models make a number
of simplifying assumptions, such as constant trading patterns, or even neglecting
trading relationships between farms, so there is scope for expanding these models
to provide greater insight on the role of trade on disease spread. The development
of more flexible and realistic generative models of network dynamics and disease
spread on them is the aim of this thesis.
1.6 The thesis
1.6.1 Aims
The general aim of this thesis is to develop highly dynamic generative models of
cattle trade that account for trading partnerships between farms and the movement
of animals that occur between trading partners. With application to disease spread,
this thesis aims to answer these questions: 1) can analytically tractable generative
models of livestock trade be developed that capture farm-level properties? 2) can
the dynamics of trade be exploited in such a way that disease persistence is reduced
while maintaining farm-level animal flows? 3) can these models be expanded to
account for time-varying farm-level stock quantities, dictating trading patterns? 4)
do changes to trade affect stock quantities to such an extent that the trading system
fundamentally changes? 5) under such scenarios, how does network adaptation
impact disease spread? 6) how do traditional disease control measures, such as
animal testing, impact the trading network, and how does that affect disease spread?
7) when applied to the Scottish cattle trade industry, do these results hold, and if
so can effective disease control strategies be proposed?
1.6.2 Thesis structure
Chapter 2 introduces a novel generative livestock trading model that accounts for
time-varying trading partnerships between farms. By considering the trading dy-
namics of farm pairs, per-farm expressions for R0 are obtained that highlight the im-
portant role of trade frequency, batch size, and the dynamics of trading partnerships
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on the ability for disease to spread and persist. This also shows that manipulation
of trading patterns while conserving farm-level animal flows can positively alter R0
such that disease is controlled. By parameterising this model to represent farms in
the Scottish cattle trade industry so that average farm-level quantities reflect obser-
vations and are maintained under putative changes to trade behaviour, the effect of
the above changes to trade are shown to be highly effective in reducing R0.
Chapter 3 expands the model of Chapter 2 by introducing dynamic, time-varying,
farm-level stock quantities that alter farms’ propensities to trade and form trading
partnerships at any given time. This reflects the idea that if a farm has just bought a
batch of animals, its propensity to do so will be lowered for some period of time. The
trading patterns are analysed and the effect of manipulations to trade similar to those
explored in Chapter 2 are shown to be ineffective except in extreme scenarios. This
difference results from the adaptive response of the system that leads to the network
structure dynamically changing so that farm flows are maintained. Animal testing
through trade is included and the effect of rejecting infected animals is shown to be
positive, reducing disease prevalence but has transitory (and sometimes permanent)
impacts on the trading sub-system. Linking testing to adaptive risk aversion, based
on local and global information, is shown to be an effective strategy in reducing
disease prevalence, and can eradicate disease in scenarios where testing alone is
insufficient.
Chapter 4 outlines the method of parameterising the dynamic trading model of
Chapter 3 to the Scottish cattle trade system, and the challenges that arise due
to the presence of time-varying stock quantities that are not observed in the data.
Successful parameterisations that successfully captures farm-level properties to large
degree are obtained, and the resulting parameterised system is explored. The pro-
posed disease control strategies explored in Chapter 3 are assessed on this real-world
parameterised system.




Generative models of network
dynamics provide insight into the
effects of trade on endemic
livestock disease
2.1 Introduction
The movement of animals via trade has long been considered a significant factor
in the spread of disease within livestock populations [37, 42, 46, 51, 71, 94, 98,
108]. For example, animal movements resulting from restocking following the 2001
Foot-and-Mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in Great Britain has been suggested as a
contributing factor to the subsequent surge in Bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) positive
farms [19, 116]. The 2001 FMD outbreak itself spread widely, via animal movements
[45], before detection led to national and international trade restrictions.
The contents of this chapter have been published in the journal Royal Society Open Science
under the title “Generative models of network dynamics provide insight into the effects of trade on
endemic livestock disease”[72]
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While exotic disease incursions like FMD in 2001 incur large costs over short timescales
(estimates for FMD 2001 include up to UK £3.1 billion for stock losses [116] and
£3.2 billion related to tourism [45]), many endemic diseases impact production year-
on-year. For example, paratuberculosis (paraTB) reduces milk production in dairy
cattle and causes weight loss affecting beef quality [12, 75, 107], and bovine viral
diarrhoea virus (BVDV ) often reduces fertility, animal growth, and milk production
[68]. These incur a significant cost to the agricultural industry (annually paraTB
is estimated to cost £0.8 million, BVDV £39.6 million, and bTB £29.7 million [4,
14]). Unfortunately, controlling such diseases is a challenge due to a number of
factors including animal movements, poorly understood transmission pathways (in
particular the role of wildlife, e.g. rabbits and badgers in the spread of paraTB and
bTB, respectively) [20, 24, 23, 30, 31, 52], long latent periods [123], and variable
sensitivities of diagnostic tests [15, 93, 95].
Understanding the initial spread of disease is highly informative of its long-term
ability to persist within a system, and can be captured by each disease’s basic
reproduction number R0; the number of secondary infections caused by a single
infected individual in an otherwise susceptible population [29]. If R0 < 1 then the
disease is unable to persist and the disease-free critical point is stable. Conversely,
if R0 > 1, the disease-free critical point is unstable, and introduction of a small
number of cases will result in exponential growth (initially) towards a critical point
in which the disease persists. The stability of these critical points switch as R0
passes through the threshold point R0 = 1 [55]. Thus, sufficiently accurate models
that retain analytical tractability so that expressions for R0 can be obtained are
of great value to inform effective interventions against both persistent disease and
outbreaks.
The increasing availability of animal movement datasets has shed light on the com-
plex and highly heterogeneous nature of livestock trade [113], with developments in
network theory enabling new insights into the dynamics of such complex systems
[22, 38]. For example, the study of disease spread on such networks reveals that R0
is heavily influenced by heterogeneity in the distribution of contacts [83, 89]. Thus,
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to study the role of trade on disease spread, epidemiologists must develop models
that adequately account for such complexities.
To date, attempts to assess the spread of disease in real-world cattle trade systems
have largely consisted of replicating animal movements observed in data while over-
laying simulated disease processes [71, 98, 76, 43, 117]. While these illustrate how
past trade dynamics may have supported disease transmission, they cannot be gen-
eralised to ask “what if. . . ” questions about what might occur under some future
set of trades. In contrast, generative models capable of capturing key properties
of such systems, while not being restricted to replaying historic movements, would
allow far more general conclusions to be drawn. They would enable exploration of
the potential impact of changes in movement patterns, highlighting novel avenues
for intervention and control that move beyond standard approaches based on im-
provements to on-farm biosecurity or movement standstills. Thus far, attempts to
develop mechanistic generative models of livestock trade systems have focussed on
global properties [87] rather than considering trade between individual farms, or
have modelled only the size and timing of animal movements on the frozen network
of trade partnerships observed in the data [58].
To our knowledge here we present the first truly generative mechanistic model
for livestock trading systems. This accounts for heterogeneity between farms and
stochastically generates both movement of animals between trade partners and dy-
namically evolves the underlying partnership network (Section 2.2.1). Extending
this to account for disease transmission via trade, we apply and extend the results
of [6] to account for between-farm heterogeneities and derive a per-farm R0, denoted
Ri0 (Section 2.3.1). We subsequently use this analytic result to show large suppliers
contribute disproportionately to disease spread and modifying trade dynamics could
play a significant role in reducing disease burden (Section 2.3.2). With application
to the Scottish cattle industry, we show that this parsimonious model can capture
key features of the dynamics of a complex real-world trading system (Section 2.4).
Subject to the condition that each farm maintains its annual in-flow of animals (rep-
resenting maintenance of business requirements), we explore, for a broad spectrum
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of endemic diseases, the impact on R0, the system-average R
i
0, of changes to the way
farms trade animals, including the formation of longer lasting trade partnerships.
These results suggest that changes to trading practices are potentially effective in
reducing both the burden of endemic disease and safeguarding against future disease
outbreaks.
2.2 Materials and methods
2.2.1 Livestock trading model
We seek to model animal movements in terms of trading practices consisting of
the formation and cessation of trade partnerships and trading between established
partners. Connectivity relevant to disease transmission is therefore controlled by
partnership dynamics (longevity of partnerships and number of concurrent partners)
and trading behaviour (size and frequency of trades between partners). We assume
a closed system of N farms and summarise between-farm heterogeneity in terms
of a small number of farm-level constants. Firstly, annual in- and out-flows of
animals measure farm-level demand and supply for farm i, and are denoted by ηi
and ζi, respectively. Secondly, rates quantifying the propensity for farm i to form
trading partnerships, ai, end partnerships, di, and make trades, bi. An outline of
model quantities is given in Table 1 and are explained below in full. We note that
in reality partnership dynamics and trade behaviour depend on a range of factors
not considered here, e.g. social networks and capital, but farm-level propensities,
supply and demand, capture much of the observed variation in the Scottish cattle
trade system Section 2.4).
Dynamics of trading partnerships
The evolution of the topology of the modelled system is determined entirely by
the formation and cessation of trading partnerships. Under the model, each farm
possesses a dynamic list detailing which farms they can purchase animals from at a
given time. Purchasing farms continually seek to optimise their trading partners by
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Quantity Definition
N Number of farms
ηi Per unit-time in-flow of animals for farm i
ζi Per unit-time out-flow of animals for farm i
ai Rate describing farm i’s propensity to form trading part-
nerships
di Rate describing farm i’s propensity to end trading part-
nerships
αij = aiηiζj/N Rate at which i forms a trading partnership with j








j 6=i pij Expected instantaneous number of concurrent trading
partners for farm i conditioned on zero partnerships at
t = 0
bi Rate describing farm i’s propensity to initiate trades with
its trading partners
ϕij = bi min(ηi, ζj) Rate at which i trades with its trading partner j
θi Batch size for farm i
V ini = θi
∑N
j 6=i ϕijpij Expected unit-time equilibrium in-flow of animals for farm
i
λ Disease prevalence on an infected farm
B(θi) = 1− (1− λ)θi Probability of at least one infected animal moves onto a
susceptible farm i given batch size θi
βij = ϕjiB(θj) Transmission rate from infected farm i to susceptible farm
j, given a trade partnership currently exists between farms
i and j
γ Disease recovery rate
Table 2.1: Table of model quantities and their respective definitions
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preferentially forming partnerships with large suppliers, i.e. farms with large ζi, and
preferentially ending partnerships with small suppliers, such that the system tends
towards an equilibrium in which farms maintain long lasting partnerships with large
suppliers. A farm i begins a trading partnership with another farm j, given no





where constant ai represents the propensity for farm i to form trading partnerships,
summarising all factors that impact the ability of farm i to do so, e.g. the time
required to search for partners. This process is uni-directional and, in general,
asymmetric (αij 6= αji).





such that all farms tend to maintain longer partnerships with large suppliers com-
pared with smaller suppliers. High demand farms are less likely to end trading
partnerships in general compared to low demand farms. The constant di represents
an intrinsic measure of the propensity for farm i to remove one of its traders, with
larger values resulting in shorter duration trade partnerships, and vice versa.
The equilibrium probability of there being a trading partnership between i and j is
pij, and the expected number of trading partners for farm i, k
in
i , are calculated as
shown in Table 2.1 (see Appendix Section 2.6.1 for further details). The 1/N scaling
of αij in Eq. (2.1) ensures that k
in
i does not scale linearly with the system size, N .
Movement of animals and trade flows
Animals are assumed to move between trading partners from j to i in batches (the
number of individual animals moved in a single trade) of constant size θi with rate
ϕij = bi min(ηi, ζj), (2.3)
where bi is taken to represent any impediment to the movement of animals, for
example delivery of livestock. The second term in Eq. (2.3) is referred to as the
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reference transaction rate and is the maximum rate of exchange of indivisible goods
(livestock), since 1/ηi is the expected time for i to generate new demand for animals
and 1/ζj the expected time for j to generate new supply [87, 58].
The per unit time in-flow of animals for farm i, when the system is at equilibrium,
which is expected to equal ηi, is




This expression is easily interpreted, since ϕijpij is the expected number of trades
from j to i in a unit of time, and θiϕijpij is the total number of animals i purchases
from j. Summed over the entire system, we obtain the total in-flow of animals per
unit time for farm i. This expression for V ini allows us to alter the dynamics of
trading partnerships and the movement of animals while maintaining each farm’s
in-flow of animals. We shall explore the effect of such conservative changes in Section
2.3.
Disease dynamics
The dynamics of disease are coupled with partnership dynamics and trade behaviour
by assuming disease is driven entirely by animal movements, neglecting indirect
transmission such as from external wildlife sources or distance modulated local in-
fection.
We categorise disease status at farm level using a standard susceptible-infected-
susceptible (SIS) model; susceptible farms become infected through trade with in-
fected farms, and can themselves infect others, and, after an exponentially dis-
tributed infectious period with mean 1/γ, recover to become susceptible once again.
In addition to the infectious period, a given disease is also characterised by an
effective on-farm prevalence level λ, assumed constant across infected farms and
time. We therefore take λ to be the average prevalence of an infected farm over
its infectious lifetime. We assume each animal moved off an infected farm i has a
constant probability λ of infecting the susceptible buying farm and that off-farm
movements do not alter herd prevalence on the selling farm. If an infected farm
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sells θ animals in a trade to a susceptible farm, the total probability of transmission
is B(θ) = 1 − (1 − λ)θ, and the rate at which a farm j receives infection from its
infectious trade partner i is βij = ϕjiB(θj), i.e. the rate at which j trades with i
multiplied by the probability that the trade results in the transmission of disease.
Thus, trades that occur with large size are more likely to result in the transmission
of disease.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Farms’ basic reproduction number
Calculating R0 for our model is challenging due to the heterogeneous nature of
partnerhip dynamics and trading. Furthermore, the central role of the partnership
network in mediating trade invalidates possible assumptions of homogeneous mixing.
However, the methods outlined in [6] allows for an expression for R0 to be obtained
by considering the dynamics of farm pairs and calculating the probability of disease
transmission. We extend these methods by incorporating farm heterogeneities and
deriving a per-farm expression for R0, R
i
0. Details of the calculation are provided
in Appendix Section 2.6.2, but assume that the trading sub-system has reached
an equilibrium (true for all simulations presented) and the partnership network is
sufficiently sparse. The latter condition is satisfied since, for large systems, the
probability of a two-way trading partnership scales as 1/N2. It is important to note
that the results presented do not depend on the functional forms adopted above to
describe partnership dynamics and trade behaviour and so offer general insights.












(see Appendix Section 2.6.2), where the transmissibility
Tij =
βij
βij + δji + γ
is the probability that farm i infects farm j if there is a trading partnership present,
before the end of the infectious contact period, i.e. prior to either recovery or the
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ending of the partnership [118]. The first term in Eq. (2.5) accounts for the number
of current trade partnerships that result in the transmission of disease. The second
term accounts for the number of new trade partnerships formed, before i recovers,
that result in disease transmission before the end of the infectious contact period.
This shows that partnership dynamics play a significant role in the ability for an
infected farm to make infectious contacts. Indeed, even if the transmissibility was
set to unity, so that farm i was guaranteed to pass infection onto its buyers following
a trade, Ri0 would still be bounded by the rate at which buying farms sought out
new trade partnerships with i, i.e. by αji.
2.3.2 The effect of changes to trading practices
We now use the above expression of Ri0 to rigorously explore the effects of modifying
trading practices under the strong constraint Eq. (2.4) that farms maintain their
expected in-flow of animals. Illustration of these results using stochastic simulations
of example systems are presented in Appendix Section 2.6.7.
The role of trade behaviour
Consider first changes to the frequency and size of trades. Due to Eq. (2.4), and
supposing the dynamics of trade partnerships are kept constant, a linear increase
in the frequency of trade is accompanied by a proportional decrease in the size of
trades, and vice versa. We introduce the scaling parameter εtrade that determines
the frequency and size of trades, and set
ϕij → εtradeϕij,
θi → ε−1tradeθi












tradeθj) + δji + γ
)
= 0,





Ri0 = 0 (2.6)
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for all i. Thus, increasing the batch size reduces R0. Similarly, in the case εtrade →∞
where trades occur more frequently, but take ever smaller size, we find that Ri0
approaches a well-defined non-zero limit, further confirming that disease spread is
inhibited by the dynamics of trade partnerships. This is due to the conservation
of the in-flow of animals, so that the infection rate βij does not scale linearly with
εtrade, but rather approaches a limit given by ϕjiθj ln (1/(1− λ)), implying that
although the number of trades increases significantly, the force of infection does not
rise indefinitely due to the decrease in batch size. See Appendix Section 2.6.3 for
details.
The role of partnership dynamics
We now explore the dynamics of trade partnerships when the frequency and size of
trade is fixed. To do so, we introduce the scaling constant εptnr and set
αij → εptnrαij,
δij → εptnrδij,
which allows for the dynamics of trade partnerships to be explored while maintaining
a farm’s expected instantaneous number of trading partners, kini . As εptnr increases,
partnerships are formed increasingly frequently, however these partnerships last a













for long duration partnerships, which is equivalent to the value of R0 for a static
directed network [83], so that the spread of disease is entirely dependent on the
initial distribution of trade partnerships mediated by trade between them. We note












where β̂ij = βijαji/δji, which is equivalent to the value of R0 for a system under the
mean-field assumption. Details of these results are provided in Appendix Sections
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2.6.4 and 2.6.5. Comparing Eqs. (2.7) and (2.8), since βij + γ > γ for all βij >
0, the disease is expected to spread more prolifically when trade partnerships are
temporary, and a static network approximation offers a lower-bound on the early-
time spread of disease, if all other components of the system are kept constant.
The role of the number of concurrent trading partners
Finally, we consider the effect on Ri0 of changes to the number of concurrent trading
partners. Since there are an infinite number of combinations of αij and δij that
result in a given kini , here we fix the duration of trade partnerships, i.e. keep δij
constant, and set
αij → εij#ptnrαij.
Note the i, j dependence of εij#ptnr in this case. We also note that conservation
equation Eq. (2.4) implies a change in the number of trading partners must be
accompanied by an inverse change in either the trade rate ϕij or the batch size θi
(or both). For simplicity, we herein maintain Eq. (2.4) by fixing the batch size and
increasing/decreasing the trade rate when the number of trading partners is altered.
For a proportional change in kini of x, we have
εij#ptnr =
xαij
(1− x)αij + δij
,
which can be verified by substitution into our expression for kini (see Table 2.1). In





Ri0 = 0 (2.9)
as expected since the system becomes entirely disconnected. For the scenario in
which the number of concurrent trading partners goes to N , as N increases so too
does Ri0. As such, we use the expression for R
i
0 for a system of finite size (see










Note here that even for a finite system to reach this limit, εij#ptnr must go to infinity as
the partnership cessation rate is fixed. Unsurprisingly, when the system is completely
connected, the spread of disease is dependent solely on the dynamics of trade and
the intrinsic disease parameters.
2.4 Case study: Scottish cattle trade industry
We demonstrate the potential of our modelling framework by application to the
Scottish cattle trade system. We first show it is able to capture key features of this
complex real-world system, and then use it to assess the potential impact of changes
to trade patterns for the Scottish cattle industry. We use data from the Cattle Trac-
ing System (CTS) for 2005-2013 inclusive, avoiding perturbations resulting from
restocking following the UK 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak [113].
We focus on the Scottish subset of this dataset featuring 15386 cattle farms which
engage in a total of 135106 trades per year, with a total of 420931 animals move per
year averaged over 2005-2013. We consider this a closed system, ignoring in-flow
(representing approximately 10% of on-movements) and out-flow (approximately
14% of off-movements) of animals beyond Scotland, and consider only farm-to-farm
movements grouped into dated batches. Animal flows through markets are main-
tained by treating such movements as transitory and replacing them with direct
farm-to-farm movements. Movements to market are expected to play a small role
in direct transmission endemic livestock disease [38, 13], but we acknowledge for
epidemic spread of exotic or re-emerging diseases, market transmission may play
a more significant role, for example in the 2001 FMD epidemic [45]. As such, we
consider only slow spreading endemic diseases.
The farm-to-farm batch movement data described above are used to parameterise our
model as follows (further details and distributions of trade quantities are presented
in Appendix Section 2.6.11). Appendix Figure 2.10 shows trading patterns and
animal flows are consistent year-on-year (movements at farm level are also known to
be consistent year-on-year [38]), and we obtain annualised average in- and out-flows,
ηi and ζi, for each farm by averaging observed yearly numbers of animals purchased
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and sold, respectively. As above, the batch size for farm i, θi, is assumed constant,
independent of the originating farm, and is estimated from data by averaging the
total in-flow over the total number of trades for each farm.
Estimates for the trade partnership formation and cessation constants ai and di are
determined by evaluating partnerships on an annual basis, that is for a given year
a partnership exists where two farms trade in that year. From the data we find
that 83% of trade partnerships end after a single year, and 89% end after two years,
emphasising the importance of accounting for partnership dynamics. To calculate
ai, we match observed new trading partners from year t to year t + 1 with the
partnership formation rate defined in Eq. (2.1), averaged over all years. Similarly,
the constant di in the partnership cessation rate Eq. (2.2) is found by equating the
number of partnership cessations occurring from one year to the next. Finally, the
constant bi in the trade rate Eq. (2.3) is obtained by solving the constraint equation
Eq. (2.4) given estimates for all other quantities. Distributions across farms for each





Figure 2.1: Model fit to data. For model with modifications to partnership formation and cessa-
tion rates. Panel (a) shows the average out-flow, ζj , of farms’ trading partners, where blue points
are obtained from data, and points from stochastic simulation, where simulations are performed
using Gillespie Stochastic Simulation Algorithm. Bottom four panels show comparisons of simula-
tion output and data for four statistics: annual in-flow (b), annual number of concurrent trading





Figure 2.2: Impact of trade behaviour and partnership dynamics. Percentage change in R0
for a persistent and high prevalence disease (λ = γ = 0.2) due to changes in the dynamics of trade
and trade partnerships compared with the current dynamics of the Scottish trade system (grey
squares). We consider changes to batch size and partnership duration (a), batch size and number
of concurrent trading partners (b), and number of concurrent trading partners and partnership
duration (c).
Initial results based on the above parameter estimates obtained for the model de-
scribed in Section Section 2.2 reveal that our proposed trading partnership formation
and cessation rates did not accurately replicate the distributions of the duration of
trade partnerships or the joint distribution of farms’ in-flows, ηi, and their traders’
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and find that setting m = 0.75 and w = 75 yields results closer to those observed in
the data as shown in Figure 2.1 (initial fits are presented in Appendix Figures 2.15
and 2.16), while also replicating the values of higher-order statistics, e.g. annual in-
flow, number of concurrent trading partners, and number of trades. This indicates
the flexibility of our approach to represent real-world complexity in a parsimonious
and tractable generative model framework. The required modifications to the model
rates show that small buyers place greater weight on factors other than simply the
size, ζi, of the prospective seller, but that larger buyers tend to buy from larger
suppliers. Furthermore, large sellers are, in general, kept as trading partners for the
same period of time as small sellers, again suggesting that farm sizes (the volume of
animals bought/sold) are only one factor in selecting trade partners.
2.4.1 Assessing the potential for trade practices to modulate
endemic disease
We now explore the effect of increased trade size, longer duration of trade partner-
ships, and reduced number of concurrent trading partners, subject to the constraint
that farms’ in-flows are maintained. To do so we focus on a fixed disease parameter-
isation λ = 0.2 and 1/γ = 5 years, which is intended to represent a high prevalence,
high persistence disease. For this hypothetical disease parameterisation and current
Scottish trading patterns, our model predicts a system-average Ri0 R0 ≈ 10.
Figure 2.2 shows the percentage reduction in R0 under varying changes to trade and
trade partnership dynamics compared with current trading patterns (see Appendix
Figure 2.19 for R0 values). This shows that fewer, longer lasting trade partnerships
yield the greatest reduction in R0, with up to 90% reduction when farms maintain
a single, near permanent trade partner. Fewer concurrent partnerships combined




Figure 2.3: Reducing endemic disease burden. The percentage reduction in the system aver-
age R0 for a range of disease parameterisations under specific trading and partnership dynamics
changes, when compared with values of R0 for current trading patterns in the Scottish trade sys-
tem. Black points represent disease parameterisations in which R0 > 1 before changes, and R0 < 1
after changes are implemented.
of concurrent partnerships is responsible for most of this reduction. In the Scottish
trading system, cattle farms average approximately 7.3 concurrent annual trading
partners, and batches take average size of 3.58. Changes to current partnership
dynamics and trading behaviour could yield both significant reductions and increases
in R0. For example, if the system-average number of concurrent trading partners
and batch size were reduced by one, then R0 would be reduced by approximately
12%. Conversely, if these were to be increased by one, then R0 is increased by over
15%.
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2.4.2 Impact of trade practices on a wide range of endemic
diseases
We now explore the effect of specific changes to trade and partnership dynamics
for a broad range of disease parameterisations (see Appendix Figure 2.20 for R0
values). We consider halving the average number of concurrent trading partners,
doubling the duration of trade partnerships, and doubling the average batch size,
with each of these interventions considered under every possible combination (Figure
2.3) and in isolation (Appendix Figure 2.21). These changes are again made subject
to conserving individual farms’ in-flows of stock. Chosen farm-level prevalence, λ,
ranges from 0.01 to 0.25, with infectious periods, 1/γ, ranging from 6 months to 5
years.
Changes to the size and frequency of trades are most effective in reducing R0 for high
prevalence, small duration diseases, whereas changes to the duration and number of
trade partnerships are most effective on high prevalence, long duration diseases (see
Appendix Figure 2.21). This difference is explained by the fact that as the batch
size increases, the inter-trade times increase, so that for small duration diseases the
probability that an infected farm recovers before it is traded with increases. Changes
to multiple aspects of trade patterns yield greater reductions in R0 compared with
changes to single elements. Encouraging fewer, longer lasting trade partnerships
combined with fewer, larger trades provides the greatest reduction in R0 (up to 53%
for the highest prevalence and longest lasting diseases considered here) and also
bring R0 below 1 for a greater range of diseases. It is noteworthy that our suggested
changes bring R0 below 1 for diseases that are already close to this threshold, but
also significantly reduce R0 for high prevalence, long duration diseases, i.e. diseases
that are extremely challenging to control and eradicate.
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Figure 2.4: Targeting high risk farms. Percentage reduction in R0 compared to: current trading
patterns (left); and 100% adoption of new trading patterns (right). The new trading patterns are
those shown in the bottom right panel of Figure 2.3d, which provides percentage reduction at 100%
(dashed lines). In both panels the x-axis indicates what percentage of the most frequent buyers
(those making the largest number of trades annually) are adopting these changes. Different disease
parameterisations are shown with dashed lines representing values of R0 for: Case 1) λ = 0.06,
γ = 1; Case 2) λ = 0.15, γ = 0.4; and Case 3) λ = 0.25, γ = 0.2. Initial R0 values for current
trading patterns are: Case 1) R0 = 1.19, Case 2) R0 = 4.92, and Case 3) R0 = 11.43.
2.4.3 Targeting the trade practices of large buyers
The results above show significant reductions in R0 are attainable when all farms
change their trade behaviour and partnership dynamics. However, consistent with
other livestock markets [113, 58], the Scottish trading system exhibits scale-free like
properties; a small number of farms trade much more frequently than the average
and have a much larger annual number of concurrent trade partners (see Appendix
Figures 2.12 and 2.13). Despite this, these outlying farms have average batch sizes
similar to the mean batch size (and in some cases smaller, for example the 1% of
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farms that make the largest number of trades make, on average, 363.5 trades per
year, with average batch size 2.86, whereas the mean batch size is 3.58), suggesting
there is scope for such farms to increase their average batch size. We therefore
explore the potential for changes targeted at the most frequent buyers (those farms
making the largest number of trades annually) and compare the resulting system
average R0 with the value of R0 for current (i.e. no changes to) trade patterns, and
with the value of R0 obtained when all farms adopt the proposed changes.
Figure 2.4 shows the results from targeting the top x% of farms with x ranging from
0 to 100%. The changes to trading patterns considered are the composite changes
that lead to the greatest reduction in R0 in Figure 2.3. These changes are assessed
under three disease parameterisations: Case 1) λ = 0.06, γ = 1, corresponding to a
disease scenario in which our suggested changes in Section 2.4.2 brought R0 below
1, Case 2) λ = 0.15, γ = 0.4, and Case 3) λ = 0.25, γ = 0.2, corresponding to the
disease parameterisation that provided the greatest reduction in R0 for the range of
parameters we explored in Section 2.4.2.
In all disease scenarios 20% of the most frequent buyers are responsible for approx-
imately 87% of the total possible reduction in R0. Moreover, when 50% of the most
frequent buyers adopt the proposed changes to trading patterns, we obtain approx-
imately 98% of the reduction in R0 that would be achievable if all farms comply. In
Case 1) 8% compliance is sufficient to bring R0 below 1, suggesting that for diseases
with values of R0 close to the threshold value, only a small fraction of farms would
need to change their trading patterns to eradicate disease. For diseases that are
challenging to control (Case 3), significant reductions are still achievable through
the targeted approach, though stricter control measures may be necessary to bring
R0 below 1 for these diseases.
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Figure 2.5: Comparing biosecurity with changes to trade patterns. Percentage reduction
in R0 (disease parameters λ = 0.25 and γ = 0.2) for targeted changes to both trading practices
and improved biosecurity (left), and due solely to targeted improvements to biosecurity (right). In
both cases, x-axes indicate what percentage of the most frequent buyers adopt trade changes and
largest sellers improve biosecurity.
2.4.4 Combining targeted changes to trading practices with
targeted biosecurity
So far we have considered only changes to buyers’ trading patters, but now show that
targeted changes in trade may be more impactful than similar targeting of standard
on-farm biosecurity measures. We assess the impact of varying percentages of the
largest sellers (those with the largest annual out-flow of animals) adopting on-farm
biosecurity that is assumed to reduce prevalence λ and the infectious period 1/γ
from a baseline (λ = 0.25 and 1/γ = 5). These targeted biosecurity changes are
assessed alone and in combination with changes to trading patterns targeted at the
most frequent buyers, as above. Figure 2.5 shows that the combination further
reduces system average R0 compared to solely targeting trade patterns. However,
these additional reductions increase relatively linearly as an increasing fraction of
sellers adopt improved biosecurity. This is in stark contrast to the impact of an
increasing fractions of the largest buyers changing trade practices (see Figure 2.4)
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for which most of the potential reduction in R0 is due to a small fraction of the
most frequent buyers. This may be understood by considering that our analysis
of the Scottish trading system suggests that formation and cessation of trading
partnerships is determined by more factors than simply the size of the selling farm,
i.e. their ζi. Thus, the out-flow of animals of a farm does not solely indicate whether
that farm is a potential risk for the spread of disease.
2.5 Discussion
Animal movements via trade have long been considered a significant factor in the
spread and persistence of diseases within national scale livestock disease systems [37,
42, 46, 51, 71, 94, 98, 108]. Recently available movement data has enabled mod-
elling of disease spread to be superimposed on historic livestock movement patterns
[51, 9, 109]. Network analysis of such data have also proved highly insightful. For
example, using static networks to identify that fewer larger trades could improve
disease control [88], or that highly connected ‘hubs’ are likely efficient targets for
biocontrol [38]. Nonetheless, there is a pressing need to develop truly generative
models of livestock movements to enable such data to better inform understanding
and management of these complex systems. In this article we outline a generative
approach with two components: a dynamic network which evolves via continuous
formation and cessation of trading partnerships determining network topology at
a given time; and a contact process on this network that represents animal move-
ment (trades) and related disease spread between farms. Our approach goes beyond
current state of the art models [58], for which only the size and timing of animal
movements is modelled on a fixed network of trade partnerships, and is sufficiently
powerful to represent key features of Scottish cattle movements as recorded by the
Cattle Tracing System (CTS). Analysis of this model yields powerful insights into
disease control, with limiting cases allowing re-derivation of known R0 expressions,
e.g. for static networks and well-mixed systems.
In the context of the Scottish cattle trading system we show that disease risks can be
reduced in a way that minimises disruption by maintaining annual in-flows of animals
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for all farms. Fewer, larger trades, and fewer, longer lasting trade partnerships yield
the greatest reduction in system average R0 when they are applied simultaneously,
especially for diseases with high prevalence and persistence. Moreover, they can
reduce R0 below 1 for diseases close to this critical threshold under current trading
patterns. Thus, changes in trade practices could eradicate certain diseases without
other, potentially more disruptive and costly, control measures, and they could assist
control of more persistent diseases that require multiple interventions. The fact
that R0 can be significantly reduced by simply changing the ways in which farms
maintain their annual in-flow of animals is, we believe, a significant finding as this
is potentially far less intrusive than other control strategies involving, for example,
movement bans or restricting from whom a farm can purchase animals [43]. We
note, however, that different network structures may effect the efficacy of each of
our proposed changes to trade.
Our analysis also highlights the potential to exploit scale-free like properties of live-
stock trading systems for disease control. Targeted changes to the trade practices
of only the farms with the highest trade volumes can significantly reduce R0 and
thus the burden of endemic disease and outbreak risk for the whole system. Fur-
ther reductions result from combining changes to trade patterns with more standard
biosecurity measures targeted on farms with the largest annual out-flows of animals.
As such targeted modifications are expanded, resulting disease control benefits from
changing trade practices scale much more favourably than do those of similarly tar-
geted farm-level biosecurity (Figure 2.5). Given the current emphasis on farm-level
biosecurity this is further evidence that the disease control potential of modifying
trade deserves greater attention.
These results illustrate how mechanistic generative models, such as introduced here,
can make a unique contribution to the study of livestock networks that complements
existing network approaches. For example, our results agree with static network
analysis identifying that fewer larger trades could improve disease control [87, 88],
but go beyond these to show the impact of trade partnership dynamics. The scale-
free properties of livestock trade are a common target for network analysis including
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recent work on UK livestock trade that shows a fraction of farms are highly connected
by contact chains involving multiple trades [38]. Although we do not explicitly
identify such contact chains, their influence on disease transmission is integrated
into our analysis and captured in our calculations of R0 that account for trade and
the formation of trade partnerships.
Naturally, the first implementation of our novel framework has made simplifying
assumptions, the relaxation of which will be the subject of further work. Firstly,
we assume trade occurs throughout the year, however animal movements generally
occur in specific months [113]. Secondly, the rate at which farms trade is assumed
constant, regardless of when the last trade was, but fluctuation in supply and demand
is likely to play an important role in trade dynamics. However, we note that currently
available generative mechanistic models of livestock trade make similar assumptions
[87, 58]. Reformulating the trade rate to be a function of these stock quantities is a
natural progression of our model which would resolve these issues, but could limit
analytic tractability. Finally, the rates determining the formation and cessation of
trade partnerships are based only on the annual in- and out-flows of farms, but our
analysis suggests other factors may be at play. Distance-based metrics, farm types
(beef, dairy, etc.), time-varying stock rates (see above), and socio-economic factors
may enable better quantification of trading and partnership dynamics, and may also
prove significant in the spread of disease.
In conclusion, we have introduced what we believe is the first generative modelling
framework for livestock movements that is able to account for key features of com-
plex national scale real-world systems. Analysis of resulting between-farm disease
spread shows changes to trading patterns that conserve farm-level in-flow of animals
provide a powerful approach to control of endemic disease and likely also mitigate
outbreak risk. Attempts to adopt these novel approaches to disease control may re-
veal frictions in the ability of a real-world trading system to implement our proposed
changes to trade and further work is needed to explore such barriers to uptake. For
example, larger batch sizes (and fewer trades) may inhibit flexibility in adapting to
changing conditions. Furthermore, there is evidence that some farmer behaviours
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are determined by responses to external influences including extreme weather events
and socially accepted farming practices [56]. This suggests that incentives, e.g. in
the form of cooperatives, health schemes, or subsidies, may be required to encourage
modification of farm-level trading behaviour. However, it is encouraging that reduc-
tions in disease burden resulting from targeted modification of trade practices scale
much more favourably than those associated with improvements to farm biosecurity
that are the usual focus of disease control policies.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Derivation of pij(t) and k
in
i (t)
We here derive the probability of a trade partnership between farms i and j, pij(t),
and the expected number of concurrent trade partners, kini (t).
The first-order differential equation governing the time-evolution of the probability
of a trade partnership between i and j is given by
d
dt
pij(t) = αij − (αij + δij)pij(t), (2.13)
which, under the assumption that the system begins in a disconnected state, i.e.















As the presence (or absence) of a trading partnership at time t is a Bernoulli random
variable with probabilities differing between farm pairs, the expected number of














2.6.2 Derivation of Ri0




P (i infects j | τij = t)P (τij = t)dt, (2.18)
where τij is the infectious contact period, the period of time in which i is infected
and is a supplier to j. Noting that the infectious contact period is a compound
Poisson process, and since either recovery of cessation of the trading partnership
ends the infectious contact period, which occurs with rate γ + δji, we have
P (τij = t) = (γ + δij)e
−(γ+δij)t,
P (i infects j | τij = t) = 1− e−βijt,
where βij is the rate at which i transmits infection to j. Upon substitution into Eq.
(2.18) and integrating, we obtain
Tij =
βij
βij + δji + γ
. (2.19)
To calculate Ri0, consider an initial infected farm i and another randomly chosen
susceptible farm j. Referring to Figure 2.6, we define S · I as the state in which i is
not a current trading partner of j. Similarly, S−I is the state in which i is a current
trading partner of j. We first calculate the probability that i transmits infection to
j by calculating the probability that the farm pair transitions to the I − I state, i.e.
the state in which both farms are infected and i is a trading partner of j, before i
recovers (represented by the transition to either the S ·S or S−S state). Now, since
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Figure 2.6: Farm pair transition diagram. The farm pair can begin in either the S − I state or
the S · I state, corresponding to the presence or absence of a trading partnership, respectively.
The presented states are the only ones relevant to obtaining the probability that the infected farm
transmits infection to the susceptible farm, i.e. the probability of transitioning to the I − I state,
and are thus the only states relevant to obtaining Ri0.
j is chosen at random, the pair can begin in an initially connected or disconnected
state, i.e. in the S ·I or S−I state, so we must calculate the conditional probabilities
of transitioning to the I − I state given their starting state, which we define as AS·I



















βij(αji + γ)− αjiδjiTij
. (2.21)
Defining the probability of transmission as ρij, we have, by the Law of Total Prob-
ability,
ρij = pjiAS−I + (1− pji)AS·I ,
i.e. the probability that the pair start in a connected state and infection is success-
fully transmitted, plus the probability that the pair start in a disconnected state
and infection is successfully transmitted. After substitution we obtain
ρij =
(αji + γpji)βijTij
βij(αji + γ)− αjiδjiTij
. (2.22)
Disease transmission is Bernoulli random variable, and the probability of transmis-
sion differs between farm pairs but is independent. It follows that Ri0 is the mean of





Using the expression αji = ajηjζi/N , substitution into Eq. (2.22) yields
ρij =
ajηjζiβijTij
βij(ajηjζi + γN)− ajηjζiδjiTij
+
γpjiβijTij
βij(αji + γ)− αjiδjiTij
.
For a large system the denominator of the first term approaches βijγN , the denom-














2.6.3 Ri0 in large εtrade limit
Under the scaling of the trade rate ϕij and batch size θi by εtrade, the infection rate
βij does not scale linearly as εtrade increases. The limit, rather, is given by
lim
εtrade→∞













which is of indeterminate form. Application of L’Hôpital’s Rule yields
lim
εtrade→∞


















+ δji + γ
,
and the large N limit of Ri0 is of the same form as Eq. (2.24).
2.6.4 Ri0 in small εptnr limit
Scaling the partnership formation and cessation rate, αij and δij, by εptnr and using















βij + εptnrδji + γ
. (2.26)














2.6.5 Ri0 in large εptnr limit
In the large εptnr limit the second term of Eq. (2.26) vanishes, but the first term is


























where β̂ij = βijαji/δji.
2.6.6 Ri0 in fully connected limit
Using the scaling factor εji#ptnr to scale the partnership formation rate αji as described
in Section 2.3.2, and noting that pji → 1 as εji#ptnr →∞, we have, for a finite system,


















2.6.7 Comparison of theoretical predictions with stochastic
simulation
We compare our theoretical predictions of R0, the system average R
i
0, for two trading
systems: one in which trading patterns of farms distributed according to Power-Law
distributions, and one in which all farms behave homogeneously, that is all quantities
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in our system are equal across farms. In all cases we set the system size N = 200,
farm prevalence λ = 0.4, and infection recovery rate γ = 0.2.
For the Power-Law system, trading quantities are of the form
p(Z = z) = Cx−α,
where C normalises the distribution, and α determines the slope of the distribution.
We distribute the in- and out-flows of farms, ηi and ζj, respectively, the number of
concurrent trading partners, kini , and the unit-time number of trades according to
this distribution, and the value of α is chosen to obtain desired averages for each of
these quantities. In the below scenarios, and in both systems, farms bring on and
send out 2 animals per time unit, i.e. η = ζ = 2, with an average of 2 trades from 2
concurrent trading partners.
We assume the constant ai in the partnership formation rate is also distributed in
such a way, and the partnership cessation constant di is thus determined by solving
the expression for kini (see Table 2.1). As an initial state, we desire the average
partnership duration to be 1 unit of time, so ai and di are rescaled to achieve this.
The batch size, θi, is obtained by dividing the unit time in-flow, ηi, by the unit time
number of trades for each farm, and the constant bi in the rate of trade is found by
solving our expression for the expected unit time in-flow of animals (see Eq. (2.4)).
As with the duration of trade partnerships, we choose an initial state in which the
average batch size is set to 1. Thus, bi and θi are rescaled to achieve this.
For the homogeneous system, for comparison we set the values of farms’ trading
quantities to be equal to the means of the Power-Law system. For a homogeneous
system, our expressions for Ri0 can be reduced to closed-form expressions. As our
system is homogeneous, we drop subscripts from all quantities and summations over







j 6=i pij = pN = k
in, and that kin → α/δ for large N . Thus,
Ri0 = R0 =
(αN + γkin)βT








T + kinT. (2.31)
Note that α is a function of the system size N so that αN is bounded for increasing
N .
2.6.8 Comparing changes to frequency and size of trades
As predicted by Eq. (2.6), increasing the batch size and decreasing the frequency of
trade has the desirable effect of reducing R0 in both the Power-Law and homogeneous
systems (see Figure 2.7). Both the theory and simulation are in good agreement,
predicting similar behaviour qualitatively and quantitatively, although there are
differences between the two systems, with the Power-Law system predicting slightly
smaller values of R0 than the homogeneous system, and a more pronounced decrease
in the equilibrium disease prevalence as the batch size is increased. In both systems,
however, complete removal of disease is possible when the batch size is increased to
6 for the Power-Law system and 8 for the homogeneous system.
2.6.9 Comparing changes to duration of trading partner-
ships
Increasing the average duration of trading partnerships reduces R0 as predicted by
Eq. (2.7), and both the theory and simulation output predict similar qualitative
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Figure 2.7: The system-average R0 (top left), equilibrium disease prevalence (top right), percentage
reduction in R0 compared to the initial state (bottom left), and the percentage reduction in the
equilibrium disease prevalence compared to the initial state (bottom right) as the average batch
size is increased from an initial batch size of 1. Solid red lines represent the theoretical predictions
for the homogeneous system, and solid black lines represent the output of the average of 2000
independent simulations for the homogeneous system. Dashed lines represent the same output
for the Power-Law system, except in simulations each of the 200 farms is chosen to be the initial
infected in 10 simulations.
behaviour, however the differences between the two are noticeable, in particular
for the homogeneous system (see Figure 2.8). Encouraging longer lasting trading
partnerships has a markedly larger effect on the equilibrium prevalence for the Power-
Law system compared to the homogeneous system, with approximately 80% and
30% reduction when partnerships last an average of 20 time units for the Power-
Law and homogeneous systems, respectively. We note that, while the value of R0
can be reduced, altering the duration of trading partnerships may be insufficient in
reducing R0 below the threshold value of 1, and its ability to do so is determined by
the intrinsic disease parameters and/or the frequency and size of trades.
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Figure 2.8: The system-average R0 (top left), equilibrium disease prevalence (top right), percentage
reduction in R0 compared to the initial state (bottom left), and the percentage reduction in the
equilibrium disease prevalence compared to the initial state (bottom right) as the average trading
partnership duration is increased from an initial duration of 1 time unit. Solid red lines represent
the theoretical predictions for the homogeneous system, and solid black lines represent the output
of the average of 2000 independent simulations for the homogeneous system. Dashed lines represent
the same output for the Power-Law system, except in simulations each of the 200 farms is chosen
to be the initial infected in 10 simulations.
2.6.10 Comparing changes to number of concurrent trading
partners
A reduction in the number of concurrent trading partners, accompanied by a pro-
portional increase in the number of trades so that farms’ in-flow of animals are
maintained, yields a reduction in R0 and the equilibrium prevalence, and, as with
changes to the batch size, the theory and simulation predict similar qualitative and
quantitative behaviour (see Figure 2.9). Complete eradication of disease is possible
as the number of trading partners is brought closer to zero, and we note that for our
two systems considered here that greater proportional reductions in the number of
trading partners is required to reduce R0 below 1 than is required if the batch size
is increased. However, this may be a property of our chosen systems and not true
in all cases, as evidenced by our analysis of the Scottish cattle trade industry where
changes in the number of trading partners yielded greater reductions in R0.
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Figure 2.9: The system-average R0 (top left), equilibrium disease prevalence (top right), percentage
reduction in R0 compared to the initial state (bottom left), and the percentage reduction in the
equilibrium disease prevalence compared to the initial state (bottom right) as the average number
of concurrent trading partners is increased from an initial number of 0.1. Solid red lines represent
the theoretical predictions for the homogeneous system, and solid black lines represent the output
of the average of 2000 independent simulations for the homogeneous system. Dashed lines represent
the same output for the Power-Law system, except in simulations each of the 200 farms is chosen
to be the initial infected in 10 simulations.
2.6.11 Overview of CTS data analysis
Our analysis of the Scottish trading system involves obtaining the distribution of
quantities to apply to our model without explicitly matching the animal movements
observed in the data. The Cattle Tracing System (CTS) dataset provides detailed
records of individual cattle movements between premises, with each animal uniquely
identified by an animal ID. We restrict our considerations solely to farms located
within Scotland, and between years 2005-2013, inclusive. We choose not to include
years prior to 2005 so that potential lingering perturbations to trade following the
2001 Foot-and-Mouth disease epidemic are minimised.
We remove seasonal trends by obtaining yearly averages for farm parameters and
quantities, and since movements to markets are expected to play a small role in
the spread of endemic diseases, we treat such movements as transitory and replace
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them with direct farm-to-farm movements (thus maintaining the flow of animals
through markets). Any movements to market that are not subsequently moved off
that market are removed from the dataset. Additionally, any animal movement to a
non-farm premises (defined as an agricultural holding in the data) is removed. This
removes movements to slaughterhouses, here considered endpoints for infection. Our
modelling assumption that disease transmits solely through trade implies that an
animal holding that neither buys nor sells at least one animal in the time period
considered makes no contribution to the spread of disease; consequently, these farms
are also removed from the dataset. Finally, any farm-to-farm movement that orig-
inated or ended at a location not within Scotland was removed, so that we have
a closed system of farms that trade solely within the population. Movements sent
out of Scotland accounted for approximately 14% of all outgoing animal movements,
and movements to Scotland accounted for approximately 10% of all incoming animal
movements.
Our resulting dataset is closed system of the individual cattle movements of 15386
farms. We combine these individual cattle movements into batch movements be-
tween farms by matching the on- and off-location IDs for a given date. These batch
movements allow us to obtain values for model quantities as follows. The yearly
average in- and out-flow of animals for farms, ηi and ζi, respectively, are obtained
by averaging the total observed number of animals purchased/solve over the time













where V ini (t) and V
out
i (t) are the total in- and out-flows of animals for farm i in year
t, respectively.
We make the modelling assumption that the batch size of a farm i, θi, is constant
and independent of the farm whence the batch originated, so that all farms can
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supply θi animals to farm i when a trade occurs. As such, we obtain θi by simply







where Φi is the total number of trades observed for farm i.
To obtain estimates for the partnership coefficients ai and di, we assume that a farm
that buys animals from another farm in year t and again in year t + 1 maintained
the trading partnership in both years. Conversely, if a trade is observed in year t
but not in year t + 1 then we assume the partnership ended at the end of year t.
Thus, we evaluate trading partnerships on an annual basis and our analysis revealed
that approximately 83% of partnerships ended after a single year, and 89% after two
years.
To calculate ai, we match the observed new trading partnerships from year t to t+1
with the partnership formation rate defined in Eq. (2.1). We do this for each year,
as the number of potential new trading partners varies over the years depending on













where Ai(t−1, t) is the number of observed trading partnerships formed by i in year
t that were not observed in year t − 1. In the subscript of the summation we take








Note that for any farm in which ζi = 0 we set ai = 0.
We obtain di in a similar manner by equating the number of partnership cessations
occurring from one year to the next with the partnership cessation rate at defined












where Di(t− 1, t) is the number of observed partnerships in year t− 1 that were not
observed in year t. Note that the denominator is only defined for non-zero Kini (t),
i.e. in years in which farm i had at least one trading partner. Thus, to obtain di,













j 6=i pij ·min(ηi, ζj)
.
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2.6.12 Distributions of model quantities from CTS data
(a)
(b)
Figure 2.10: Monthly total number of animal movements (a) and number of animals moved (b). In
general, animal movements and flows are consistent year-on-year, though there is a notable decline




Figure 2.11: The distribution (a) and empirical cumulative distribution (b) of animal flows.
(a) (b)




Figure 2.12: The distribution (a) and empirical cumulative distribution (b) of the annual average
number of trading partnerships.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.13: The distribution (a) and empirical cumulative distribution (b) of the annual average
number of trades.
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2.6.13 Distribution of trading partners’ out-flows and part-
nership duration before and after modification to for-
mation and cessation rates
(a)
(b)
Figure 2.15: Simulation output and data for the distribution (a), and density and empirical cumu-
lative distribution (b) of the average out-flow of farms’ trading partners under original functional




Figure 2.16: Simulation output and data for the distribution (a), and density and empirical cumu-
lative distribution (b) of the average partnership duration of farms under original functional forms




Figure 2.17: Simulation output and data for the distribution (a), and density and empirical cumu-
lative distribution (b) of the average out-flow of farms’ trading partners under modified functional




Figure 2.18: Simulation output and data for the distribution (a), and density and empirical cu-
mulative distribution (b) of the average partnership duration of farms under modified functional
forms for the partnership formation and cessation rates.
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2.6.14 Values of R0 for varying trade patterns
Figure 2.19: System average R0 for varying values of average batch size, average partnership
duration, and average number of concurrent trading partners. We consider changes to batch size
and partnership duration (top left), batch size and number of concurrent trading partnerships (top
right), and number of concurrent trading partnerships and partnership duration (bottom left).
Grey squares represent the current trading patterns of the Scottish trade system. In all cases we
set λ = γ = 0.2.
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2.6.15 Values of R0 for varying disease parameterisations
Figure 2.20: The predicted system average R0 for a range of disease parameterisations under
current observed trading patterns in the Scottish trade system.
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Figure 2.21: Percentage reduction in system average R0 for singular changes to trade over a range of
disease parameterisations. Changes considered are doubling the batch size, with an accompanying
halving of the number of trades (top left), doubling the duration of trade partnerships (top right),
and halving the number of concurrent trading partners (bottom left). Changes to the batch size are
most effecitve for diseases characterised by high prevalence and short infectious periods, whereas
changes to the duration and number of trading partnerships are most effective for diseases with
high prevalence and long infectious periods.
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Chapter 3
A stochastic, adaptive systems
view of livestock trading
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we introduced a generative trade model that accounts for the stochastic
formation and cessation of trade partnerships and the movement of animals that such
partnerships permitted. The rates determining the formation and cessation of trade














ϕij = bi ·min(ηi, ζj), (3.3)
where ηi and ζj are the unit-time in- and out-flow of farms i and j, respectively, N
is the system size, ai, di, and bi are rates defining the propensity for farm i to form
and end partnerships, and trade, respectively, and m and w are constants. These
rates are functions of static farm-level quantities, namely annual in- and out-flows
of animals, and are thus invariant to changes and/or perturbations of the trading
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system. However, trading patterns are generally not static, with seasonal trends
clearly evident in the UK cattle trade system with the majority of animal movements
occurring in springtime, corresponding to periods in which the majority of calves
are born [46, 113]. Moreover, while farmer behaviour generally evolves with cultural
changes, they can also be affected and disrupted by external pressures, including
disease outbreaks, extreme weather events, and farm relocation [56]. In a network
context, seasonal trading patterns are examples of “burstiness”; events occur in
concentrated bursts, followed by a period of low activity [11]. The implications of
bursty activity on disease spread has been studied previously, though its effect can
be beneficial or deterimental to disease control based on correlations between the
topological structure of the network and the frequency and timing of contacts [34].
The surges of trades in springtime represent periods in which supply and demand,
or stock levels, are at their greatest and the drop in movements following the spring
months suggests a level of satiation of demand. Our trading model outlined in
Chapter 2 does not account for farm satiation; indeed, a farm is as likely to trade
immediately following a previous trade as that farm is during a long inter-trade
period. We therefore extend our model to account for farm-level time-varying stock
quantities, measuring current farm-level supply and demand, which determine the
rates at which farms form trading partnerships, make trades, and the size of trade
batches. Our resulting model extends previous work in the literature which included
similar time-varying stock quantities, however we go beyond the current state of the
art by 1) explicitly accounting for trade partnerships, and 2) accounting for stock
quantities in the rates of partnership formation and trade [58, 87].
In this chapter, we introduce an individual-based dynamic trading model in which
time-varying farm-level stock quantities, defined as supply and demand, determine
the rates at which farms form new trading partnerships and trade with current
trade partners. We will explore the dynamics of this highly dynamic and adaptive
system, initially in the absence of disease, and consider the response of individual
farms in changes to trading propensities (such as increased trade friction) and how
these individual-based responses alter the trading dynamics at the system level.
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Moreover, we will analyse the sensitivity of the system to shocks in farm-level supply
and demand. When disease is introduced, we will show that farm-level responses
to changes in trading propensities alter the structure of the trading system in ways
such that disease prevalence is largely unaltered, except in certain extreme cases.
We introduce typical disease control strategies, such as on-movement animal testing,
and evaluate the impact of animal and batch rejection on farms’ ability to maintain
their business needs, and also how such control strategies affect between-herd disease
prevalence. Farm- and system-level information propagation, mediated through on-
movement animal testing, indicating “high-risk” farms will be introduced, and the
impact of farms’ avoidance of high-risk farms on the trading system and disease
prevalence will be explored. Our results will highlight the potential benefits of a
global risk aversion strategy on significantly reducing disease prevalence.
3.2 An individual-based systems model of trade
dynamics
3.2.1 Mechanisms of stock generation and a global pricing
strategy
We assume a closed system of N farms in which farm i’s propensity to form trading
partnerships and make trades are determined by time-varying stock quantities, Di(t)
and Si(t), which represent, respectively, the number of animals farm i wishes to
purchase and has available to sell at time t. A full outline of model quantities and
parameters is presented in Table 3.1. We herein use the terms demand and supply










Global stock levels determine a system-wide price of goods at a given time t, P (t).
We adopt the pricing model of [87] and assume that the rate of change of the
logarithm of the price is proportional to the rate of change of the net willingness to
trade, defined as D(t)− S(t), i.e.
d
dt
P (t) = σP (t)
d
dt
(D(t)− S(t)) , (3.6)
⇒ P (t) = P0 · exp(σ(D(t)− S(t)− (D0 − S0)), (3.7)
where P0, D0, and S0 are, respectively, the price, global demand, and global supply
at t = 0. The constant σ represents the price sensitivity of goods to the difference
in global supply and demand. We assume that the system begins in a state with no
stock, so that D0 = S0 = 0, meaning P0 = P
∗ can be interpreted as a steady-state
price when supply and demand are balanced. Thus we have
P (t) = P ∗eσ(D(t)−S(t)). (3.8)
Note that the price is determined not by absolute values of global stock quantities,
rather by relative imbalances between supply and demand. The functional form for
P (t) is desirable as it does not permit negative prices, and replicates macroeconomic
properties, namely that excess demand causes prices to increase, excess supply causes
prices to decrease, and balanced supply and demand causes the price to equilibriate.
Collectively, these form the so-called law of supply and demand [79].
Farms generate units of stock with a linear, per-farm, rate of ηi(t) for demanded
stock and ζi(t) for supply stock. This simple rate is intended to represent the fact
that farms will accumulate supply and demand over time if no trades occur. The
functional forms of ηi(t) and ζi(t) are assumed to be
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Quantity Definition
N Number of farms in the system
Di(t) Demanded stock of farm i at time t
Si(t) Available supply of farm i at time t
D(t) Global demanded stock at time t
S(t) Global available supply at time t
P (t) Price of goods at time t
P ∗ Price of goods when global stocks are equal
ηi(t) Rate at which farm i generates new demand at time t
η∗i
Rate at which farm i generate demand at price equilib-
rium
εD
Elasticity of demand. Measure of how demand genera-
tion changes due to changes in price
ζi(t)
Rate at which farm i increases its available supply at
time t
ζ∗i
Rate at which farm i increases available supply at price
equilibrium
εS
Elasticity of supply. Measure of how supply generation
changes due to changes in price
αij(t)
Rate at which i forms a trading partnership with j at
time t
δi Rate at which i ends a trading partnership
ϕij(t)
Rate at which i trades with its trading partner j at time
t
θij(t) Size of trade following a trade between i and j at time t
Table 3.1: Table of quantities and parameters in the model
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: Sensitivity of price to stock imbalances Price sensitivity to imbalances in global
demand and supply (a) and stock generation rates for varying prices (b). In both cases we set




i = 1. Each trajectory is obtained deterministically from Eqs.


















which are functionally similar to those used in [87], however we exclude stock losses,
external flows, and explicit characterisation of farms as either strict buyers or sellers.
The constants η∗i and ζ
∗
i represent stock generation rates at market equilibrium, i.e.
when global stock levels are balanced and P (t) = P ∗. We saw in Chapter 2 that
these are readily determined from data on between-farm movements averaged over
a suitable period. The constants εD and εS are, respectively, the price elasticities
of demand and supply. Their values determine how sensitive stock generation is to
perturbations of the price around the equilibrium price, and, for simplicity, we have
assumed they are constant across farms.
Figure 3.1a shows the sensitivity of price to imbalances in demand and supply for
varying values of the constant σ. As expected, a surplus in demand relative to
supply yields exponential increases in price, particularly for larger values of the
price sensitivitiy σ. Conversely, a surplus of supply causes the price to decrease,
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P (t) = 0,
lim
D(t)−S(t)→0
P (t) = P ∗.
Figure 3.1b highlights the relationship between the stock generation rates and price
as presented by Eqs. (3.9) and (3.10). Increases in price decrease the demand
generation rate ηi(t) and increases the supply generation rate ζi(t), whereas decreases
in price increase ηi(t) and decrease ζi(t). Thus farms generate more demand (and
less supply) when prices are low, and less demand (and more supply) when prices are
high. There is a feedback loop between the price of goods and stock levels: excess
demand leads to increases in price, which cause the demand generation rate, ηi(t),
to decrease and the supply generation rate, ζi(t), to increase. This, in turn, causes
the net willingness to trade, D(t) − S(t), to decrease and thus the price to return
to the equilibrium price P ∗. As the price returns to the equilibrium price, the stock
generation rates return to their equilibrium values. Therefore, the inclusion of a
pricing model can act as a corrective mechanism in the model to prevent stock level
divergences. Finally, we note that changes in price do not alter current supply and
demand, altering only future generation of stock.
3.2.2 The dynamics of trade partnerships
The presence of trade partnerships explicitly distinct from trade events was a key
extension to existing models in the model presented in Chapter 2. This innovation
enabled representation of a dynamic network of trade partnerships on which trades
occurred, also dynamically. This was a step forward compared with the static trade
partnership networks with dynamic trades of earlier studies. However, the rates
determining the dynamics of partnerships were constant, and unaffected by recent
trade activity of farms. We extend these rates here by expressing them as functions






We note here that further analysis of the length of partnership durations in the
Scottish trading system revealed that farm in-flow is not a strongly determining
factor in the duration of trade partnerships (correlation between farm-in flow and
trade partnership duration length is R2 = 0.057, p << 0.01). As such, and for
simplicity, we herein keep the partnership cessation rate, δi for a given farm i,
constant.
Eq. (3.11) describes how model farms’ propensities for forming new trading partner-
ships are dictated by current stock levels, rather than average, long-term properties
of farms as in Chapter 2, and new trade partners are chosen based on their current
available supply stock. As demand now varies in the model, so does the partnership
formation rate; periods of high demand will cause a surge of partnership formations,
followed by the gradual removal of partnerships as demand is satisfied by trade so
that new partnerships are formed less frequently. As in Chapter 2, we include the
constant m = 0.75 to represent that farms’ decision making process in the formation
of trade partnerships is not influenced entirely by stock levels (though we do not
explore such behaviour here) [56]. Our expression for αij(t) may lead to less discrim-
inatory choices in trade partners as farms with small long-term supply rates are not
precluded from having large instantaneous supply levels. We posit, however, that
small ζ farms will have, on average, low supply so that the distribution of “sizes”
(measured by farm out-flows ζ) of farms’ trading partners will be similar to Figure
2.1 in Chapter 2.
3.2.3 The dynamics of trade
As with the partnership formation rate, we extend the rate of trade from Chapter
2 to be a function of current demand of a farm i and current supply of its trading
partner j:
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ϕij(t) = bi ·min(Di(t),Sj(t)), (3.12)
where the constant bi is intended to represent any impediment to efficient trade
[87]. The trade rate presented in Chapter 2 was a function of the expected long-
term average in- and out-flows of animals of a buying farm and its trading partner,
and was intended to represent that large out-flow farms will generally have larger
supply. As with Eq. (3.11), the key difference is that the rate at which farms
purchase animals is driven entirely by current requirements for stock, rather than
long-term trading trends. For a farm i, the min function in Eq. (3.12) allocates the
highest trade rate to a trade partner j that can match or exceed i’s demand. In
other words
ϕij(t) = biDi(t) if Di(t) < Sj(t), (3.13)
ϕij(t) = biDi(t) = biSj(t) if Di(t) = Sj(t), (3.14)
ϕij(t) = biSj(t) if Di(t) > Sj(t). (3.15)
Thus, purchasing patterns of farms are driven by dynamical state variables, namely
supply and demand. We neglect, therefore, more abstract and hard to quantify
variables that are likely present in real-world trading systems, e.g. farmer reputation,
details of the stock type that may make it more suitable, perceptions of disease risk,
etc. The exploration of such behaviour is an avenue for future work and we consider
some simple behavioural-trade feedback loops in the context of disease later in this
chapter.
Trades initiate a batch movement of animals, the size of which is also determined by
current demand Di(t) of the purchasing farm and current supply Sj(t) of the selling
farm:
θij(t) = min(Di(t),Sj(t)). (3.16)
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At most, farms will purchase enough animals to satisfy their demand at a given time,
and sellers operate on a first come, first served basis, i.e. sellers will offload their
entire supply in a single trade if demanded. Farms, therefore, buy and sell based
on current market pressures, excluding any forecasting, allocation of stock, future
agreements to sell, etc. Analysis in [58] found that Eq. (3.16) resulted in simulation
output most closely resembling data, suggesting that farms do indeed purchase and
sell animals in the most fluid way possible.
Interpreting Eq. (3.16) is straightforward: supply and demand are indivisible quan-
tities in our model, representing animals available for sale and number of animals a
farm wants to buy, respectively. As such, batches can take minimum size 1, i.e. a
single animal moved. The maximum size, however, is determined by current stock
quantities of the buying and selling farm, which can lead to excess demand and
supply following a batch movement. Therefore, transactions are imperfect [87] in
the sense that batch movements may not fully satisfy the buyer. Excess stock from
a trade is carried over and influences future trades.
Finally, the cumulative in-flow of animals for a typical farm i at time t is given by






where pij(t) is the probability that farm j is a seller to i, i.e. a trade partner, and
kini (t) is the number of trade partners of farm i at time t. Eq. (3.17) accumulates the
history of trade for farm i up to time t, however, unfortunately, is not analytically
tractable as the functional forms of ϕij(t) and θij(t) contain discontinuities and are
themselves functions of Di(t) and Sj(t) which cannot be expressed in closed-form.
To conclude, our model represents a free market, where agents (farms) buy and sell
animals at a given price level, outside the influence of regulatory and governmental
control. Nonetheless it is possible to add such externalities into future analyses based
on modifications of the model presented here. It is possible that our model may be
described as a perfectly competitive market, which must satisfy two conditions: 1)
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goods are homogeneous, i.e. all the same, and 2) that there are sufficient numbers of
buyers and sellers that no single individual can influence or dominate the market [79].
The first point is a simplifying assumption of our model (though is not a necessity;
we could distinguish animals into type (beef and dairy, for example), or indeed
quality). The second point is dependent on the trading system being analysed, and
influenced by system size and the distributions of trading patterns of farms.
3.3 The adaptive system dynamics of trade
In this section we explore the behaviour of our trading model in the absence of
disease dynamics for a simple, homogeneous system in which farms generate supply
and demand with equal rates and have similar propensities to form and end trading
partnerships, and to trade animals. In all cases we assume N = 200, η∗i = ζ
∗
i = 2.0,
P ∗ = 1, ai = 0.2, δi = 1.0, and b = 2.0 for all farms i. The price elasticities are set
to εD = 0.412 and εS = 0.821 and are taken from the FAPRI-UK economic model
documentation 2011 [36]. Stochastic simulations are performed using a standard
Gillespie Stochastic Simulation Algorithm [47, 48].
3.3.1 Exclusion of a pricing model can lead to divergent
stock levels
In Section 3.2.1 we highlighted that the presence of a pricing model introduces a feed-
back loop between imbalances in global supply and demand and the stock generation
rates. Referring to Figures 3.2 and 3.3, variation in the price sensitivity parameter
σ alters the sensitivity of the stock generation rates in response to changes in price,
and the price itself is more sensitive to imbalances in global supply and demand for
greater values of σ. The dynamic pricing model is effective at constraining stock
levels so that stock imbalances are minimised, even for very small values of σ. The
exception is the case when σ = 0, which is equivalent to the absence of a pricing
model entirely. In this case, stock generation rates are equal to their equilibrium
value at all times, and stochasticity of the simulation can lead to scenarios in which
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Figure 3.2: Price sensitivity on stock generation Average stock generation rates and average
price over time for varying values of the price sensitivity parameter σ. The special case σ = 0
represents the absence of a pricing model. For each parameter value, output is generated by
averaging 20 independent realisations of the stochastic simulation.
stock levels become imbalanced. Furthermore, in the absence of a pricing model,
such imbalances are not corrected for by changes in the stock generation rates, lead-
ing to cascading imbalances and divergences in stock quantities. We note that in
the output presented in Figure 3.3, a divergence in demand is evident, however
divergences in supply are also possible (see Figure 3.4).
3.3.2 Shocks in stock quantities
We now explore the ability for the modelled trading system to adapt itself to shocks
in global stock quantities when starting from equilibrium. We consider first shocks
in global demand, namely the introduction of a fixed increase in demand for each
farm at a specified point in time. Considering Figure 3.5, we see that shocks in
demand cause rapid increases in excess demand and therefore price. However, these
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Figure 3.3: Price sensitivity on supply and demand stability Average price against excess
demand (left) and excess demand over time (right) for varying values of the price sensitivity
parameter σ. The special case σ = 0 represents the absence of a pricing model, i.e. no fluctuations
in price caused by excess demand. For each parameter value, output is generated by averaging 20
independent realisations of the stochastic simulation.
spikes are temporary and the system rapidly adjusts by appropriate reductions in
the demand generation rate η(t) and increases in the supply generation rate ζ(t)
so that excess demand and price return to pre-shock equilibrium values. Of note
is the inability for the stock generation rates to return to pre-shock values, instead
finding a new stable equilibrium (with larger shocks causing greater shifts away from
pre-shock equilibria). Referring to Figure 3.6, shocks in demand bring about surges
in the formation of new trade partnerships and trades as farms seek to satisfy their
new demand. This leads to reductions in available supply, hence the increase in ζ(t).
The surges in trade are temporary, quickly returning to pre-shock values, however
average stock quantities do not return to pre-shock values, instead finding a new,
slightly larger, equilibrium (this new equilibrium is approximately 25% larger for
the largest demand shock).
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Figure 3.4: Stock imbalances in the absence of price Global excess demand for a number of
independent stochastic simulations when a pricing model is absent (σ = 0).
Considering similar shocks to supply, Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show that the system
response in terms of excess demand and price is similar, though mirrored compared to
demand shocks, when the system exhibits supply shocks. The stock generation rates
attain new equilibrium values in response to supply shocks, with farms generating
more demand and less supply on average in the immediate aftermath than in pre-
shock times. Interestingly, however, supply and demand levels do not deviate from
pre-shock equilibrium values after the initial surge in trade following supply shocks,
suggesting our trading system is more sensitive to shocks in demand than in supply.
This may be explained by differences in our chosen supply and demand elasticities, as
the supply generation rate ζ(t) is more elastic (sensitive to changes in price [79]) than
is the demand generation rate η(t). Moreover, the model itself responds differently
to shocks in demand than supply because the partnership formation rate increases
and decreases linearly with increasing and decreasing demand and fixed supply, and
increases and decreases nonlinearly with increasing and decreasing supply and fixed
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demand.
Finally, we explore the system response to complete removal of all stock, i.e. Di(t) =
Si(t) = 0 for all farms i. Our stochastic simulations begin in a disconnected state,
i.e. there are no trade partnerships, and farms have no stock quantities. As the
simulation progresses, farms generate stock and begin to form partnerships until the
system reaches an equilibrium where farms can match with appropriate sellers to
satisfy their demand. In this shock scenario, we are investigating how the system
in equilibrium responds to a sudden loss of all supply and demand. Considering
Figures 3.9 and 3.10, we notice that removal of farm stocks has no discernible effect
on the price of goods. This is to be expected, as the price is affected by imbalances
in stock quantities rather than the individual availability of stock. As a result, stock
generation rates are also unaffected by global stock removals. The removal of stock
causes short-term out of equilibrium trade patterns, however the system rapidly
returns to the pre-shock equilibrium as farms begin to re-accumulate stock. There
is also negligible difference in the time taken for the system to return to the pre-shock
equilibrium compared with the time taken to reach equilibrium beginning from the
initial, disconnected state. We note that removal of all supply and demand is not
equivalent to the real-world removal of all animals in the system, which would be
catastrophic and prevent farms (in the short term, at least) to generate new supply.
3.3.3 Effects of trade and partnership friction on system
dynamics
In this section we explore the impacts of friction on the rate of trade and partnership
formation as given by Eqs (3.12) and (3.11), respectively. In economics, friction
represents any impediment to efficient trade, for example distance, matching buyers
and suppliers, and delivery times [27]. Friction is transposed onto our model in
a similar manner as in [58, 87], but with a key difference; we treat the formation
of trade partnerships as distinct from trade events. As such, the constant ai in
Eq (3.11) represents the frictional component to finding trade partners, and the
constant bi in Eq (3.12) represents the frictional component of all impediments to
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Figure 3.5: Shocks in demand impact price and stock generation Global excess demand
(top left), average price (top right), average demand generation rate η(t) (bottom left), and average
supply generation rate ζ(t) (bottom right) for varying shocks to global demand. For a given demand
shock s, for all farms i, farm-level demand is updated to Di(t) → Di(t) + s. In all cases, shocks
occur at t = 250.
trade between partners. Therefore, we can explore the role of friction in these two
components of trade in isolation and together. In Chapter 2 we explored the role of
friction in early-time disease spread, finding that manipulation of friction can lead
to desirable reductions in R0, but in this section we restrict our analysis solely to
its impact on transient and long-term dynamics of trade.
Trade friction
We consider first changes to trade friction, via changes to the trade rate constant
b, noting again that in this example system farms are homogeneous in their stock
generation rates and trade and partnership rates (though farm stock levels will differ
due to the stochasticity of the system and timing and sizes of trades). Increasing
b decreases trade friction, so farms have a greater propensity to trade, whereas de-
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Figure 3.6: Shocks in demand and response of trading system Average per-farm demand
(top left) and supply (top right), number of trading partners (middle left), number of trades (middle
right), batch size (bottom left), and per unit-time animal in-flow (bottom right) for varying shocks
to global demand. For a given demand shock s, for all farms i, farm-level demand is updated to
Di(t)→ Di(t) + s. In all cases, shocks occur at t = 250.
creasing b increases trade friction and farms trade less frequently. For the model
described in Chapter 2, and in the trading models presented in [58, 87], any change
in the friction of trade is linearly reflected in the frequency of trade, e.g. a 50% reduc-
tion in b corresponds to 50% fewer trades, as conditional on b, the rates describing
the frequency of trade are constant and are functions of farms’ average long-term
in- and out-flows. For the model described here, however, the rate of trade is a
dynamic function, varying with farm stock levels. As such, a given change in b may
not necessarily result in a correspondingly large change in the frequency of trade.
Indeed, Figure 3.12 reveals that this is the case, and by considering b = 1 as a base-
line, increasing b (less friction) does increase the frequency of trade, but not linearly.
For example, setting b = 100 (2 orders of magnitude greater than b = 1) increases
the number of trades per farm by approximately 55.68% (from an average of 0.67
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Figure 3.7: Shocks in supply impact price and stock generation Global excess demand (top
left), average price (top right), average demand generation rate η(t) (bottom left), and average
supply generation rate ζ(t) (bottom right) for varying shocks to global supply. For a given supply
shock s, for all farms i, farm-level supply is updated to Si(t)→ Si(t) +s. In all cases, shocks occur
at t = 250.
trades when b = 1 to 1.05 when b = 100). This is due to the effect on stock levels
as b is changed. For large b (low friction), farms begin by accumulating stock and
forming trade partnerships. However, as friction is low, farms trade with their trade
partners at high frequency leading to smaller batch sizes and lower levels of unmet
demand and available supply. These depleted stock levels feed back into the rates of
partnership formation and trade, so that farms require fewer trade partners, and the
effect of increasing b on the trade rate is thus counteracted by smaller stock levels.
The converse if true for reductions in b, as for small b there is greater friction in
trade resulting in farms accumulating more stock before a trade occurs, resulting in
large batches of animals. However, larger unmet demand and available supply leads
to farms forming a greater number of trade partnerships in an attempt to satisfy
their demand. When b = 1, average per-farm demand and supply is approximately
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Figure 3.8: Shocks in supply and response of trading system Average per-farm demand (top
left) and supply (top right), number of trading partners (middle left), number of trades (middle
right), batch size (bottom left), and per unit-time animal in-flow (bottom right) for varying shocks
to global supply. For a given supply shock s, for all farms i, farm-level supply is updated to
Si(t)→ Si(t) + s. In all cases, shocks occur at t = 250.
2.26, when b = 100 the average is 1.74 (a reduction of 22.78%), and when b = 0.01
the average is 6.15 (an increase of 171.66%), hence the effect of friction on farms’
ability to satisfy their demand is not symmetric, with a disproportionately larger
impact when friction is high (b = 0.01) compared with when friction is low (b = 100).
We note, however, that in all cases the system reaches an equilibrium, and farms
maintain the same level of animal in-flow, though the time to reach equilibrium is
greater when friction is high. Also, excess demand, price, and stock generation rates
are largely unaffected by changes in trade friction.
Friction in partnership formation
We next consider changes to friction in the formation of trade partnerships by al-
tering the formation rate constant a. Small values of a correspond to large amounts
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Figure 3.9: Removal of all stock does not alter price and stock generation Global excess
demand (top left), average price (top right), average demand generation rate η(t) (bottom left), and
average supply generation rate ζ(t) (bottom right) when global supply and demand are removed.
In all cases, shocks occur at t = 250.
of friction in forming trade partnerships, and large values of a correspond to small
amounts of friction. To our knowledge, we are the first to consider friction in part-
nership formation, with current generative cattle trade models not distinguishing
partnership dynamics with trade events [58, 87]. As with trade friction, changes to
friction of partnership formation in the model of Chapter 2 resulted in corresponding
changes in the number of trade partnerships. However as with changes to trade fric-
tion, Figure 3.13 shows that the responses to changes in a are nonlinear in the more
complex model. Again using a = 1 as a baseline, setting a = 100 increases the equi-
librium per-farm average number of trading partners from 1.12 to 7.07 (an increase
of 528.98%). A correspondingly large reduction in a, setting a = 0.01, decreases the
number of trading partners to 0.22 (a reduction of 80.02%). In terms of stock levels,
setting a = 100 reduces average per-farm supply and demand to 0.29 from 1.18 (a
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Figure 3.10: Removal of all stock and response of trading system Average per-farm demand
(top left) and supply (top right), number of trading partners (middle left), number of trades (middle
right), batch size (bottom left), and per unit-time animal in-flow (bottom right) when global supply
and demand are removed. In all cases, shocks occur at t = 250.
reduction of 75.34%), whereas setting a = 0.01 increases these to 6.27 (an increase of
429.29%). Small values of a (large friction) result in farms having few trade partners
at any given time, so that there are fewer farms from whom to purchase animals to
satisfy demand. As such, average stock levels increase and animal batches during a
trade increase. Conversely, large values of a (low friction) cause farms to form more
partnerships, giving a greater number of farms from whom to purchase animals, so
average stock levels decrease and batch sizes are small. As with changes to trade
friction, greater friction in partnership formation (small a) increases the time for the
system to reach equilibrium, however in all cases farms are able to maintain their
required in-flow of animals.
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Duration of trade partnerships
Finally, we consider changes to the propensity for farms to end trade partnerships,
i.e. changes to the partnership cessation rate δ. Small values of δ result in longer
lasting partnerships, and small values result in short duration partnerships. Consid-
ering Figure 3.14, small δ (long duration partnerships) result in a greater number of
trading partners, more frequent trading (with smaller batches), and smaller levels
of per-farm unmet demand and available supply. On the other hand, large δ values
(short duration partnerships) result in very few trade partnerships and trades, larger
batch sizes when trades do occur, and farms have, in general, larger unmet demand
and available supply. It is impressive, however, that even in the case where δ = 100,
i.e. partnerships typically last 0.01 units of time, when farms have very few trade
partners, the system is still able to adapt and reach a stable equilibrium, with farms
maintaining their desired in-flow of animals. Of note is the transient dynamics of
stock quantities and batch sizes for small δ, where stock levels initially increase, be-
gin to level off, and then decrease to reach a stable equilibrium. The reason for this
is that at these small δ values, the timescales of trade and partnership cessations
are vastly different, with trade occurring more frequently than the removal of trade
partners. This allows farms to more readily purchase animals from trade partners
before the partnership ends, depleting supply levels and satisfying demand, causing
the decrease in stock levels and approach to a stable equilibrium.
3.4 Disease control and trade in a complex adap-
tive system
In this section we extend our trading model to account for disease spread via trades.
Previously in this chapter, we showed how alterations to the propensity for farms to
form and end partnerships, and make trades do not necessarily result in predictable
alterations to respective trade quantities, e.g. a reduction in the trade rate constant
bi does not yield a commensurate reduction in the number of trades. This was
due to the resulting impact on stock quantities, increasing pressure for farms to
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Figure 3.11: Impact of trade friction on price and stock generation Global excess demand
(top left), average price (top right), average demand generation rate η(t) (bottom left), and av-
erage supply generation rate ζ(t) (bottom right) for varying values of the trade rate constant b,
representing varying levels of trade friction.
form partnerships and continue trading. Alterations to friction changed the trading
structure of the system so that farms minimised their demand and maintain their
in-flows of animals. Such effects on network structure in relation to cattle trade
have not previously been explored, and the resulting implications for disease spread
may contradict previous results highlighting the effect of restrictions and changes to
network structure on disease spread [43, 85, 87].
We extend our trading model to include disease transmission in a similar manner as
in Chapter 2. The dynamics of disease are coupled with partnership dynamics and
trade by assuming disease is driven entirely by animal movements, neglecting indirect
transmission such as from external wildlife sources. Disease status is categorised at
farm level using a standard susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model; susceptible
farms become infected through trade with infected farms, and can themselves infect
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Figure 3.12: Impact of trade friction on trading system equilibria Average per-farm demand
(top left) and supply (top right), number of trading partners (middle left), number of trades (middle
right), batch size (bottom left), and per unit-time animal in-flow (bottom right) for varying values
of the trade rate constant b, representing varying levels of trade friction.
others, and, after an exponentially distributed infectious period 1/γ, recover to
become susceptible once again [8]. In addition to the infectious period, a given
disease is also characterised by an effective on-farm prevalence level λ, assumed
constant across infected farms and time. We therefore take λ to be the average
prevalence of an infected farm over its infectious lifetime. We assume each animal
moved off an infected farm i has a constant probability λ of infecting the susceptible
buying farm and that off-farm movements do not alter herd prevalence on the selling
farm [106]. Our disease model differs from the one presented in Chapter 2 in one
key element: batch sizes are not constant and thus the probability of infection varies
over time and with farm-level stock quantities. If an infected farm j sells θij(t)
animals to a susceptible farm i at time t, the probability that that trade results in
infection is B(θij(t)) = 1 − (1 − λ)θij(t), and the rate at which i receives infection
120
Figure 3.13: Impact of partnership formation friction on trading system equilibria Av-
erage per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top right), number of trading partners (middle left),
number of trades (middle right), batch size (bottom left), and per unit-time animal in-flow (bottom
right) for varying values of the partnership formation rate constant a, representing varying levels
of friction in the formation of trade partnerships.
from j is βji(t) = ϕijB(θij(t)), i.e. the rate at which i trades with j multiplied by
the probability that the trade results in the transmission of disease. Thus, trading
dynamics, and hence disease risks, change with the accumulation of stock and the
satiation of demand.
Having explored the generic behaviour of adaptive trade dynamics in our individual-
based systems model, we now explore a case study based on a simple representation
of a real-world trading system. We simulate disease spread on our trading system for
a network of N = 200 homogeneous farms (all farms share equal values for a, b, δ,
η∗, and ζ∗), and parameterise the system so that equilibrium per-farm averages for
number of trade partners, trades, batch size, and animal in-flow match those for the
Scottish trading system. Average values for these trading quantities are presented
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Figure 3.14: Impact of partnership durations on trading system equilibria Average per-
farm demand (top left) and supply (top right), number of trading partners (middle left), number
of trades (middle right), batch size (bottom left), and per unit-time animal in-flow (bottom right)
for varying values of the partnership cessation rate δ, representing varying levels of propensities
for farms to end trading partnerships.
in Table 3.2. In all scenarios presented below, we assume an initial burn-in period
for the trading system to reach equilibrium and to allow disease to be introduced
and reach an equilibrium prevalence level (we note that disease is introduced only
after the trading system has reached equilibrium). Putative changes to trade are
implemented at t = 50 in all cases. Disease parameters in all scenarios are λ = 0.25
(corresponding to 25% on-farm prevalence) and 1/γ = 3 (farms remain infectious
for an average of 3 time units). We will refer to this as the baseline disease scenario
throughout. All figures presented below are replicated in the Appendix for two fur-
ther disease scenarios: 1) λ = 0.05, γ = 1/3, representing a low farm prevalence, long
infectious period disease, and 2) λ = 0.25, γ = 1.5, representing a high farm preva-
lence, short infectious period disease. In all three disease scenarios, trading patterns
using the chosen parameterisation predict high system-level prevalence, suggesting
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that the trading system operates in a way that permits widespread prevalence across





In-flow (and out-flow) 27.1
Table 3.2: Table of system-level averages for trading quantities obtained from the Scottish trading
system.
3.4.1 The effect of friction on disease spread and control
To explore the role of friction on disease spread, we use a similar strategy as in
Chapter 2 by scaling the frictional components of partnership formations and trade,




Recall from Chapter 2 that these scalings were used to alter farm-level trading
propensities to desired levels.
Trade friction
Considering first alterations to trade via changes to εb, Figures 3.15 and 3.16 show,
respectively, the impact of changes to trade friction on trade quantities and preva-
lence levels over time, and at equilibrium. As expected, increases in trade friction
(small values of εb) result in significant alterations to the trade network, with farms
having more trade partners, overall greater demand and available supply, and with
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Figure 3.15: Impact of trade friction on trade and disease prevalence Average per-farm
demand (top left) and supply (top middle), number of trading partners (top right), number of
trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle), per unit-time animal in-flow (middle right), and
system disease prevalence (bottom left) for varying values of εb, the scaling factor to the frictional
component of trade, b. In all cases, disease is introduced at t = 25 and changes to trade at t = 50.
trades occurring much less frequently and with much larger size. We note, how-
ever, that for all values of εb considered, the system is able to adapt so that farm
in-flows are maintained, though there is a transitory period in which farm flows are
not maintained as the system adjusts to the alterations in the trade rate and farms
search for new trade partners. The resulting network still permits stable disease
persistence except in the case of very high friction when εb = 10
−5, as in this case
trades occur infrequently enough to allow infected farms to recover before they are
traded with, even though these trades are highly likely to spread disease if the source
farm is infected, due to the very large batch sizes of these trades. Considering Ap-
pendix Figure 3.30 for the low farm prevalence, long infectious period scenario, we
see that the impact of εb on disease prevalence is similar, with disease eradication
possible only in the extreme cases where trades become very infrequent. However,
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Figure 3.16: Impact of trade friction on equilibrium values of trading system and disease
prevalence Average equilibrium per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top middle), number of
trading partners (top right), number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle), per unit-
time animal in-flow (middle right), and system disease prevalence (bottom left) for varying values
of εb, the scaling factor to the frictional component of trade, b.
Appendix Figure 3.44 for the high farm prevalence, short infectious period scenario
shows that alterations to trade via εb are more effective, with complete removal of
disease achievable at smaller εb (εb ≤ 0.001). As prevalence is high under the base-
line trading network, this suggests that the recovery rate determines the efficacy of
alterations to trading patterns, highlighting the potential for on-farm biosecurity to
play a significant role in disease control.
Friction in partnership formation
Similar qualitative behaviour is observed when alterations are made to the frictional
component of partnership formation via εa as shown in Figures 3.17 and 3.18, with
disease persisting except at very small values of εa, which corresponds to a sparse
network in which few trade partnerships are present. In those scenarios farms are
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Figure 3.17: Impact of partnership formation friction on trade and disease prevalence
Average per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top middle), number of trading partners (top
right), number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle), per unit-time animal in-flow
(middle right), and system disease prevalence (bottom left) for varying values of εa, the scaling
factor to the frictional component of trade, a. In all cases, disease is introduced at t = 25 and
changes to trade at t = 50.
characterised by similar stock quantities as was observed for small εb, and few trades
occur but take large size. Again, however, the system adapts itself so that farm
flows are maintained. Interestingly, for very large values of εa, disease prevalence
is largely unaffected, despite the system tending towards a highly connected, highly
frequent trading regime in which farms are more readily able to satisfy their demand
and maintain animal flows. This is in direct contradiction of the results presented
in Chapter 2, which predicted that increasing network connectivity and trade fre-
quency would increase Ri0, leading to greater disease persistence. This result clearly
highlights the important role of accounting for farm-level stock quantities, and the
nontrivial effect satiation has on mitigating the potential role of trade on disease
spread. As with εb, the efficacy of alterations to partnership formation via εa is
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Figure 3.18: Impact of partnership formation friction on equilibrium values of trading
system and disease prevalence Average equilibrium per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top
middle), number of trading partners (top right), number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle
middle), per unit-time animal in-flow (middle right), and system disease prevalence (bottom left)
for varying values of εa, the scaling factor to the frictional component of trade, a.
determined by the disease parameters. For the low farm prevalence, long infectious
period scenario, Appendix Figure 3.32 shows that disease can only be eradicated in
the extreme cases when εa is very small. In the high farm prevalence, short infec-
tious period, scenario, Appendix Figure 3.46 shows that, as with εb, disease can be
eradicated at larger values of εa, so smaller alterations to the trading system are
required to reduce disease prevalence.
Duration of trade partnerships
Finally, we consider alterations to the trade partnership duration, 1/δ, through
changes in εδ. Larger values of εδ correspond to reductions in partnership duration,
and vice versa. Referring to Figures 3.19 and 3.20, we see that encouraging longer
lasting trade partnerships (small εδ) does not alter equilibrium prevalence signifi-
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Figure 3.19: Impact of partnership durations on trade and disease prevalence Average
per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top middle), number of trading partners (top right),
number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle), per unit-time animal in-flow (middle
right), and system disease prevalence (bottom left) for varying values of εδ, the scaling factor to
the partnership cessation rate, δ. In all cases, disease is introduced at t = 25 and changes to trade
at t = 50.
cantly, however it does lead to greater satiation of farm-level demand, due to the
greater average number of trade partnerships. Our results of Chapter 2 showed that
encouraging longer lasting partnerships could reduce disease persistence to non-zero
levels, but not completely eradicate disease. On the other hand, significantly reduc-
ing the duration of partnerships (large εδ) does reduce disease prevalence but even
for extreme values of εδ, eradication is not possible and the disease is able to persist
at a lower equilibrium prevalence. Appendix Figure 3.34 shows that for the low farm
prevalence, long infectious period scenario, the impact of εδ on disease prevalence is
similar to the baseline disease scenario, and complete eradication is not possible for
the values of εδ considered here. Indeed, only small reductions are achievable rela-
tive to the magnitude of change to the trading system. Encouragingly, in the high
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Figure 3.20: Impact of partnership durations on equilibrium values of trading system
and disease prevalence Average equilibrium per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top middle),
number of trading partners (top right), number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle),
per unit-time animal in-flow (middle right), and system disease prevalence (bottom left) for varying
values of εδ, the scaling factor to the partnership cessation rate, δ.
prevalence, short infectious period scenario, complete eradication of disease is possi-
ble when trade partnerships last for increasingly short durations, again highlighting
that the impact of changes to trade on disease prevalence is largely determined by
the infectious period, rather than the farm-level prevalence, possibly due to the base-
line structure of the trading system permitting widespread between-herd prevalence
even for low farm-level prevalences.
3.4.2 Movement testing: impact on trading patterns and
prevalence
Animal testing and culling is a common approach to control livestock diseases [59,
73, 123], however these result in financial burdens on farms due to production losses.
129
In this section we explore the ability for post-movement animal testing to control and
eradicate disease globally across a trading system for variable test sensitivities and
under two on-movement testing regimes: 1) test-and-cull individual animals, and 2)
test-and-cull whole animal batches. In contrast to existing models, a critical issue we
are able to address here is the system-wide response of the trading dynamics to the
impacts of such on-movement testing. That is, testing may cause long-term changes
to trading patterns due to the creation of imbalances in stock levels; if a trade
results in the detection of infected animals, the removal of these animals will result
in different levels of depletion of supply and demand for the selling and buying farm,
respectively, as the selling farm reduces its supply by the batch size of the trade, but
the buying farm’s demand is reduced only by the number of animals in the batch
that were not rejected. For example, assume a susceptible farm i makes a trade
with its infectious trade partner j. If the trade takes size θ, and the test sensitivity
is τ , i.e. infected animals test positive with probability τ , then the expected number
of detected animals in the batch is τλθ, i.e. the probability of detecting an infected
animal given a herd-level prevalence of λ multiplied by the batch size. Thus for
individual animal testing and rejecting, the expected number of infected animals
entering the buying farm is λθ(1− τ) and the stock levels of the buying and selling
farm are updated to, respectively,
Di(t)→ Di(t)− θ(1− τλ)
Sj(t)→ Sj(t)− θ.
In the case of testing and rejecting the entire batch, batches can only enter the
buying farm if all animals test negative, which occurs with probability (1 − τ)θ, so
the expected number of infected animals to enter the buying farm is λθ(1− τ)θ. In







The two testing strategies are equivalent when τ = 0, in which case no animals are
detected to be infected so there are no imbalances to stock depletion, and when τ = 1,
in which case all infected animals are detected and removed. In this scenario, the
effect of testing is expected to produce the greatest disturbance to trading patterns,
though is guaranteed to eradicate disease as batches from infected farms will always
be rejected, preventing any disease spread between farms. To measure the potential
financial burden of such on-movement controls, i.e. the costs of rejecting animals,
we calculate a simple measure of farms’ income, defined as the number of animals
each supplying farm sells (regardless of whether they are rejected due to testing
positive for infection) multiplied by the price at the time of the trade, and farms’
lost income, defined as the number of animals that are rejected due to testing positive
for infection multiplied by the price at the time of the trade. We then define the net
income as the difference between these two quantities. We assume that detection of
infected animals does not alter farms’ propensities to trade in the future with the
selling farm, except through the typical changes due to depletion of stock following
a trade.
Rejection of individual animals
Considering first testing-and-rejecting of individual animals, Figure 3.21 shows the
long-term evolution of the trading system when animal testing is introduced for a
range of selected test sensitivities. In general, we find that implementation of a
testing regime causes long-term changes to trading patterns (except when testing
eradicates disease). For example, at τ = 0.5, testing causes long-term increases in
farm-level demand and reductions in supply, causing long-term increases in price and
reductions in the net income of farms. Moreover, due to rejection of animals, farms
are unable to maintain their desired in-flow of animals. These long-term changes in
the system are due to testing being insufficient in fully removing disease, with very
small observed reductions in prevalence. When τ = 1, however, disease is guaranteed
to be eradicated as every infected animal tests positive for infection. In this scenario,
the system still exhibits a temporary shock to trading patterns following the intro-
duction of on-movement testing as animals are rejected during trades, however this
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Figure 3.21: Impact of individual animal rejection on trading system and disease preva-
lence Average per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top middle), number of trading partners
(top right), number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle), per unit-time animal in-
flow (middle right), price (bottom left), net income (bottom middle) and system disease prevalence
(bottom right) for various test sensitivities under the test-and-reject individual animal regime.
leads to rapid reduction in system-wide disease prevalence and trading patterns re-
turn to pre-testing equilibrium values. Assessing the effect of testing across a larger
range of sensitivities, Figure 3.23 shows that complete elimination of disease is pos-
sible only at very high test sensitivities, i.e. τ > 0.95, with prevalence being reduced
by only 3.45% at τ = 0.5 and 12.71% at τ = 0.75, though at τ = 0.95 prevalence
is reduced by approximately 87%, suggesting significant reductions in prevalence
are still possible at high, but not perfect, test sensitivities. From Appendix Figure
3.35, for the low farm prevalence high infectious period scenario, individual animal
rejection appears more effective at reducing prevalence, even for test sensitivities in
which eradication is not possible. This may be due to the fact that at low farm
prevalences λ, the number of infected animals in a batch is expected to be small. As
such, successful detection and removal of infected animals essentially clear infection
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Figure 3.22: Impact of whole batch rejection on trading system and disease prevalence
Average per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top middle), number of trading partners (top
right), number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle), per unit-time animal in-flow
(middle right), price (bottom left), net income (bottom middle) and system disease prevalence
(bottom right) for various test sensitivities under the test-and-reject whole batch regime.
from the batch, leading to fewer infectious trades. This results in smaller distur-
bances to trade, as fewer animals in a batch are rejected, minimising imbalances
in stock quantities. For the high farm prevalence, short infectious period scenario
(see Appendix Figure 3.49), testing and rejection of individual animals is also more
effective than in the baseline disease scenario. In this case, however, animal rejec-
tion is more effective because infected farms recover more quickly, so the number of
potentially infectious contacts is smaller. As such, if sufficient numbers of animals
are rejected so that disease spread is prevented, infected farms are more likely to
recover before they are traded with again and therefore are denied the chance to
infect their buyers.
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Rejection of animal batches
We now consider the testing-and-rejecting of batches. As explained above, under
this regime entire batches are rejected if a single infected animal is detected, which is
expected to cause greater long-term disturbances to trade for test sensitivities that
fail to fully eradicate disease, and even for sensitivities in which eradication is possi-
ble, we expect the temporary shocks to be significantly greater than the individual
animal test-and-reject regime. From Figure 3.22 we see that this is indeed true.
At τ = 0.5, rejecting batches leads to greater long-term increases in demand and
reductions in supply, larger increases in price, greater reductions in net income, and
a greater inability for farms to maintain their in-flows. Moreover, at this sensitivity
disease prevalence is reduced by 11.17%, compared with 3.45% for the individual
rejection scheme. At τ = 1, we see again that complete eradication of disease is pos-
sible, though the temporary shocks to the trading system are significantly greater
than in the individual animal rejection regime. Of note is the temporary net loss
exhibited under this regime when τ = 1, as all batches from infected farms are tem-
porarily removed while disease is cleared from the system. Referring to Figure 3.23,
we see that for all test sensitivities, batch rejection leads to larger reductions of dis-
ease prevalence than individual animal rejection, though the long-term disturbances
to trade are significantly greater for test sensitivities τ ≤ 0.85. For sensitivities
greater than this, the differences in disturbance to trade are small between the two
regimes, while the batch removal regime provides greater reduction in disease preva-
lence. Sensitivities of the single intradermal comparative cervical tuberculin test for
bTB have been estimated to have median values of between 87-90% [96, 111], and
the ELISA test to detect paratuberculosis is highly variable with sensitivities ranging
from 13.5% to 75% for high shedding animals [60, 120]. Referring to Appendix Fig-
ure 3.37, in the low farm prevalence, long infectious period scenario, the differences
in testing regimes is small for disease prevalence, though the whole batch rejection
strategy causes greater disturbances to trade at lower test sensitivities. However,
testing is more effective at reducing disease prevalence compared to the baseline dis-
ease scenario, with lower disease prevalence at all test sensitivities and eradication
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possible at τ ≈ 0.8, compared with τ = 0.95 in the baseline disease scenario. The
reasons for the small differences in prevalence reduction are due to the fact that
at small λ, batches are more likely to contain only a single infected animal, so the
detection of an infected animal in the individual rejection scheme has a similar effect
to the detection of an infected animal in the batch rejection scheme. In this case,
however, individual animal rejection is preferable as it is unlikely there are more in-
fected animals in the batch, whereas rejection of the entire batch overestimates the
risk of infection and leads to unnecessary disturbances on the trading system. For
the high farm prevalence, short infectious period scenario, Appendix Figure 3.51
shows that both individual and whole batch rejection is more effective compared
to the baseline disease scenario for all test sensitivities, highlighting the ability of
testing to prevent disease spread between farms before infected farms recover. We
observe that complete eradication is possible at τ = 0.75 for the individual rejection
scenario, and τ ≈ 0.6 for the whole batch rejection scenario. As in the baseline
disease scenario, whole batch rejection leads to greater reduction in prevalence, due
to batches containing, in general, a larger number of infected animals. At lower
test sensitivities, where infected animals are more likely to avoid detection, rejecting
the batch requires only a single detection, minimising the likelihood that infected
batches will avoid detection, and reducing onwards transmission.
3.4.3 Networked versus global information to inform risk
aversion
In the previous section we explored animal testing via trade, with successful detec-
tion of infected animals resulting in either individual animal or whole batch removal,
and showed that this can lead to disease eradication for high sensitivity tests, but
leads to long-term trade disturbances when testing is unable to eradicate disease.
However, detection of infected animals from a given supplier did not alter the likeli-
hood of the buying farm purchasing animals again from the still potentially infected
farm (beyond the typical effect due to the depletion of stock). Risk aversion, whereby
individuals avoid high-risk individuals, has been an observed behaviour of farmers in
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Figure 3.23: Equilibrium values of trading system and prevalence for both testing
regimes Equilibrium average per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top middle), number of
trading partners (top right), number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle), per unit-
time animal in-flow (middle right), price (bottom left), net income (bottom middle) and system
disease prevalence (bottom right) for various test sensitivities under the test-and-reject individual
animal regime (dashed lines) and test-and-reject batch regime (solid lines).
an attempt to control bTB [21, 35] and is generally know to impact the spread and
stability of disease [41]. Here we implement risk aversion through animal testing,
by altering the propensities for farms to form and maintain partnerships, and trade
with farms that are deemed high-risk, i.e. farms for which there is past evidence that
they are infected. We assume throughout that trade operates under a test-and-reject
batch scheme, i.e. farms reject the entire batch if a single animal tests positive.
We first implement risk aversion at a farm level, where buyers perceive suppliers to
be high-risk based on their previous trades with them and thus develop a perceived
prevalence of disease based on information from their individual trade network.
Farms maintain a vector of weights, Wi for farm i, that determine the propensity
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to form and end partnerships, and trade with each farm within the system. As
such we modify trade partnership formation, rate of trade with trade partners, and
dissolution of trade partnerships as follows:
αij(t)→ Wijαij(t),
ϕij(t)→ Wijϕij(t),
δi → (Wij)−1 δi,
where Wij is the j-th element of farm i’s vector of weights, i.e. the weight assigned
by farm i to farm j, and we take (Wij)
−1 to be the inverse of the j-th element of
Wij. Weights initially take value 1, with successful detection of infected animals
assigning a new weight ω < 1. Further trades that do not result in the detection of
infected animals incrementally increase weights in steps of ω until they return to 1,
and further trades in which detection occurs returns weight Wij to ω. We note that
this aversion strategy may lead to unnecessary long-term disturbances to trade even
when disease is eradicated, as farms only update their weights with each specific
supplier farm during trades, which the risk aversion strategy itself hinders.
Information propagation on local networks
Figure 3.24 shows the effect of individual risk aversion, with a chosen aversion param-
eter ω = 0.1 in all cases. At test sensitivity τ = 0.5, risk aversion causes long-term
perturbations to trade within the system, as test sensitivity is high enough for farms
to begin detecting infection and rejecting batches. This causes initial reductions
in farm-level supply, however risk aversion causes farms to avoid farms that are
deemed high-risk, resulting in these high-risk farms accumulating supply, causing
system-average supply levels to increase. When testing was performed in isolation
(Figure 3.22), we observed only long-term reductions in supply. We also observe
greater long-term increases in demand as a result of risk aversion, as farms avoid
trade with high-risk farms, reducing the number of farms that can be traded with.
In terms of disease prevalence, however, individual based risk aversion has a positive
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Figure 3.24: Impact of individual-based risk aversion on trading system and disease
prevalence Average per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top middle), number of trading
partners (top right), number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle), per unit-time
animal in-flow (middle right), price (bottom left), net income (bottom middle) and system disease
prevalence (bottom right) for various test sensitivities combining batch testing and removal with
farm-level risk aversion, where we set the aversion parameter ω = 0.1. Dashed lines in the disease
prevalence plot represent the average per-farm perceived level of prevalence, defined as the fraction
of the network with ω 6= 1.
effect in reducing prevalence for τ = 0.5, a sensitivity that did not permit removal of
disease when only testing was performed, with further reductions in disease preva-
lence compared with only testing. This reduction in prevalence reduces the number
of batches rejected, so that the price, net income, and in-flow of animals begin to
return to pre-testing equilibrium values, though we note that this return is slow
(and we do not follow the trajectory long enough to see complete convergence). We
see that weights that are updated solely through individual trades cause unneces-
sary system-wide “distrust” for test sensitivities that complete remove disease, e.g.
τ = 1. While disease is fully removed in this scenario, the average per-farm perceived
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prevalence (the fraction of farms that have a weight ω < 1) does not return to zero,
leading to long-term avoidance of farms deemed high-risk. Figure 3.26 shows that
over a range of test sensitivities, an individual based risk aversion strategy leads to
greater reductions in disease prevalence compared to the test-and-reject only strat-
egy for all test sensitivities τ > 0.15. Qualitatively, including individual based risk
aversion alters the impact of testing on farm-level supply and batch size, with both
quantities increasing with individual risk aversion, compared with decreasing with
test-and-reject only. Individual based risk aversion is not as effective in the low farm
prevalence, long infectious period scenario (see Appendix Figure 3.40), as risk aver-
sion is tied to successful detections of infected batches, which at low farm prevalences
are less likely than in the baseline disease scenario. As such, farm-level perceived
prevalences are lower and the actual disease prevalence is reduced by similar mag-
nitudes compared to simply testing, i.e. with no risk aversion. Similarly, in the
high farm prevalence, short infectious period scenario (see Appendix Figure 3.54),
individual based risk aversion does not significantly alter the ability for disease to
spread and persist. In this case, however, the small differences are due to the short
infectious periods, meaning farms are unlikely to repeat trade with infected farms
even without risk aversion. Thus, for short infectious period diseases, an individual
based risk aversion strategy is unnecessary compared to simply testing and rejecting
animal batches.
System-wide propagation of information
We now consider a system-wide aversion strategy, which we define as global risk
aversion. This aversion strategy differs from the individual based aversion strategy
in that farms no longer possess an individual vector of weights, rather all farms share
and contribute to information on high-risk suppliers through a single global vector
of weights. Thus, all farms adjust their behaviour towards individual farms when
any farm detects infection from a selling farm during a trade. We expect, therefore,
for a greater degree of risk aversion (at least initially) due to farms combining their
weights into a single, system-wide, aversion strategy. Considering Figure 3.25, we
indeed see that a global aversion strategy causes greater initial shocks in stock levels
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Figure 3.25: Impact of global risk aversion on trading system and disease prevalence Av-
erage per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top middle), number of trading partners (top right),
number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle), per unit-time animal in-flow (middle
right), price (bottom left), net income (bottom middle) and system disease prevalence (bottom
right) for various test sensitivities combining batch testing and removal with global (system-wide)
risk aversion, where we set the aversion parameter ω = 0.1. Dashed lines in the disease prevalence
plot represent the average per-farm perceived level of prevalence, defined as the fraction of the
network with ω 6= 1.
than individual based aversion, however for τ = 0.5 and τ = 1, these shocks are
temporary and farms begin to return to pre-testing equilibrium values. We notice
that for τ = 0.1, a global aversion strategy is still unable to eradicate disease, though
does lead to larger reductions in prevalence than in the individual based aversion
strategy. Long-term perturbations to the system are greater for this sensitivity than
for the individual based aversion strategy, due to a greater system-wide perceived
prevalence. For the global aversion strategy, we note that perceived prevalences
generally follow the trend of actual disease prevalence, which was not observed in
the individual based aversion strategy. For the individual based aversion strategy,
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Figure 3.26: Equilibrium values of trading system and prevalence for both risk aversion
strategies Equilibrium average per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top middle), number of
trading partners (top right), number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle), per unit-
time animal in-flow (middle right), price (bottom left), net income (bottom middle) and system
disease prevalence (bottom right) for various test sensitivities under a test-and-reject batch regime
only (black line), test-and-reject batch with individual risk aversion (red line), and test-and-reject
batch with a global aversion strategy (blue line). In both aversion strategies we set the aversion
parameter ω = 0.1.
farms updated their weights based on their trades with farms, resulting in perceived
prevalences that did not track actual prevalence levels. However, for the global aver-
sion strategy, farms collectively contribute to system-levels weights, so that trades
with high-risk farms are more likely to occur, resulting in updates to weights and
perceived prevalences that more closely resemble actual prevalence levels. Referring
to Figure 3.26, we observe that a global risk aversion strategy removes disease for
a much larger range of test sensitivities (τ ≥ 0.55). Furthermore, for sensitivities
that do not result in complete removal of disease, system-wide prevalence is still
significantly reduced compared to both an individual based aversion strategy and
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no aversion strategy at all (the latter corresponding to simply testing and rejecting
batches). As mentioned above, a global aversion strategy causes greater long-terms
disturbances to trade than an individual based and no aversion strategy at low test
sensitivities (τ ≤ 0.25), but is less intrusive than individual based risk aversion at
larger sensitivities. For the low farm prevalence, long infectious period scenario (see
Appendix Figure 3.54), global aversion does further reduce disease prevalence, but
not as significantly as in the baseline disease scenario. As with individual based
risk aversion, farms deem suppliers high-risk based on successful detections of in-
fected batches, which are less likely when the farm-level prevalence is low. As farm
weights increase based on subsequent trades that do not result in detected animals,
this reduced likelihood of detecting infected animals results in farm weights that are
generally higher than in the baseline disease scenario, so that farms are less risk
averse towards infected farms. In the high farm prevalence, short infectious period
scenario (see Appendix Figure 3.54), a global risk aversion strategy is highly effective
for all test sensitivities, significantly reducing disease prevalence compared with in-
dividual risk aversion and only testing, and can eradicate disease at test sensitivities
as low as τ = 0.25. As the global risk aversion strategy allows farms to preemptively
avoid high-risk farms (in the individual risk aversion regime farms must trade at
least once to determine whether a farm is high-risk), due to information on risk
being shared across the system, high-risk farms are avoided to such an extent that
they recover from infection before they are traded with and have the potential to
spread disease.
Discounting risk information
We conclude this section by including a natural incremental increase to weights
after some fixed period of time, as well as via trade. This is intended to represent a
regaining of trust of farms that are deemed high-risk. For a given aversion parameter
ω, we assume that farms incrementally increase weights of high-risk farms (whether
at an individual farm level or globally depending on the risk aversion strategy)
by ω if, after some fixed period, a positive test has not occurred with that high-
risk farm, until the weight returns to 1. We assume that this is in addition to
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Figure 3.27: Impact of discounting of risk for individual-based risk aversion on trading
system and prevalence Average per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top middle), number of
trading partners (top right), number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle), per unit-
time animal in-flow (middle right), price (bottom left), net income (bottom middle) and system
disease prevalence (bottom right) for test sensitivity τ = 0.75 combining batch testing and removal
with individual risk aversion and an incremental increase in weights after various periods of no
trades with a detected batch, where we set the aversion parameter ω = 0.1 and weights increase
in increments of ω. Dashed lines in the disease prevalence plot represent the average per-farm
perceived level of prevalence, defined as the fraction of the network with ω 6= 1.
the incremental increases to weights that occur if trades with high-risk farms do
not result in the testing and rejection of animal batches. We test the impact of
these natural incremental increases to weights for both the individual based aversion
strategy and the global aversion strategy. In all cases presented below we assume a
test sensitivity τ = 0.75, a sensitivity that allowed for complete removal of disease
in the global aversion regime, and significant (though not complete) reduction in
prevalence in the individual based aversion regime, and that farms operate under a
test-and-reject whole batch regime.
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Figure 3.28: Impact of discounting of risk for global risk aversion on trading system
and prevalence Average per-farm demand (top left) and supply (top middle), number of trading
partners (top right), number of trades (middle left), batch size (middle middle), per unit-time
animal in-flow (middle right), price (bottom left), net income (bottom middle) and system disease
prevalence (bottom right) for test sensitivity τ = 0.75 combining batch testing and removal with
global risk aversion and an incremental increase in weights after various periods of no trades with
a detected batch, where we set the aversion parameter ω = 0.1 and weights increase in increments
of ω. Dashed lines in the disease prevalence plot represent the average per-farm perceived level of
prevalence, defined as the fraction of the network with ω 6= 1.
Considering first the individual risk aversion scenario, Figure 3.27 shows that a nat-
ural weight increase is detrimental to the ability for risk aversion to reduce disease
prevalence, with a short period between weight increments resulting in higher dis-
ease prevalence compared with no natural weight increases. This is because weights
return to 1 more quickly, resulting in a perceived prevalence that is markedly lower
than the actual prevalence. Even when the period between increments is long, dis-
ease prevalence is generally larger, suggesting that for the chosen test sensitivity,
long-term “distrust” is beneficial in controlling disease. There are positive benefits
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of a natural weight increase, however, with farms more readily able to satisfy their
demand, but farm flows, price, and net income remain depressed compared with no
on-movement testing. In the case of small farm-level prevalence and long infectious
period Appendix Figure 3.42 shows that a natural weight increase does not signifi-
cantly alter the ability for risk aversion to remove disease, with similar qualitative
reductions in disease prevalence regardless of the time period in which weights are
updated. This is also the case for the high prevalence, short infectious period sce-
nario (see Appendix Figure 3.56), with rapid eradication of disease possible for all
weight increment periods.
For the global risk aversion scenario, Figure 3.28 shows that for all weight increment
periods, global risk aversion is still able to fully remove disease for our chosen test
sensitivity. There are clear benefits to including a natural weight increment in
this case, however, with smaller initial disturbances to trading patterns for smaller
weight increment periods (increased discounting of historic information on risk),
and no significant impact on the time for the trading system to return to pre-testing
equilibrium values once disease has been removed. This behaviour is also observed in
the low farm prevalence, long infectious period case (Appendix Figure 3.41) and the
high farm prevalence, short infectious period case (Appendix Figure 3.55), suggesting
a natural weight increment may be effective in minimising disruption to trade while
not impacting the ability for risk aversion to remove disease from the system for a
global risk aversion strategy and test sensitivity that is capable of removing disease.
3.5 Discussion
In this chapter, a highly dynamic generative trading model was introduced in which
farms’ propensities to form partnerships and trade with their trade partners are de-
termined by farm-level time-varying stock quantities, defined as supply and demand.
These stock quantities vary over time due to a constant rate at which farms increase
them in unitary amounts, and they are depleted via trade with farms’ trade partners.
Thus here we add the dynamics of farm-level supply and demand to the dynamics
of the trade partnership network modelled in Chapter 2. This ensures that trading
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and partnership formation behaviours of any given farm reflect livestock levels and
in particular satiation of demand due to trade can lead to long inter-trade times in
which farms accumulate stock before they trade again, a dynamic not systematically
accounted for in the model of Chapter 2. As real-world trading patterns vary over
time in the UK cattle trade network, with peaks in springtime, for example, [46,
113], incorporating a simple time-varying trading mechanism into our generative
models allows for more realistic trading dynamics.
However, these additional features come at the cost of analytical tractability, as our
model rates contain discontinuities (in the trade rate and batch size, for instance),
and we thus rely heavily on stochastic simulation of our system. Our model in
Chapter 2 was designed in such a way that analytical tractability was maintained,
and we were able to obtain disease relevant expressions for R0 that informed po-
tentially effective control strategies. An ongoing challenge is the development of a
theoretical framework allowing for analysis of our dynamic trading model. Our gen-
erative trading model introduced in this chapter goes beyond currently developed
generative trading models by 1) explicitly including time-varying trade partnerships,
an element of trade that is conspicuously lacking in the literature (except for our
model outlined in Chapter 2 [72]) and 2) all of our rates are functions of supply and
demand (current generative models assume constants rates of trade, for example)
[58, 87].
By altering the propensities for farms to form and end partnerships, and make trades
with their trade partners, we showed that our dynamic trading model reflects the
emergent adaptive nature of real-world trading amongst intelligent actors all seeking
to meet their business needs, and will adapt itself in response to these changes in such
a way that the structure of the network changes. This adaptive systems behaviour
is fundamentally different from the model introduced in Chapter 2. The network
adaptation is due to the pressure of accumulation of farm-level stock quantities
that these changes bring about, and enables farms to maintain their animal in-
flows. This network adaptation clearly shows the potential of generative trading
models, as typical data-driven network-based models of livestock trade have not, to
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our knowledge, explored how the network adapts to changes in trading propensities,
restrictions, or shocks. Our model shows that simple changes to trading propensities
do not result in predictable changes in farm trading patterns, as seen in the model
in Chapter 2. In response to shocks in stock quantities, our model rapidly adjusts,
leading to surges in trade as these shocks are mitigated, and quickly return to pre-
shock equilibrium values except in the extreme cases where farm-level demand is
perturbed by a significant amount, in which the system maintains an equilibrium
in which farm-level supply and demand are very slightly greater than pre-shock
equilibrium values.
We introduced disease spread via trade on a simple homogeneous system of N = 200
farms, parameterised in such a way that system-average properties, such as the
number of trade partners, trading frequency, batch size, and animal flows, matched
system-averages obtained from the Scottish subset of the CTS data. To our knowl-
edge, our analysis of trade, and changes in trade, on disease spread represents the
first in-depth attempt at exploring the role of trade on such a dynamic trading
model. We assumed a baseline disease parameterisation characterised by farm-level
prevalence λ = 0.25, and recovery rate γ = 1/3, representing a highly prevalence
and persistent disease, but also considered the effect of trade on two other diseases:
1) λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3, a low prevalence, highly persistent disease, and 2) λ = 0.25
and γ = 1.5, a high prevalence, short duration disease. We first explored the poten-
tial of changes to trading propensities on disease persistence, because the model of
Chapter 2 suggested these may be effective in reducing disease and reducing trade
frequency has also been shown to be potentially effective in a generative modelling
framework [87]. Under our dynamic trading model, we find that simple changes to
trading propensities do not reduce disease prevalence by significant amounts, except
in extreme cases where trade essentially stops, the network dissolves, or trade part-
nerships last for vanishingly small durations (even in this latter case, disease is not
completely eradicated). This resilience of disease to changes in trading propensities
is due to the adaptation of the trading system in response, with farms finding new
avenues of minimising their demand and maintaining animal flows that also allowed
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for the persistence of disease. The UK cattle trade network has been previously
shown to adapt in response to changes in trade aimed at reducing disease spread,
resulting in network structures that permit greater disease spread [44, 109, 115].
An interesting observation is that changes in trading propensities so that trades
occur more frequently leads to farms having a greater number of trade partners,
and partnerships that last longer, do not result in noticeable increases in disease
prevalence, as might be expected. As our homogeneous model is parameterised to
match system-average properties of the Scottish trading system, this may suggest
that farms currently trade in a very low frictional trading system, and significant
alterations to trading patterns may be required to reduce disease persistence.
Introducing testing of traded animals showed the potential for routine batch testing
on disease prevalence. For our baseline disease scenario, testing animals through
trade was shown to reduce disease prevalence, but could only eradicate disease in
high test sensitivity scenarios for both individual animal rejection, and whole batch
rejection. There were significant alterations to network structure in response to the
introduction of testing, with both individual and whole batch rejection resulting
in imbalances in farm-level stock quantities that disrupted animal flows, increased
prices, and reduced farms’ net incomes. We supplemented our testing strategies
by linking animal detections to different risk aversion strategies, in which farms
change their trading patterns towards farms deemed high-risk. Farm risk aversion
is an observed behaviour in an attempt to avoid infected of bTB [21, 35] and more
generally risk aversion has been shown to be effective in controlling disease (such
as COVID-19) [41]. We proposed two risk aversion strategies: an individual-based
risk aversion, whereby farms avoid farms from whom they have detected an infected
animal, and a global risk aversion, whereby farms share a common source of infor-
mation and avoid farms that have been deemed high-risk (by supplying an animal
detected as infected) either by them or by other farms in the system. Risk aversion
was shown to be an effective supplemental control strategy and significantly reduced
disease prevalence compared with only testing. In particular, a global risk aversion
strategy was shown to be able to eradicate disease even for low sensitivity tests, and
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resulted in lower disease prevalence for all test sensitivities. In the cases where risk
aversion could not completely remove disease, there were further disturbances to
the trading system as farms began avoiding high-risk farms, leading to greater un-
met demand. Moreover, individual level risk aversion lead to inaccurate perceptions
of prevalence. We attempted to prevent this by incorporating a natural increment
to farm weights, so that farms would regain “trust” in high-risk farms over time.
For the individual-based risk aversion strategy, this was shown to be detrimental
to prevalence reduction, as farms would more readily trade with high-risk farms,
resulting in greater prevalence than without this natural weight increment. For the
global aversion strategy, however, there were no significant impacts on disease preva-
lence, with eradication still possible at the chosen test sensitivities. In addition, the
transitory disturbances to the trading system were smaller when farms rapidly re-
gained their trust in high-risk farms, further augmenting the positive benefits of risk
aversion.
While our parameterisation was intended to match observed Scottish trading pat-
terns, we assumed for simplicity that the system was homogeneous, i.e. that all
farms traded in similar manners (on average). However, the Scottish and UK cattle
trading system is known to be highly heterogeneous, displaying scale-free behaviour
[22, 84, 113], and, more generally, network structure is known to have an impact on
disease spread [89, 100]. Moreover, we assumed a small system of N = 200 farms,
so factors that may influence disease spread such as network density are unexpected
to match the Scottish trading system. The results of this chapter, therefore, should
be interpreted with care, as they may not necessarily be indicative of the effect of
our explored control measures on real-world networks, but they do present a first
attempt at exploring such control measures using a complex adaptive systems model
of trading behaviour. In the next chapter we address the challenges of parameter-
ising our dynamic trading model for the Scottish trading system. In addition, we
will explore the potential for the control measures outlined here to be successful in
a real-world system, and the magnitude of disturbances to the trading system.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Plots for λ = 0.05, γ = 1/3
Effect of friction
Figure 3.29: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for varying values of εb, the scaling
factor to the frictional component of trade, b, when λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3.
Figure 3.30: Average equilibrium trade quantities and disease prevalence for varying values of εb,
the scaling factor to the frictional component of trade, b, when λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3.
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Figure 3.31: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for varying values of εa, the scaling
factor to the frictional component of trade, a, when λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3.
Figure 3.32: Average equilibrium trade quantities and disease prevalence for varying values of εa,
the scaling factor to the frictional component of trade, a, when λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3.
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Figure 3.33: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for varying values of εδ, the scaling
factor to the partnership cessation rate, δ, when λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3.
Figure 3.34: Average equilibrium trade quantities and disease prevalence for varying values of εδ,
the scaling factor to the partnership cessation rate, δ, when λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3.
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Batch testing
Figure 3.35: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivities under the
test-and-reject individual animal regime, and when λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3.
Figure 3.36: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivities under the
test-and-reject whole batch regime, and when λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3.
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Figure 3.37: Equilibrium average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitiv-
ities under the test-and-reject individual animal regime (dashed lines) and test-and-reject batch
regime (solid lines), and when λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3.
Risk aversion
Figure 3.38: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivities combining
batch testing and removal with farm-level risk aversion, where we set the aversion parameter
ω = 0.1, and λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3. Dashed lines in the disease prevalence plot represent the
average per-farm perceived level of prevalence, defined as the fraction of the network with ω 6= 1.
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Figure 3.39: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivities combining
batch testing and removal with global (system-wide) risk aversion, where we set the aversion
parameter ω = 0.1, and λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3. Dashed lines in the disease prevalence plot
represent the average per-farm perceived level of prevalence, defined as the fraction of the network
with ω 6= 1.
Figure 3.40: Average equilibrium trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivi-
ties combining batch testing and removal with global (system-wide) risk aversion, where we set the
aversion parameter ω = 0.1, and λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3. Dashed lines in the disease prevalence plot
represent the average per-farm perceived level of prevalence, defined as the fraction of the network
with ω 6= 1.
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Figure 3.41: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivities combining
batch testing and removal with global (system-wide) risk aversion and natural incremental increase
to weights, where we set the aversion parameter ω = 0.1, and λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3. Dashed lines
in the disease prevalence plot represent the average per-farm perceived level of prevalence, defined
as the fraction of the network with ω 6= 1.
Figure 3.42: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivities combining
batch testing and removal with individual risk aversion and natural incremental increase to weights,
where we set the aversion parameter ω = 0.1, and λ = 0.05 and γ = 1/3. Dashed lines in the
disease prevalence plot represent the average per-farm perceived level of prevalence, defined as the
fraction of the network with ω 6= 1.
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3.6.2 Plots for λ = 0.25, γ = 1.5
Effect of friction
Figure 3.43: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for varying values of εb, the scaling
factor to the frictional component of trade, b, when λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5.
Figure 3.44: Average equilibrium trade quantities and disease prevalence for varying values of εb,
the scaling factor to the frictional component of trade, b, when λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5.
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Figure 3.45: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for varying values of εa, the scaling
factor to the frictional component of trade, a, when λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5.
Figure 3.46: Average equilibrium trade quantities and disease prevalence for varying values of εa,
the scaling factor to the frictional component of trade, a, when λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5.
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Figure 3.47: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for varying values of εδ, the scaling
factor to the partnership cessation rate, δ, when λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5.
Figure 3.48: Average equilibrium trade quantities and disease prevalence for varying values of εδ,
the scaling factor to the partnership cessation rate, δ, when λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5.
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Batch testing
Figure 3.49: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivities under the
test-and-reject individual animal regime, and when λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5.
Figure 3.50: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivities under the
test-and-reject whole batch regime, and when λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5.
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Figure 3.51: Equilibrium average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitiv-
ities under the test-and-reject individual animal regime (dashed lines) and test-and-reject batch
regime (solid lines), and when λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5.
Risk aversion
Figure 3.52: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivities combining
batch testing and removal with farm-level risk aversion, where we set the aversion parameter
ω = 0.1, and λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5. Dashed lines in the disease prevalence plot represent the
average per-farm perceived level of prevalence, defined as the fraction of the network with ω 6= 1.
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Figure 3.53: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivities combining
batch testing and removal with global (system-wide) risk aversion, where we set the aversion
parameter ω = 0.1, and λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5. Dashed lines in the disease prevalence plot
represent the average per-farm perceived level of prevalence, defined as the fraction of the network
with ω 6= 1.
Figure 3.54: Average equilibrium trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivi-
ties combining batch testing and removal with global (system-wide) risk aversion, where we set the
aversion parameter ω = 0.1, and λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5. Dashed lines in the disease prevalence plot
represent the average per-farm perceived level of prevalence, defined as the fraction of the network
with ω 6= 1.
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Figure 3.55: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivities combining
batch testing and removal with global (system-wide) risk aversion and natural incremental increase
to weights, where we set the aversion parameter ω = 0.1, and λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5. Dashed lines
in the disease prevalence plot represent the average per-farm perceived level of prevalence, defined
as the fraction of the network with ω 6= 1.
Figure 3.56: Average trade quantities and disease prevalence for various test sensitivities combining
batch testing and removal with individual risk aversion and natural incremental increase to weights,
where we set the aversion parameter ω = 0.1, and λ = 0.25 and γ = 1.5. Dashed lines in the disease
prevalence plot represent the average per-farm perceived level of prevalence, defined as the fraction




generative systems model for
livestock trade and implications
for disease control
4.1 Introduction
It is well understood that trade plays a role in the spread of livestock diseases,
though a complete understanding of the mechanisms through which trade influences
disease spread are not fully understood. It is vital, therefore, that models of livestock
trade that can capture much of the complexity of the systems they represent are
developed so that a thorough understanding of trade can be obtained and used to
develop truly effective disease control strategies. Attempts to model livestock trade
and disease have largely consisted of constructing static and temporal networks of
observed trades from a dataset and subsequent simulation of disease spread through
those movements [43, 71, 76, 98, 117]. These models, while illustrative, cannot
necessarily be generalised to ask “what if...” questions, as they are necessarily
constrained by past movements observed in data. For example, such approaches are
164
not suited to address questions that relate to how the trade system might adapt
in the face of shocks or under the imposition of regulations or control policies;
precisely the kind of questions of most interest to policy makers. Generative models
in which a system is parameterised according to data that capture individual-level
properties while not being constrained to specific movements may be an invaluable
tool in exploring the role of trade in disease spread and there is a pressing need
for the development of such models [57]. Cattle trading networks, with more or
less complete observation of a dynamic network process in realtime, represent an
ideal case-study for the development of such tools. However, there have been few
such attempts to develop generative network models for cattle trading networks, and
these have generally made simplifying assumptions such as parameterising assuming
a homogeneous system or treating trading dynamics as static [58, 87].
In Chapter 3, a generative model of livestock trade dynamics was developed that in-
cluded farm-level time-varying quantities, representing available supply and demand
for a given farm and time. The model was designed so that these stock quantities de-
termined the rates at which farms sought out trading partners and initiated trades.
It was shown that altering the propensities for farms to form or end partnerships, or
initiate trades would ultimately change the structure of the network as farms sought
to minimise their unmet demand and maintain animal flows. When disease spread
was introduced through trade, it was shown that these manipulations may not be as
effective in reducing disease prevalence as had been shown in Chapter 2, due to this
adaptation of the system and resulting restructuring of the network, however dis-
ease could be eliminated in some extreme cases, such as when trades occurred very
infrequently, or the network was essentially dissolved. Alternative control strategies,
such as batch testing and risk aversion, were considered and shown to be potentially
effective, but would lead to transitory disturbances to the trading system in the
cases when widespread disease could be eradicated, and ongoing disturbances when
disease could not be eradicated.
While the analysis of Chapter 3 was informative on the potential dynamics of disease
spread in our modelled dynamic trading system, homogeneity was assumed and the
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system size was small (N = 200). The model was parameterised in such a way that
system-average properties, such as average unit-time trades, trade partners, and
batch size were similar to those observed in the Scottish cattle trading system, how-
ever the network structure ultimately differed markedly from the real-world system
as the Scottish system is highly heterogeneous and exhibits scale-free behaviour, i.e.
a small fraction of farms trade in ways and frequencies vastly different to the ma-
jority of the system [22, 84, 113]. Network structure is known to have an impact on
disease spread [89, 100], so applying the model of Chapter 3 to the Scottish trading
system is vital in truly understanding the impact of proposed trading and control
strategies on disease spread.
The highly dynamic nature of the our trading model introduces challenges in terms
of parameterisation for the Scottish trading system, namely due to the fact that
farm-level stock quantities are unobservable in the data. In this chapter, therefore,
a method for using the CTS data to parameterise our dynamic trading model is
outlined in Section 4.2 and an analysis of the resulting parameterised system is
explored to ensure that system- and farm-level properties are well characterised
in our dynamic trading model. It will be shown that the parameterised system
represents farms’ trading properties to a very high degree of success, and accurately
characterises qualitative and quantitative distributional properties at system-level.
Disease spread via trade is introduced in Section 4.3 and alterations to trade and
control strategies similar to those explored in Chapter 3 will be applied to the
Scottish system, highlighting potential effective avenues for disease control on this
real-world system.
4.2 Parameterising systems model of trade dy-
namics using farm-to-farm movement data
In this section we describe the challenges and our method for parameterising the
trading model outlined in Chapter 3 Section 3.2 to the Scottish cattle trade system
using the Cattle Tracing System (CTS) data. We show that an accurate parameter-
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isation is possible and that farm-level properties can be captured by our dynamic
model.
The fundamental challenge of parameterising our model is that the rates of partner-
ship formation and trade are functions of dynamic, time-varying stock quantities,
Di(t) and Si(t), which are not recorded in available data. While animal flows are
readily observable in the data, farm-level demanded and available stock are hidden
and the relationship between farm-level supply and demand and animal flows may be
difficult to discover (preventing a simple mapping of the farm-level parameterisation
from Chapter 2 to our supply and demand based trading model used here), as in the
data farms maintain their animal flows in different ways, e.g. by purchasing from
multiple farms, making frequent small batch trades, infrequent large batch trades,
etc. In Chapter 2, parameterisation was more straightforward as rates were constant
functions of farms’ average annual in- and out-flows, so we had only to obtain values
of ai, δi, and bi that replicated the frequency of partnership formations, cessations,
and trades, respectively.
To parameterise our dynamic trading model, we take the parameterisation from
Chapter 2 as an initial state, so we assume that farm-level equilibrium demand and
supply is, on average, equivalent to their respective equilibrium stock generation
rates, η∗i and ζ
∗
i . This assumption is likely to overestimate stock levels for farms
that trade frequently, but underestimate stock levels for farms that do not trade
frequently. Farms that trade frequently, e.g. more than once per year, accumulate
less demand before it is satisfied (at least partially) via trade so that typicallyDi(t) ≤
η∗i ), whereas farms that trade infrequently (less than once per year), will accumulate
more demand before it is satisfied via trade so typically Di(t) ≥ η∗i . Nonetheless,
using this initial state, we simulate our trading system to obtain per unit-time
averages (for each farm) for the number of trading partnerships and number of
trades. We then use these values to inform necessary adjustments to ai and bi (the
parameters η∗i , ζ
∗
i , and δi are invariant to changes in farm-level supply and demand
and so their values are readily observed from data as described in Chapter 2) in the
following way:
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where s is the sth simulation (equivalently the sth step in the fitting algorithm),
kini (s) is the average number of trading partners for farm i in simulation s, Φi(s) is
the average number of trades for farm i in simulation s, and kin,datai and Φ
data
i are
the number of trading partners and trades for farm i from the data, respectively.
The ratios kin,datai /k
in
i (s) and Φ
data
i /Φi(s) are the factors quantifying the difference
between the data and simulation for number of trading partners and number of
trades for farm i in simulation s, respectively. We implicitly assume, therefore,
that the number of trading partners and number of trades are monotonic functions
of ai and bi, respectively (our method may still be applicable for non-monotonic
functions if the initial values of ai and bi are sufficiently close to the true values).
We then use the updated values for ai and bi and iteratively re-simulate the system
and update ai and bi. These simulations are run to simulate trade dynamics in the
modelled system for the period of time spanned by the observations so that numbers
of trades and trade partners can be compared as described above. In addition, it is
important to note that simulations are allowed to equilibriate before recording these
measures since, as noted in Chapters 2 and 3 we assume that the observed data is
representative of a system in equilibrium. We note here that we assume that the
generation of stock is deterministic, so in an abritrary time interval [t, t+ ∆t], farm
i will generate ηi(t)∆t demand and ζi(t)∆t supply. We choose ∆t to be the largest
time interval that allows for the farms with the largest η∗i and ζ
∗
i to generate one
unit of demand and supply in this time interval, respectively. This was done due
to the computational complexity of simulating our trading system, but does lead to
predictable fluctuations in price and excess demand that operate on 9 year cycles,
reflecting the duration of observations in the CTS used here.
Our iterative method for obtaining parameter values is somewhat analogous to an
Expectation-Maximisation algorithm (EM algorithm). The EM algorithm calculates
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an expectation for the log-likelihood given current parameter estimates, followed by
computation of parameter values that maximise the expectation of the calculated
log-likelihood. The two steps are then iteratively repeated until suitable parameter
values are obtained [28]. Starting from an initial reasonable best guess, our method
proceeds by calculating a discrepancy measure between simulations based on current
parameter values (which plays the role of the log-likelihood here), and then uses
this to make an adjustment to the parameter values. This process is iterated until
convergence. Our method is able to parameterise farms in such a way that per-farm
trading quantities are replicated in stochastic simulation, though we note that it
does not explain the relationship between farm-level supply and demand and their
respective animal flows. For farms that trade infrequently, in particular farms that
only make one observed trade in the nine year period we consider from the CTS data,
the above method requires multiple iterations to obtain suitable parameterisations.
This is because these farms are susceptible to inherent stochasticity in simulation
and long inter-event times, resulting in unit-time averages obtained from only a
small number of observed events.
4.2.1 Assessing model fit at global and farm level
Figure 4.1 shows per-farm fits after a sequence of parameter iterations using the
method outlined above. In general, simulation output is able to replicate desired
trading behaviour for individual farms as described in the data. Correlations be-
tween data and simulated output of trade quantities for individual farms are given
in Table 4.1, highlighting that in general our parameterisation replicates, at farm
level, trading behaviour exhibited in the data extremely well. The area of poorest
performance is that farm batch sizes are generally not as well represented by simu-
lation. However there is still a statistically significant positive correlation between
simulation and data (see Table 4.1). In particular it is farms that trade with large
batch sizes that are not as accurately represented. However, such farms are generally
those that make a small number of trades (typically 1 or 2) over the 9 year period of
the observations, and as such are those farms that are challenging to parameterise.
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Figure 4.1: Model fits to data The average number of trade partners (top left), number of trades
(top middle), batch size (top right), animal in-flow (bottom left), and animal out-flow (bottom
middle) comparing respective values obtained from data against average values from stochastic
simulation, where each point represents a farm in the system.
Quantity Correlation p-value
Trade partners 0.9999 < 2.2× 10−16
Trades 0.9999 < 2.2× 10−16
Batch size 0.4261 < 2.2× 10−16
In-flow 0.9998 < 2.2× 10−16
Out-flow 0.9999 < 2.2× 10−16
Table 4.1: Table of correlation coefficients of trade quantities from simulation and data output for
individual farms.
Figure 4.2 shows simulation output over time (of a single realisation) for our cur-
rent optimal parameterisation, starting from an initial condition in which no trade
partnerships are present but must be formed through parnership formations and ces-
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Figure 4.2: Time evolution of trading system System average per-farm demand (top left),
supply (top right), number of trade partners (middle left), trades (middle right), batch size (bottom
left), and animal in-flow (bottom right). In all cases dashed horizontal lines represent system
averages obtained from data.
sations. After an initial burn-in period, where the system rapidly evolves to satisfy
demand and ensure farm flows are maintained, the system reaches a stable equilib-
rium. We note that the equilibria differ slightly for number of trade partners and
average batch size, so that in general in simulation farms have a greater number
of trade partners and trade batches of smaller size than the data. To explore the
properties of this equilibrium, we use the autocorrelation function as a measurement
of the correlation between successive time points for each of our trading quantities.
Figure 4.3 shows that for all trade quantities, autocorrelations show a general trend
of tending towards zero, which is typically the case in stochastic dynamic systems
[81]. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the dynamics of supply and demand operate on similar
timescales (likewise for the dynamics of trades and partnership formation). Further-
more, it is interesting to note that the dynamics of supply and demand appear to
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operate on longer timescales than those of trade partnership and trade dynamics,
with the former having an autocorrelation length (time over which the ACF falls
to 0.5) of around half a decade, whereas the autocorrelation lengths of partnership
and trade dynamics are less than a year. However, whilst the form of these auto-
correlations are informative of the dynamical properties of the trading system, their
further analysis remains the subject of future work.
Considering distributional properties of the trading system (again noting that values
are obtained once the simulations have reached equilibrium), Figure 4.4 highlights
that our stochastic model is also able to replicate the distributions of trade quantities
to a very high degree. More rigorously, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S
test) to measure the extent to which our simulation deviates from the data. To
do so, the K-S test calculates the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of each trade quantity from the data and from simulation output, and obtains the
absolute maximum difference D between the simulation CDF and the data CDF.
Table 4.2 shows the values of D for various trade quantities, and we conclude that
there is no significant difference between the distribution of simulation output and
data output.
Quantity D p-value
Trade partners 0.0541 < 2.2× 10−16
Trades 0.0767 < 2.2× 10−16
Batch size 0.0574 < 2.2× 10−16
In-flow 0.0433 5.548× 10−13
Out-flow 0.0258 7.121× 10−5
Table 4.2: Table of K-S test maximum absolute difference between stochastic simulation output
and data.
On a more granular scale, we consider the per-farm ratio of simulation output to





Figure 4.3: Autocorrelations of trading system Autocorrelation function plots for simulation






If the simulation value matches the data value, then this ratio will be equal to 1,
if it is smaller then the ratio will be smaller than 1, and if it is larger then the
ratio will be greater than 1. From Figure 4.5, we see that, for all trade quantities,
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Figure 4.4: Model distributions of trade quantities Density distributions of average number
of trade partners (top left), trades (top right), average batch size (middle left), average animal in-
flow (middle right), and out-flow (bottom left). In all cases blue lines represent out from stochastic
simulation, and black lines are obtained from the data.
farms generally operate in the simulation similarly to their observed behaviour in
the data. Table 4.3 shows that there are some farm-level differences between the
simulation and data, with not insignificant values for the Mean Absolute Percentage









where N is the system size, and Di and Si are the data and simulation output for
farm i for a given trade quantity, e.g. number of trade partners. Table 4.4 also
highlights that the percentage of farms whose simulations outputs deviate greatly
from the data are relatively small, with the number of trading partners being the
most variable. Encouragingly, however, we see that farm in- and out-flows are very
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Figure 4.5: Assessing farm-level differences in model compared to data Distributions of
the per-farm ratios between simulation output and data for the average number of trade partners
(top left), number of trades (top right), the average batch size (middle left), and the animal in-
and out-flows (middle right and bottom left, respectively). In all cases, red dashed lines represent
a ratio of 1, indicating the simulation perfectly represents the data. Note the scales of x-axes differ
between panels, emphasising small differences in farm flows.
well represented by simulation, clearly showing that our model is able to accurately
match buyers and sellers so that farm flows are maintained.
Sim-data ratio Mean S.D MAPE
Batch size 1.03 0.24 9.06
Num. trades 0.97 0.15 8.95
Num. trade partners 1.02 0.24 13.72
In-flow 0.97 0.07 2.77
Out-flow 0.99 0.02 1.32
Table 4.3: Table of sim-data ratios of trade quantities with their respective system-wide means,
standard deviations, and MAPE, the mean absolute percentage error.
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Figure 4.6: Model distributions of supply and demand Histogram of average farm-level
demand (left) and supply (right) obtained from stochastic simulation of our trading system.
Sim-data ratio Num (%) ≤ 0.8 Num (%) ≥ 1.2
Batch size 580 (3.77) 1162 (7.55)
Num. trades 1169 (7.60) 598 (3.89)
Num. trade partners 1436 (9.33) 1777 (11.55)
In-flow 362 (2.35) 0 (0)
Out-flow 13 (0.08) 0 (0)
Table 4.4: Table of the number (and percentages) of farms with sim-data ratios smaller than 0.8
and greater than 1.2.
4.2.2 Measuring farm stock quantities
It was highlighted in Section 4.2 that the fundamental challenge of paramterisation
of our trading model was the inability to explicitly relate farm flows, that were used
to parameterise the model in Chapter 2, to time-varying, farm-level stock quantities,
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Figure 4.7: Model cumulative distributions of supply and demand Cumulative distribution
of farm-level supply and demand stock, obtained from stochastic simulation of our trading system.
namely supply and demand. Our iterative method for parameterising the system,
however, allowed us to achieve accurate, per-farm values for ai and bi, the frictional
components of partnership formation and trade, respectively, without requiring us
to define this relationship explicitly (the resulting simulations define an implicit
relationship). We dedicate this section, therefore, to exploring potential relationships
between farm-level stock quantities and trade behaviour. Referring to Figure 4.6,
we see that the majority of farms have small unmet demand and available supply at
any given time; indeed 94.58% and 75.04% of farms have, on average, demand and
supply smaller than 10, respectively. Figure 4.7 shows that farms have, in general,
smaller available supply than demand, suggesting that waiting times between trades
are due primarily to the requirement for farms to accumulate supply, and also shows
that our model is efficient in matching buyers and sellers so that available supply is
minimised by efficient trade.
Exploring the relationship between farm-level trading patterns and stock quantities
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(noting that our calculations are based on simulation output), we find there is little
correlation between a farm’s demand generation rate η∗i and its average demand
(R2 = 0.0303), but there is a strong, significant, positive relationship between a
farm’s average batch size and its average demand (R2 = 0.4375), indicating that
farms with large demand generally trade in large batches. Conversely, there is a
very strong relationship between a farm’s supply generation rate ζ∗i and its avail-
able supply (R2 = 0.9203). This may be due to the fact that in our model farms
have no agency in offloading supply, with trades and the formation of partnerships
being initiated by the buying farm. Moreover, the partnership formation rate αij(t)
nonlinearly increases with supply, so large supply farms are not disproportionately
chosen as trade partners. This does not lead to divergences in excess demand, how-
ever, as is evident from Figure 4.8, showing that global excess demand is small and
any imbalances in stock levels are quickly accounted for by appropriate alterations to
price and stock generation rates. In addition, the average ratio of demand to supply,
another measurement for imbalances in stock quantities, is very tightly constrained
around 1.
Exploring whether high farm-level demand can be explained by an inability for
farms to maintain their in-flow, we find that farms that do not maintain their in-
flow relative to their expected in-flow from the data (the number of such farms is
very small, see Table 4.4) generally have larger demand (R2 = −0.3453) suggesting
that unmet demand may be reduced for these farms if they were able to maintain
their in-flows. Conversely, there is very little correlation between farm-level supply
and the difference in out-flow from simulation compared to the data (R2 = 0.0976)
(see Figure 4.9).
4.3 Disease spread on Scottish cattle trading sys-
tem
We now use the parameterised model to explore the dynamics of potential disease
control in the Scottish cattle trading system. Disease is introduced and spreads via
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Figure 4.8: Measuring model imbalances in supply and demand The average system-wide
excess demand (left) and the average ratio of demand to supply (right), obtained from stochastic
simulation of our trading system.
trade in a way similar as in Chapter 3. We assume infected farms have a constant
farm-level prevalence λ and recover with rate γ so that infected farms are infected for
an exponentially distributed period with mean 1/γ. If a susceptible farm i makes a
trade with its infectious trade partner j of batch size θ, the probability that i becomes
infected is simply the probability that at least one infected animal from j is chosen
in the batch, which occurs with probability 1− (1− λ)θ. Thus, larger batches have
a greater probability of transmitting disease. In the scenarios presented below we
assume λ = 0.25, and γ = 1/3, intended to represent a high prevalence disease that
is highly persistent. Under current trading patterns of the Scottish trading system,
our model predicts an equilibrium between-herd prevalence of approximately 55%,
as opposed to approximately 88% for the homogeneous system studied in Chapter
3. This disparity highlights a number of important network characteristics that
should be taken into account. Firstly, we assumed a system size of N = 200 in
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Figure 4.9: Impact of model and data differences on farm-level supply and demand
Per-farm average animal in-flow against demand and out-flow against supply averaged over a 45
year period.
Chapter 3, as opposed to N = 15386 in the real-world system, and while the model
was parameterised so that system-average properties of the Scottish system were
replicated, this lead to a more densely connected network, allowing disease to spread
more easily between farms. Secondly, the homogeneous structure of the network
itself played a role, as all farms exhibited average system-level properties of the
Scottish system. However, the Scottish system is highly heterogeneous, displaying
scale-free properties, which are known to skew the mean. As such, trading patterns
of farms in the homogeneous system are different from those of “typical” farms in
the Scottish system.
4.3.1 Impact of changes to propensities of trade
In Chapter 3, we showed that simple changes to the propensitities for farms to form
and end partnerships, and initiate trades by scaling the partnership formation rate
180
constant ai, the cessation rate δi and the trade frictional constant bi by, respectively,
εa, εδ, and εb were insufficient in significantly reducing disease prevalence. The ex-
ceptions were in extreme scenarios where trading patterns were disturbed sufficiently
to effectively halt trade in the case of εb, alter network structure so that farms have
very few trade partners in the case of εa, and cause partnerships to last vanishingly
small time periods in the case of εδ. This was in contrast of the results of Chapter
2 which suggested these changes could be highly effective. These differences are a
result of the adaptive capacities of the trade system as represented in the model
developed in Chapter 3. This flexibility is mediated by the dynamic nature of in-
dividual farm-level supply and demand levels which rise in response to restrictions
represented by the above mentioned scalings of trade rate and partnership formation
and duration. Since the relevant rates depend on both the intrinsic rate parame-
ters and dynamically adjusted supply and demand, this allows the farm-level animal
flows to be maintained, with potential prevalence reducing benefits of alterations to
trade patterns being limited or nullified.
We now explore the potential for impacts on the structure of the Scottish trading
system, and disease prevalence, resulting from such changes, i.e. to changes in
friction associated with trading and the formation of trade partnerships, as well as to
the duration of such partnerships. In particular, we consider two alterations: halving
current rate constants for each individual farm, i.e. we set ε = 0.5, and doubling
current rate constants for each individual farm, i.e. we set ε = 2. Considering first
alterations to trading frequency via εb, we observe from Figure 4.10 that setting
εb = 0.5 results in a noticeable decrease in trade frequency, however these trades
occur with larger batch sizes, and farms have, in general, a larger number of trade
partners. The opposite holds true when εb = 2, with farms trading more frequently
and in smaller batches, and have fewer trade partners in general. In both scenarios,
we note that farms flows are not disturbed, highlighting the ability for the modelled
system to adapt and find new structures that enable farm flows to be maintained.
Figure 4.11 shows that the effect on prevalence of changes to εb are small, with slight
reductions in prevalence when εb = 0.5, and little to no increase when εb = 2. Recall
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Figure 4.10: Impact of trade friction on Scottish trading system System-averages for various
trade quantities when each farm’s trade rate constant bi is scaled by various values of εb. Vertical
dashed lines represent the point at which εb is changed, and horizontal dashed lines represent
respective system-wide averages for various trade quantities as obtained from the CTS data.
that this was also observed in the homogeneous adaptive systems model of Chapter
3. The fact that prevalence is largely unaltered suggests that simple interventions
designed to impact one aspect of trade behaviour, e.g. to increase trade friction, can
result in complex changes to trade networks and unpredictable changes in prevalence,
due to farms finding new avenues to maintain animal flows. It may also suggest that
the Scottish trading system is currently operating in a very low frictional trading
regime in the sense that changes to trade friction make little difference to overall
outcome in terms of net flows of animals. This implies that the system dynamic (the
market) is sufficiently flexible to overcome the effect of increased friction in one or
other constituent activity, in this case trade. This may also be inferred from Figure
4.4, when considering batch sizes. Most farms buy animals in batches of 1, i.e. a
single animal is bought per observed trade, whereas if trade friction was very high,
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Figure 4.11: Impact of trade friction on disease prevalence System-wide disease prevalence
when each farm’s trade rate constant bi is scaled by various values of εb. Vertical dashed lines
represent the point at which εb is changed.
it might be expected that farms would generally purchase larger batches.
Considering now alterations to the propensity for farms to form trading partnerships
via εa, we again consider scenarios where εa = 0.5, so that farms generally form fewer
partnerships, and ε = 2 so that farms form more partnerships. From Figure 4.12,
when εa = 0.5 the trading system shifts to one which the methods of Chapter 2
would suggest is highly favourable for reducing disease prevalence; farms have fewer
trade partners, and trade less frequently with larger batches. Conversely, when
εa = 2, the system shifts to an unfavourable structure, with farms having a larger
number of trade partners, and trade more frequently in smaller batches. Figure
4.13 shows, however, that while disease prevalence is reduced and increased when
ε = 0.5 and ε = 2, respectively, the magnitude of these changes are small. Again,
this result was highlighted in Chapter 3, with significant alterations to εa required
to reduce disease prevalence. We note that in the case of εa = 2, farm-level stock
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Figure 4.12: Impact of partnership formation friction on Scottish trading system System-
averages for various trade quantities when each farm’s partnership formation rate constant ai is
scaled by various values of εa. Vertical dashed lines represent the point at which εa is changed,
and horizontal dashed lines represent respective system-wide averages for various trade quantities
as obtained from the CTS data.
quantities are reduced significantly, as farms have a greater number of available
suppliers from whom to purchase stock. Our model, therefore, suggests there may
be scope for changes to the Scottish cattle trading system, allowing farms to form a
greater number of trade partnerships, as this appears to have only small implications
for disease prevalence.
Finally, we consider alterations to the duration of partnerships via εδ, and again
assume two scenarios: εδ = 0.5 so farms maintain trade partners for twice as long,
and εδ = 2 so partnerships last half as long as they currently do. Figure 4.14 shows
that in the case where εδ = 0.5, farms possess a larger number of trade partners,
trade more frequently and in smaller batches. This leads to reductions in farm-level
stock quantities as farms have a larger number of trade partners and those partners
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Figure 4.13: Impact of partnership formation friction on disease prevalence System-wide
disease prevalence when each farm’s partnership formation rate constant ai is scaled by various
values of εa. Vertical dashed lines represent the point at which εa is changed.
remain as partners for a longer period of time, allowing a greater level of supply
depletion before the partnership ends. When partnerships last smaller durations,
i.e. when εδ = 2, farms have fewer trade partners, trades occur less frequently and
are of larger batch size. This results in greater available supply and unmet demand,
as farms wait longer before trades occurs, leading to greater accumulation of stock.
The effect on prevalence is, again, small and considering Figure 4.15, longer lasting
partnerships result in a small increase in disease prevalence, and shorter duration
partnerships resulting in a small decrease in prevalence.
To conclude, it appears the Scottish trading system is resistant to simple changes
in farm propensities to alter trading patterns, with even substantial alterations in
network structure resulting in little to no significant changes in disease prevalence.
This is because a simple change in the frequency of trade, for example, results in
changes to farm-level stock quantities, and the system adapts itself and finds a new
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Figure 4.14: Impact of partnership durations on Scottish trading system System-averages
for various trade quantities when each farm’s partnership cessation rate constant δi is scaled by
various values of εδ. Vertical dashed lines represent the point at which εδ is changed, and horizontal
dashed lines represent respective system-wide averages for various trade quantities as obtained from
the CTS data.
network structure that mitigates the effects of these changes to trade. Such changes
to network structure in response to legislative changes to trade, and the implications
they have on disease spread, have been observed for the UK cattle trading network,
finding these changes to network structure have increased the susceptibility for dis-
ease spread on the UK network [44, 109, 115].
4.3.2 Whole batch testing and rejecting
In Chapter 3, we showed that animal batch testing through trade may be an effec-
tive strategy, though its effectiveness was dependent on both test sensitivity (the
probability that an infected animal tests positive), and the batch rejection strategy
employed. We found that whole batch rejection, whereby farms reject entire batches
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Figure 4.15: Impact of partnership durations on disease prevalence System-wide disease
prevalence when each farm’s partnership cessation rate constant δi is scaled by various values of
εδ. Vertical dashed lines represent the point at which εδ is changed.
if a single animal tests positive, was more effective than individual animal rejection,
whereby farms reject single animals if they test positive, in reducing disease preva-
lence for all test sensitivities, and could eradicate disease for smaller test sensitivities.
We now explore the potential for whole batch rejection to reduce disease prevalence
on the Scottish system for various selected test sensitivities.
Figure 4.16 shows the impact of whole batch rejection on system-wide trade quanti-
ties, with larger test sensitivities causing larger shocks to the system. In particular,
at sensitivity τ = 1, testing causes price to more than double initially, and farms
report net losses, though these shocks are temporary due to the detection of in-
fected animals and consequent rejection of batches, and trading patterns return to
pre-testing equilibrium values. Qualitatively similar behaviour is observed when
τ = 0.9, though under this sensitivity the trading system does not return to pre-
testing values as quickly. When τ = 0.5 and τ = 0.1, the trading system exhibits
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Figure 4.16: Impact of whole batch rejection on Scottish trading system System-averages
for various trade quantities when whole batch testing and rejecting is enforced, for various test
sensitivities.
long-term disturbances, with farms unable to maintain their in-flow, and increased
prices and less net income observed. Figure 4.18 shows that testing causes significant
transitory imbalances in stock levels for τ = 1 and τ = 0.9, due to the initial rejection
of batches leading to varying levels of stock depletion at farm level following a trade.
For τ = 0.5 and τ = 0.1, these imbalances are longer lasting, with large persistent
excess demand observed, though the magnitude of the disturbances are smaller for
τ = 0.1 than τ = 0.5. These different system-level responses to testing are due to
the ability for testing to remove disease. When τ = 1, all trades with infected farms
result in the batch being rejected, and infected farms cannot spread infection. This
results in rapid reduction in disease prevalence, and eventually eradication, so that
trading patterns return to pre-testing values. When τ = 0.9, we observe similar
rapid reduction in disease prevalence, however complete eradication is not possible
in the time period considered. While disease could not be fully eradicated, preva-
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Figure 4.17: Impact of whole batch rejection on disease prevalence Effect of whole batch
testing and rejecting on system-wide disease prevalence for various test sensitivities.
lence is reduced to sufficiently low levels that batch rejections become increasingly
rare and trading properties return to near pre-testing equilibrium values. In the
case where τ = 0.5 or τ = 0.1, testing still reduces disease prevalence, however test-
ing alone is insufficient in eradicating disease due to a sufficient number of infected
batches avoiding detection and allowing disease spread. This inability to eradicate
disease results in permanent disturbances to trading patterns and associated costs.
The testing and rejection of animal batches may therefore be an effective control
strategy for the Scottish cattle trade system, though only when animal tests are
of high sensitivity. For low sensitivities, disease cannot be eradicated through test-
ing alone and leads to long-term disturbances to the trading system, in particular
increased prices and lower farm net income.
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Figure 4.18: Impact of whole batch rejection on stock imbalances Impact of batch testing
and rejection for various test sensitivities on imbalances in stock quantities (left) and the ratio of
system-average demand to supply (right).
4.3.3 Whole batch testing and rejecting with a global risk
aversion strategy
Recall from Chapter 3 that risk aversion, where farms avoid farms deemed high-risk,
modulated through batch testing, was an effective combination control strategy that
could further reduce disease prevalence compared to testing alone. We now explore
the potential for a global risk aversion strategy to further reduce disease prevalence
within the Scottish cattle trade system (we omit individual-based risk aversion due
to computational limitations for a system of N = 15386 farms, and due to the fact
that the results of Chapter 3 showed global sharing of information was more effective
in reducing prevalence).
In the global aversion regime, there is a system-wide vector of weights W that
represents knowledge of the empirically determined risk level associated with each
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Figure 4.19: Impact of global risk aversion on Scottish trading system System-averages for
various trade quantities when whole batch testing and rejecting is enforced which informs a global
risk aversion strategy, for various test sensitivities.
selling farm. In this model we assume that this information is used to determine
alterations for farms to form and end trade partnerships, and to trade with a given
farm. By default the elements of W take value 1, however trades with a farm, j,
that result in detection of infected animals alter the value of weights to some value
ω (we use ω = 0.1 in all cases here to represent a large level of risk aversion). When




respectively, for all farms i. Thus, information on high-risk farms is shared through-
out the system, and all farms have a tendency to avoid such high-risk farms in
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Figure 4.20: Impact of global risk aversion on disease prevalence System-wide disease
prevalence when whole batch testing and rejecting is enforced which informs a global risk aversion
strategy, for various test sensitivities. Dashed lines represent system-wide perceived prevalence,
the fraction of the system with weight ω < 1.
similar ways. In the global aversion regime, farms are able to preemptively avoid
high-risk farms due to the sharing of information on risk, which differs from the
individual-based aversion regime, as in that case farms necessarily must directly
trade and detect an infected batch before they would deem a supplier high-risk and
alter their trading patterns. As in Chapter 3, we assume that repeat trades with
high-risk farms increase their weight in steps of ω, until the weight of the high-risk
farm returns to 1.
Introducing global risk aversion alters trading behaviour compared with testing
alone, regardless of test sensitivity. Considering Figure 4.19, global risk aversion
perturbs farm-level stock quantities to a greater degree than testing alone, with a
general increase in supply and demand, especially for test sensitivity τ = 0.1, in
which long-term consistent increases in stock are observed. This is because test-
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Figure 4.21: Impact of global risk aversion on stock imbalances Impact of batch testing and
rejection, and global risk aversion for various test sensitivities on imbalances in stock quantities
(left) and the ratio of system-average demand to supply (right).
ing creates imbalances in supply and demand, and risk aversion leads to long-term
avoidance of farms, leading to the accumulation of supply for farms deemed high-risk
and the accumulation of demand because there are fewer suppliers that buyers are
willing to trade with. The avoidance of farms is also reflected by the fact that the
introduction of testing and risk aversion cause farms to reduce their number of trade
partners, whereas an increase in the number of trade partners was observed when
testing only was introduced. As positive tests cause farms to increase the cessation
rate and decrease the formation rate of the farm from whom the batch originated,
it is not surprising that risk aversion leads to a thinning of network structure. This
is further observed in the frequency of trade, with risk aversion causing a decrease
in the number of trades, whereas testing alone caused increases in trade frequency.
Trades that do occur take larger batch sizes in the risk aversion regime than when
testing alone, and we observe similar shocks to animal flows, price, and net income
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in both regimes.
There is a noticeable effect of risk aversion on between-herd prevalence, with disease
eradicated for τ = 0.9 more quickly than through testing alone, and for τ = 0.5
disease is almost completely eradicated, highlighting the significant role risk aver-
sion could have on controlling diseases for low test sensitivities. For τ = 0.1, the
disease cannot be eradicated with the inclusion of risk aversion, but prevalence is
significantly reduced to a new equilibrium. We observe, however, that the perceived
disease prevalence, defined as the fraction of the network with a weight smaller than
1, is generally overestimated compared with actual prevalence, except when τ = 0.1
due to the poor sensitivity of testing, suggesting that our mechanism through which
weights are updated (trade) contains a lag and thus may result in altered trading
patterns for longer than is necessary. Nonetheless, a global risk aversion strategy is
clearly effective in reducing disease prevalence, and for test sensitivities for which
testing alone could not eradicate disease, there is potential for risk aversion to al-
ter trading patterns such that disease can be eradicated or prevalence significantly
reduced. This would allow the trading system to return to pre-testing (and risk
aversion) equilibrium values that is not possible through testing alone when risk
aversion allows for eradication of disease, but we note that long-term disturbances
to trade are observed when disease cannot be eradicated.
4.3.4 Whole batch testing and rejecting with a global risk
aversion strategy and discounting of risk
We attempt to reduce the lag between actual prevalence and perceived prevalence
that was observed for the global risk aversion strategy by introducing a natural,
incremental, increase to farm weights after a specified and fixed time period in
which no detected batches from a high-risk farm were detected. That is we discount
information about supplier risk levels. In Chapter 3, this was shown to not alter
disease prevalence for the global risk aversion strategy for a test sensitivity in which
disease was eradicated without this incremental weight updating, however it did
reduce the transitory perturbations of the trading system when farms regained trust
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Figure 4.22: Impact of discounting of risk on Scottish trading system System-averages for
various trade quantities when whole batch testing and rejecting is enforced which informs a global
risk aversion strategy, for various test sensitivities. High-risk farms have their weights incrementally
increased in steps of ω after a period, ∆t = 0.1, in which no batches were detected to contain an
infected animal.
quickly. We apply this to the Scottish trading system and assume ω = 0.1 and
weights update in steps of ω after a chosen time period ∆t = 0.1 (corresponding to
roughly one month) in which no batch was detected positive. Weights continue to
be incremented (globally) through trade as before.
Considering Figure 4.22, qualitatively similar behaviour is observed for τ = 0.9 when
natural weight increments are introduced, though the initial shocks to supply and
demand are less severe, as farm weights update more quickly. Generally, the system
returns to pre-testing equilibrium values more quickly than in the scenario where
there is no discounting of information on supplier risk, which may be understood by
considering Figure 4.23, noting that the perceived prevalence for τ = 0.9 matches
the actual prevalence to a greater degree than in the case without risk discounting
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Figure 4.23: Impact of discounting of risk on disease prevalence System-wide disease preva-
lence when whole batch testing and rejecting is enforced which informs a global risk aversion strat-
egy, for various test sensitivities. High-risk farms have their weights incrementally increased in
steps of ω after a period, ∆t = 0.1, in which no batches were detected to contain an infected
animal.
(see Figure 4.20). For τ = 0.5 and τ = 0.1, natural increments to weights appear to
negatively impact the effect of risk aversion, with the system once again exhibiting
long-term disturbances to trading patterns. This is because of the increased dis-
ease prevalence compared with no discounting of risk. In addition, in this case the
perceived prevalence is now underestimated, so farms are less risk averse than they
should be. Thus incorporating a natural regaining of trust via time-dependent in-
crements to weights can be effective in reducing unnecessary burden on the trading
system for test sensitivities that permit eradication of disease, however care must be
taken for lower test sensitivities, as this regaining of trust may detrimentally impact
the success of risk aversion and cause longer-run persistence of disease and strain on
the trading system.
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Figure 4.24: Impact of discounting of risk on stock imbalances Impact of batch testing and
rejection, and global risk aversion with natural increments to weights for various test sensitivities
on imbalances in stock quantities (left) and the ratio of system-average demand to supply (right).
4.4 Discussion
In this chapter, we outlined the challenges of parameterising our highly dynamic gen-
erative trading model to the Scottish cattle trading system, owing to the presence of
time-varying farm-level stock quantities in our model that are not observable in the
data. By initiating the parameterisation from an assumed starting point taken from
the parameterisation of the model described in Chapter 2, we showed our method for
obtaining farm-level parameters for ai and bi, the frictional components of partner-
ship formation and trade, respectively, can lead to parameterisations that represent
distributional properties of the Scottish trading system, as well as capturing farm-
level trading dynamics to a remarkable level of accuracy, especially considering the
relative simplicity of the model. This method, however, is computationally intensive
as it requires simulation of the system, followed by a reevaluation of ai and bi for
each farm, followed by subsequent simulations using these updated values. More-
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over, it does not define an explicit relationship between farm-level trading patterns
and farm-level supply and demand. To our knowledge this model represents the
first attempt at developing and parameterising a highly dynamic generative trading
model. With the parameterisation developed here it has been shown that it is possi-
ble to explore the dynamics of trade in ways that have, up to now, not been possible
using current modelling approaches, such as the conceptually simple approach of
representing observed cattle movements as a snapshotted temporal network. Cur-
rent approaches to modelling livestock trading dynamics are limited to generation
of trade events on existing trade partnership networks. However, our generative
model goes beyond current models by including dynamic trading partnerships, and
parameterising at farm-level [58, 87] and can be used to explore the response of the
trading system to a wide range of proposed disease control measures, including those
studied here.
Extending our parameterised trading model to account for disease spread via trade
for a disease characterised by farm-level prevalence λ = 0.25 and recovery rate γ =
1/3, representing a high prevalence, highly persistent disease, we showed that under
current Scottish trading patterns, the disease is expected to persist at a between-
herd prevalence of approximately 55%. We first explored the potential for changes
to the propensities for farms to form and end partnerships, and to make trades
and showed that our model under the Scottish parameterisations predicts similar
qualitative behaviour as the homogeneous model in Chapter 3, with the trading
system adapting to increased (or reduced) frictions such that the network structure
changes to maintain farm flows. As a result, disease prevalence is largely unaltered
by such changes to trade propensities. This is in direct contradiction of the results
of the model of Chapter 2, which suggested such changes could be highly effective,
and also of current generative trading models, which have suggested reductions to
trade (and compensatory increased batch sizes) could reduce disease prevalence [87].
Our results highlight that trade is complex and dynamic, and farm response to
alterations to trade can have unexpected consequences for disease spread. This has
been observed previously, with legislative changes to trade following the 2001 FMD
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outbreak altering the UK cattle trade network in such a way that it has been shown
the UK network is now more susceptible to disease spread [44, 109, 115], further
emphasising the need for trading models that can accurately explore the role of
trade on disease spread.
Including animal batch testing and rejection was shown to be an effective control
measure against persistent endemic disease spread, with eradication or near erad-
ication for high test sensitivities, and significant reductions possible for lower test
sensitivities. The impact of such tests on the trading system, however, was clearly
visible, with large, short-term, disturbances to trade for sensitivities in which disease
could be eradicated, and long-term persistent alterations to trade for sensitivities
that did not eradicate disease. Thus testing alone through traded animal batches
may be insufficient in eradicating diseases such as paraTB, a disease for which the
commonly used ELISA test has notoriously variable test sensitivities [60, 120]. We
also note that for paraTB, it has been shown on a dataset of animal movements in
France that typical control measures such as animal testing of trade animals may
be insufficient in eradicating the disease [13].
We extended our testing regime by linking it to a global risk aversion strategy, where
farms share a common pool of information regarding high-risk farms. Farm risk
aversion, where farmers avoid high-risk farms is observed as a behaviour related to
avoidance of bTB infection [21, 35] and more generally risk aversion has been shown
to be effective in controlling disease [41]. We incorporated risk aversion through
changes to farms’ propensities to form and end partnerships, and make trades, with
farms deemed high-risk by scaling the appropriate rates by a weight, ω. Risk aversion
employed in this manner was shown to be highly effective at eradicating disease, and
near complete removal of disease was possible for test sensitivities for which testing
alone could not eradicate disease. However, it generally resulted in an overestimated
perceived prevalence, leading to unnecessarily long disturbances to trade. In an
attempt to mitigate this, we introduced a natural regaining of “trust”, or discounting
of risk, in which weights incrementally increased after some period of time in which
no infected batches were detected. For high test sensitivities, this was shown to be an
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effective supplement to risk aversion, allowing for complete eradication of disease. In
addition perceived disease prevalence matched actual disease prevalence, minimising
the duration of disturbances to trade. For lower test sensitivities, however, the
same rate of discounting of risk was shown to detrimentally impact risk aversion,
preventing disease eradication and causing ongoing disturbances to trading patterns.
While this dynamic model represents the first attempt at developing a parameter-
imised model of the Scottish cattle trade, there is scope for extension. We chose not
to include animal markets, though animal flows through these premises are main-
tained in our parameterisation as we treat farm-to-market movements as transitory,
and replace them with the resultant farm-to-farm movements. As markets generally
do not operate permanently, including them in our model is challenging as their
presence must be accounted for in our parameterisation. Moreover, it is unclear
whether our supply and demand based trading model can accurately account for
market dynamics, an issue highlighted in previous generative trade models [58]. Fi-
nally, while we generally assume that we are modelling endemic diseases, for which
markets may not be as influential, for epidemic diseases such as FMD, markets are
known to play a significant role [45]. In terms of our method of parameterisation,
while we showed that our parameterisation could capture farm-level dynamics to a
very high degree, it was less successful for farms that trade very infrequently, and in
general simulation of our parameterised system predicted smaller batch sizes than is
observed in the data. The limited number of observed trading events for such farms
is likely to make and parameterisation challenging. Nonetheless, development of a
more rigorous method for parameterising the system at farm-level is a natural next
step, as this may allow for a deeper understanding of the nature of farms’ trading




5.1 Aims of the thesis
The general aim of this thesis was to expand and develop generative trading models
of cattle trade, an area of research currently lacking, and explore the role of trade on
disease spread. These generative models are an attempt to extend current modelling
approaches of livestock trade, in which large-scale datasets are employed to replay a
network of animal movements as either a static or temporally snapshotted network,
and simulation of a simulated disease process modulated by the observed animal
movements.
The thesis aimed to answer the following questions: 1) can analytically tractable
generative models of livestock trade be developed that capture farm-level proper-
ties? Yes, in Chapter 2 we presented such a model that was amenable to theoretical
analysis, and parameterisation to the Scottish cattle trade system was achieved using
the Cattle Tracing System (CTS) dataset; 2) can the dynamics of trade be exploited
in such a way that disease persistence is reduced while maintaining farm-level ani-
mal flows? Yes, the trade properties of farms in the model of Chapter 2 could be
manipulated to conserve farm-flows, and it was shown that this could reduce R0,
the basic reproductive number, across a range of diseases; 3) can these models be
expanded to account for time-varying farm-level stock quantities, dictating trading
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patterns? Yes, the model of Chapters 3 and 4 were an extension of the model of
Chapter 2 and incorporated farm-level supply and demand, altering the rates at
which farms formed new trade partnerships and trade at a given time, though at
the loss of analytical tractability; 4) do changes to trade affect stock quantities to
such an extent that the trading system fundamentally changes? Yes, the model of
Chapters 3 and 4 were highly dynamic, and changes to farm trading patterns lead
to network adaptation as farms attempted to minimise their demand and maintain
animal flows; 5) under such scenarios, how does network adaptation impact disease
spread? It was found in Chapters 3 and 4 that network adaptation nullifies the
potential disease reducing benefits of changes to trading patterns, except in extreme
scenarios where trade is essentially halted; 6) how do traditional disease control
measures, such as animal testing, impact the trading network, and how does that
affect disease spread? Testing of trade animal batches was shown to be effective in
reducing disease prevalence for certain test sensitivities. Test-and-slaughter strate-
gies caused transitory disturbances to system-wide trading patterns when testing
could remove disease, and permanent disturbances when testing could not fully re-
move disease. Risk aversion strategies were shown to be an effective supplemental
behavioural change in response to detection of infected animals, further reducing
disease prevalence. A global aversion strategy was found to be more effective than
an individual-based aversion strategy; 7) when applied to the Scottish cattle trade
industry, do these results hold, and if so can effective disease control strategies be
proposed? Yes, simple changes to trading propensities alter the Scottish trading sys-
tem but do not yield significant reductions in disease prevalence. Control measures
such as batch testing and risk aversion can significantly reduce (or eradicate) dis-
ease even for low test sensitivities, though cause disturbances to system-wide trading
patterns.
For complex systems and intractable problems, there is often no one approach to
best suggest solutions. However, understanding the dynamics of the system, includ-
ing how key factors interact enable proposed interventions to be designed, tested for
unexpected outcomes, and combined in ways that may yield significant insight to be
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made in addressing challenging problems. In this thesis we have developed an ap-
proach to modelling complex trading patterns and shown that the resulting models
provide a good representation of the highly complex Scottish cattle trading system.
Application of our models to putative disease control measures provide useful un-
derstanding of their potential impacts, including unintended outcomes that mitigate
against desired goal of disease prevalence reduction. These models therefore confirm
that control of endemic disease is a complex problem, but provide tools that may
enable more intelligent design and combinations of interventions to address it.
We now discuss the results of each chapter in more detail.
5.1.1 Chapter 2
In Chapter 2 a heterogeneous trading model was introduced in which farms pos-
sessed a dynamic list of trading partners from whom they exclusively purchase an-
imals. This model was analytically tractable and applying the methods of [6] we
were able to derive a per-farm expression for the diseases basic reproductive number,
defined as Ri0. This expression highlighted the role of the dynamic nature of trade
partnerships and trade on disease spread that does not appear to have been consid-
ered previously. Using the expression, it was shown that manipulation of farm-level
trading propensities while maintaining animal in-flows were an effective method of
reducing Ri0, with sufficient changes to trade patterns capable of bringing R
i
0 be-
low 1, the critical threshold value that destabilises the endemic disease equilibrium.
We applied our methods to the Scottish subset of the CTS dataset over the years
2005-2013, and showed that per-farm parameterisations could be obtained such that
farm-level trading properties were matched, along with system-level distributional
properties. Analysis of changes to trading patterns on this parameterised system via
Ri0 were shown to significantly reduce R
i
0. In particular, encouraging fewer, longer
lasting trade partnerships, with fewer trades of larger batch size could reduce Ri0
significantly, especially for high farm prevalence, highly persistent diseases; the dis-
eases that are typically challenging to control. Moreover, targeted trading changes
to the largest farms were shown to be highly effective in reducing disease persistence,
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more so than traditional biosecurity control measures.
5.1.2 Chapter 3
The model of Chapter 2 assumed that a farm’s trading behaviour was not altered by
the effects of trade events, i.e. it did not account for fluctuations in farm-level supply
and demand. However, this is not realistic for the real-world Scottish cattle trading
system as time-varying trading patterns are readily observable, e.g. burstiness of
trade events. We therefore extended the model of Chapter 2 by including farm-
level stock quantities, defined as supply and demand, that accumulated at constant
rate and were depleted via trades. We incorporated demand satiation and supply
depletion at a farm-level by modelling rates of trade partnership formation and trade
as functions of farms’ dynamically varying demand and the selling farms’ supplies.
Thus, farms trade and form trade partnerships more frequently when demand is
high, but demand is satisfied through trade, leading to demand satiation resulting
in farms’ trading behaviour (tendency to form trade partnerships and trade) altering.
Our generative models go beyond current state-of-the-art by dynamically modelling
stock levels and allowing these to influence event rates by incorporating farm stock
levels into our model rates [58, 87]. However we lost analytical tractability due
to discontinuities in model rates and farm-level stock quantities at a given time
could not be expressed in a closed-form expression. A simple pricing model (similar
to the pricing model of [87]) was included into our model, that satisfied simple
macroeconomic supply-demand principles, as a mechanism for controlling global
stock imbalances, finding that without a pricing model, small imbalances in global
stock levels could lead to cascading and long-term imbalances. The inclusion of a
pricing model was also desirable to measure the potential financial impact on the
system of changes to trade.
The dynamic nature of our model was explored by manipulating farm-level trad-
ing propensities. We found that the trading system would adapt itself in response
to these alterations, and network structure would change so that new avenues of
trade were found which minimised the effect of changes to trading propensities such
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that farm-level unmet demand was minimised and farm flows were maintained. The
robustness of the trading system to instantaneous shocks to stock levels was investi-
gated, finding the model would rapidly adjust to these shocks, leading to temporary
surges in trade, but with the system quickly returning to pre-shock equilibrium
values. The exception was when demand was perturbed significantly, with the sys-
tem finding a new equilibrium in which farm-level demand was slightly larger than
pre-shock equilibrium values.
Disease spread via trade was included in the model, and similar changes to trade
propensities as in Chapter 2 were made to explore the impact of the dynamic adap-
tation of the model on disease spread. Changing the propensities for farms to form
and end partnerships, and make trades was found to be largely ineffective in reduc-
ing disease prevalence, except in extreme cases where either trade effectively halted,
or the network dissolved. These findings were in direct contradiction of the results of
Chapter 2, which showed these changes to trade were highly effective, and highlight
the dynamic nature of trade and the challenges of effectively modelling livestock
trading systems.
We introduced animal batch testing, a common control strategy for diseases such as
bTB and paraTB [4, 123], and considered two animal rejection strategies: removing
individual animals that test positive, and removing entire batches if a single infected
animal is detected. Testing in this way is similar to post-movement testing, and
while we did not consider pre-movement testing, this can be incorporated into the
model. As expected, the greater the test sensitivity, the more effective both testing
strategies were in reducing disease prevalence, however whole batch rejection always
leads to greater reductions in prevalence and could eradicate disease at lower test
sensitivities. Animal rejection naturally leads to imbalances in global stock levels, as
buyers accept only animals that do not test positive for disease in a batch, and our
dynamic model allowed us to explore the effect on trade that these imbalances cause;
an analysis that, to our knowledge, has not been performed before using standard
livestock trade modelling approaches. Both individual and whole batch rejection lead
to disturbances to trading patterns, and the magnitude of these disturbances were,
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in general, larger for whole batch rejection. These disturbances were permanent for
test sensitivities for which post-movement testing was unable to eradicate disease,
and transitory when testing could eradicate disease.
An adaptive risk aversion strategy was incorporated that was influenced by ani-
mal testing; farms would adjust their trading propensities towards farms that were
deemed high-risk. We explored two risk aversion strategies, an individual-based
strategy, whereby farms possessed a list of farms that they identified as high-risk,
i.e. from whom they had detected infected animals, and a global strategy whereby
the trading system shared and contributed towards a global list of farms that were
deemed high-risk. High-risk farms were assigned a weight that altered the rates at
which farms would form and end partnerships, and make trades, and risk aversion
was shown to be an effective supplemental control strategy that further reduced dis-
ease prevalence compared with testing alone. Risk aversion altered the disturbances
to the trading system compared with only testing, as testing alone did not alter
the propensities for farms to trade with high-risk farms (except due to stock deple-
tion), whereas risk aversion caused farms to avoid these high-risk farms, leading to a
reduction in network connectivity. Both aversion strategies lead to disease eradica-
tion at lower test sensitivities than testing alone, however a global aversion strategy
was shown to be more effective than individual-based aversion allowing for disease
eradication at even lower test sensitivities. This was due to farms being able to
preemptively avoid high-risk farms, whereas for the individual-based aversion farms
necessarily had to trade with farms before they could be deemed high-risk. While
risk aversion was effective at reducing prevalence, farms generally overestimated
their “perceived” prevalences, i.e. the fraction of the system that were deemed high-
risk, which lead to unnecessarily long disturbances to trading patterns. To mitigate
this, we incorporated a natural regaining of “trust”, or discounting of risk, allowing
for weights of high-risk farms to incrementally increase after some period in which
no animal or batch were detected to have infection. We evaluated this for a test
prevalence in which global aversion allowed for complete removal of disease, and for
which individual aversion lead to near eradication. For the global aversion strategy,
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natural increments to weights were found to not alter long-run disease prevalence,
but did cause smaller disturbances to trading patterns, especially when weights were
updated quickly. On the other hand, for individual-based aversion, the same rate of
discounting of risk was shown to be detrimental and lead to increased disease preva-
lence. Both aversion strategies have the potential for reducing prevalence, however
a system-wide aversion scheme appears to be a highly effective surveillance system
supplementing animal testing that could reduce disease prevalence, even for low test
sensitivities.
5.1.3 Chapter 4
The model analysed in Chapter 3 was parameterised for a small homogeneous sys-
tem of farms. However, real-world trade networks display a large degree of hetero-
geneity, including scale-free like distributions across farms int he case of livestock
trading systems [22, 84, 113]. The challenges of parametersing our dynamic trading
model for the Scottish trading system via the CTS data was presented, the main
challenge being that the model rates were functions of farm-level supply and de-
mand, which are unobserved in the data. We chose to use an iterative method to
parameterise our model, where each farm is parameterised by an iterative method
starting from an initial parameterisation (we chose to use the parameterisation used
for the model in Chapter 2). The system was then simulated, and average values
for per-farm trading quantities were compared with their values in the data. The
factor differences between simulation and data for each farm were used to inform a
new parameterisation, the system was re-simulated and the process repeated. This
method was computationally intensive, requiring multiple iterations to obtain ap-
propriate parameterisations. In addition, our method was inefficient in obtaining
parameterisations for farms that trade very infrequently, as these farms are sensitive
to stochasticity in the simulation. However, it should also be noted that the data
contain relatively few events and by implication limited data for such farms. Further
refinement of this parameterisation method is an avenue for future work. Neverthe-
less, we were able to obtain a parameterisation that represented the trading patterns
of the Scottish system to a very high degree, both at system-level and farm-level.
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Introducing disease spread via trade into our parameterised system, we explored the
effects of similar changes to trading propensities on prevalence as in Chapter 3. Our
results conformed to the results of Chapter 3, finding that the system adapted to
changes in trading propensity so that animal flows were maintained, which lead to
minimal reductions in disease prevalence. Even for trading patterns that the model
of Chapter 2 predicted would lead to increased incidence, for example increased net-
work connectivity, more frequent trades, and smaller batch sizes, there were only
very small increases in disease prevalence. We posit that the Scottish trading sys-
tem is currently operating with very low friction, and fundamental alterations to
the system would be required to reduce disease prevalence without other disease
control strategies. However, as with many complex systems it may be that multiple
interventions could yield useful benefits.
Whole batch testing and rejection was included and shown to be an effective control
strategy at reducing disease prevalence, but could not eradicate disease except for
high test sensitivities. For all test sensitivities, the introduction of batch testing
resulted in disturbances to the trading system caused by imbalances in farm stock
levels that testing resulted in (in a trade, the buying farm accepts either the whole
batch if all animals test negative for infection, or the batch is rejected if a single
animal tests positive, but the supply of the selling farm depletes by the batch size
regardless of whether the batch is accepted or rejected by the buying farm). For
test sensitivities in which disease was eradicated (or very close to eradication), these
disturbances were temporary and the trading system would return to pre-testing
equilibrium values. When testing could not eradicate disease, these disturbances
were permanent and the trading system would find a new stable trading equilib-
rium. We linked animal testing to a behavioural response by introducing the global
risk aversion strategy outlined in Chapter 3. As in Chapter 3, the introduction of
risk aversion altered the trading patterns of farms compared to testing alone, and
was again highly effective in reducing disease prevalence, with disease eradication
possible for test sensitivities that did not permit eradication through testing alone,
and substantial reductions for very low test sensitivities (though eradication was
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still not possible in these cases). As with animal testing, when risk aversion could
not eradicate disease, there were permanent disturbances to trading patterns, such
as increased prices, lower farm net income, and farms were not able to fully meet
their in-flow requirements. For test sensitivities in which testing combined with
risk aversion could eradicate disease, farms generally overestimated the risk of dis-
ease, and perceived prevalences were generally higher than the actual prevalence.
The discounting of risk as in Chapter 3 was included, and similar behaviour was
observed for the parameterised system. For high test sensitivities, disease could
still be eradicated and perceived prevalence more closely matched the actual preva-
lence, minimising the disruption to the trading system that testing and risk aversion
caused. For lower test sensitivities, there was a detrimental impact on prevalence
reduction, with disease no longer able to be eradicated for middling test sensitivi-
ties, and the effect of risk aversion was largely mitigated for low test sensitivities,
resulting in further disruptions to the trading system.
5.2 The role of trade in disease spread
The models presented in this thesis are the first attempt at developing new tools in
analysing the role and effect of trade on livestock diseases, with case studies applied
to the Scottish cattle trading system by parameterising our models to the Scottish
subset of the CTS dataset. With the recent development of network theory and the
increasing availability of large, rich datasets of animal movements, typical models
of livestock trade have consisted of replicating observed animal movements and ob-
serving a simulated process modulated through these movements, finding that trade
(specifically the movement of infected animals between herds) is a significant risk
factor to the spread and maintenance of livestock diseases [13, 37, 39, 46, 51, 71, 97,
98]. These modelling approaches have identified potential avenues for exploiting the
highly heterogeneous nature of trade, with targeted rewiring of network connections
based on network-level properties such as centrality measures, or by rewiring move-
ments away from particular holdings shown to be reduce disease prevalence [43, 85,
117]. In addition, effectively removing certain connections in the network has been
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shown to alter the structure of the network and the size of the giant component in a
way that may be effective in reducing disease persistence [62, 63]. However, assessing
the impact of these alterations to trade on farm-level properties, such as maintaining
animal flows or minimising demand, or on system-level properties such as price, is
challenging using these modelling approaches as they are typically constrained by the
models designed around fixed observed animal movements. It has previously been
shown that alterations to farm trading patterns in response to legislative changes
intended to control disease or in response to a disease outbreak (for example the
2001 UK FMD outbreak) can have unintended consequences on the structure of the
trading network, leading to increased susceptibility to disease spread [44, 109, 115],
highlighting the need for the development of trading models that can incorporate
business considerations of farms that may influence trading behaviour.
We have developed novel generative trading models, in which the trading system
grows and develops based on farm-level trading characteristics, for which there is a
pressing need in general [57], and when parameterised to the Scottish cattle trading
system represent, to our knowledge, the first attempt at analysing trade and its
effect on disease spread on a national scale for a highly heterogeneous system using
a systems modelling approach. There have been very few attempts at developing
generative models within livestock trading, and none applied to Scotland, and these
models have focused primarily on trading dynamics, with small consideration to
disease spread. Moreover, simplifying assumptions such as constant trade networks,
rates of trade, and homogeneity cannot capture the complexity and time-varying
nature of livestock movement patterns [58, 87]. The generative model outlined in
Chapter 3, and parameterised for the Scottish trading system in Chapter 4, was ef-
fective in showing the potential for a generative modelling framework, yielding new
insight into how farms may adapt their trading behaviour in response to alterations
in trading propensities. Our generative models are effective in capturing the com-
plexities and nuance of livestock trade, and show that simple alterations to trading
patterns may not yield expected changes to disease prevalence, as farms dynamically
alter their trading behaviour, a phenomena that may not be easily understood using
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typical network-based approaches. In addition, the effect of typical disease control
measures, such as post-movement testing, and the response of the trading system to
such measures can be analysed using our generative modelling approach, to inform
potential intervention strategies that reduce prevalence while minimising farm- and
system-level disturbances to trade.
5.3 Extensions and future work
Our generative modelling framework is a flexible tool allowing for the modelling of
trade and disease spread, and the effect of control strategies and alterations to trade
can be incorporated into the model. There are a number of elements of real-world
trading systems that we have not included in our models, and the inclusion of some
of these will be the focus of future work. Firstly, we have neglected any spatial
component to our trading models, for example farms preferentially buying/selling
to nearby farms, with farms’ decisions on who to farm trade partnerships and trade
with dictated entirely by current stock quantities. While the presence of markets
facilitates long-range animal movements, it has been observed that cattle in the
UK, for example, generally travel short distances via movements in their lifetime
[113]. The comparison between the dynamic model presented in Chapters 3 and 4
and an amended model in which distance influenced trades between farms would
be informative, both when considering the differences in disease prevalence and how
distance-based movements impact the dynamics of the trading system. The 2001
UK FMD epidemic is an example of a disease outbreak in which long- and short-
range animal movements contributed to the magnitude of the outbreak; long-range
movements via animal markets were primarily responsible for the initial nationwide
spread, with subsequent local movements considered responsible for the maintenance
of the disease [45].
External sources of infection, such as wildlife reservoirs, is a natural future inclusion
to our models, as we have considered the spread of disease solely through trade
throughout this thesis. For example, the presence of infected badgers, which can
act as environmental reservoirs of bTB [103], is suspected of increasing herd-levels
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risk of infection of bTB [82], with the UK having higher badger densities than
mainland Europe [18], although Scotland does have lower densities than the rest of
the UK [61]. The impact of persistent external sources of infection into herds on
the control measures outlined in this thesis is a promising area for future work, and
one that can be facilitated within our modelling framework. In particular, while
we showed in Chapters 3 and 4 that simple changes to farm trading propensities
was unsuccessful in eradicating disease except in extreme cases where the system
fundamentally changes, it would be interesting to explore how such changes, when
combined with distance-based trading as above, may effect the ability for local high-
risk areas of infection from wildlife to spread disease to low-risk areas of infection
from wildlife.
A simplifying assumption of our models is to treat farms as a unit, that is to say
we do not track individual animals. As the CTS dataset contains the identification
and movement records of individual animals, there is scope to extend our model
to incorporate individual animals. As we treats as a single unit, we assume that
infected farms maintain a constant herd-level prevalence throughout its infectious
lifetime, however herd demographics (such as births and deaths) and animal move-
ments (infected animals may be introduced or leave the farm) may cause prevalence
to fluctuate. Our disease model could be considered a “worst-case” scenario, due to
farms maintaining their herd-level prevalence regardless of the frequency and size
animal movements. An individual-based trading model has previously shown that
increasing animal movements could be beneficial to reducing disease persistence, if
combined with constant animal tests during these movements [106]. As we neglect
herd demographics such as herd size, interpreting farm-level supply and demand can
be challenging, and we have considered these quantities as a measure of inefficiency
in farms’ abilities to completely satisfy their demand, and also to measure the po-
tential impact on farms caused by changes to trading patterns and disease control
strategies. Our analysis and parameterisation of the Scottish cattle trade system
further highlighted that these stock quantities should not be taken as representative
of herd demographics, with some farms having extremely large supply and demand
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at any given time, and their values were more a consequence of farm-level trading
patterns rather than an indicator of herd size.
We have considered the impacts of disease control measures both on disease preva-
lence and also on the trading system, however there are a number of intervention
strategies that we have not considered but can be analysed using our generative
modelling framework. While alterations to trading propensities were explored as a
potential alternative to movement restrictions, movement restrictions are a common
control strategy in response to the detection of disease. For example, in the 2001
and 2007 UK FMD outbreaks, nationwide movement restrictions were imposed to
minimise the spread of disease causing widespread disruption to farms and incurring
large economic costs [7, 45, 116]. Moreover, following the relaxation of these restric-
tions, animal movements were atypical as farms attempted to offload larger amounts
of stock and to recuperate losses due to slaughter [19, 116]. Movement restrictions
can be incorporated into our generative trading model, and the inclusion of farm-
level stock quantities allow for both a measurement on the stress of these restrictions
on farms, but will also influence short- and perhaps long-term trading behaviour fol-
lowing the relaxation of restrictions. Initial exploration (not shown in the thesis) of
simple movement restrictions have suggested that the success of system-wide restric-
tions depends entirely on whether disease can be eradicated during the time period
of restrictions. If the disease is not eradicated before restrictions are lifted, large
surges of trade due to accumulation of stock result in prevalence rapidly returning
to pre-restriction levels. More work is required on behavioural changes of farms in
response to restrictions, e.g. less generation of supply and demand, to fully under-
stand the effect of restrictions on disease spread, but is a potentially economically
important area of study due to the large disruptions nationwide restrictions create.
We explored risk-based trading through an adaptive risk-aversion strategy, modu-
lated through the testing of traded animals. A natural extension of such approaches
is to model so-called risk-based trading schemes. There has been little modelling of
such schemes, however the introduction of trading schemes based on bTB score cards
has been shown to potentially reduce the number of infected animals purchased from
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high-risk farms [3]. Our generative modelling framework is well suited to exploration
the potential of similar trading schemes on control of disease, but also on the finan-
cial burden on farms and their ability to maintain animal flows and meet demand.
Considerations such as minimum scheme size necessary to maintain farm-level de-
mand, critical scheme sizes at which disease can be maintained within the scheme,
and the development of “smart” schemes in which trading schemes partition at crit-
ical sizes so that potential disease persistence within the scheme is prevented are all
future areas of work that may help inform the effectiveness of trading schemes and
inform potential future policy when applied to real-world cattle trading systems.
Our dynamic models of Chapters 3 and 4 were analytically intractable and required
extensive use of simulation. A challenge, and area of future work, is developing a
theoretical framework to allow for similar theoretical analyses of the model as was
presented in Chapter 2.
We conclude by noting that while we have focused on cattle trading systems, our
generative models are not confined to such systems, and can potentially be adapted
to other dynamic systems, for example computer networks and the spread of viruses
in data packets. The current COVID-19 pandemic has shed light on the devastating
impact diseases can have on human health and national economies, and the role of
control strategies that minimise contacts between individuals on preventing disease
spread. Our model has the potential to be adapted to human contact networks and
could be an invaluable tool in quantifying the risks of certain contact patterns and
the economic and financial impacts to individuals on typical control strategies, and
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